



Fieldnotes from an Arctic “Bazaar”

Report on the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly, Reykjavik, Iceland



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“The Arctic Circle assembly ... serve[s] an important function in the Arctic governance system as a ‘bazaar’ for the exchange of global and marginalised knowledge, ideas and interests.”

- Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds, “Bazaar Governance: Situating the Arctic Circle,” in *Governing Arctic Change* (2017).

“Everyone is entitled to their own opinion. They are not entitled to their own facts.”

- 2019 Arctic Circle Award recipient John Kerry quoting the late US senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

From 11-13 October 2019, Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer participated in the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly (ACA) in Reykjavik, Iceland, representing NAADSN. This report is not intended as a comprehensive summary of the ACA, but seeks to summarize and reflect upon selected discussions of potential interest to NAADSN members.

Canada's North: Economic Development Now and for the Future

This panel, organized by Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and moderated by **Jutta Wark** (Director, Nordic & Polar Affairs at GAC), featured **David Sproule**, Senior Arctic Official & Director General for Arctic, Eurasian, and European Affairs, GAC; **Brian Burke**, Executive Director, Nunavut Fisheries Association; **Heather Bourassa**, Jane Glassco Northern Fellow and co-owner of a general contracting business in Fort Good Hope, NWT; and **Shaleen Woodward**, Deputy Secretary Indigenous and Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of the NWT. Sproule provided an overview of the Government of Canada's priorities, including innovation and technological advancement, Canadian capabilities and expertise in the Arctic, and opportunities associated with the tourism, fishery, and cultural industry sectors.

Burke promoted fisheries in Inuit Nunangat as a renewable, sustainable resource sector in Inuit Nunangat which employs more than 300 Inuit in harvesting and processing. All of the fishing companies in his association are owned by communities and/or regional Inuit organizations, bringing various returns to their communities (from wages to research on potential inshore fisheries). He discerned various opportunities for future growth, including increasing the Northern share of adjacent allocations, and evaluating and developing the potential of inshore community fisheries (eg. Pangnirtung's lucrative winter ice fishery for turbot) not only for export but to bolster Inuit food security. Significant challenges to growth and sustainability include:

- Infrastructure deficits: There is no deepwater port on the Baffin Coast to unload fish (and thus no onshore employment, which instead is in Greenland and Newfoundland where fish can be unloaded). Qikiqtarjuaq, which has no tidal issues, holds the potential for a deep water port. There is a well-established need for more small craft harbours in communities throughout Inuit Nunangat. Furthermore, the NFA members' commercial fishing fleet is aging and requires renewal.
- The need to expand and support scientific research on fisheries, including traditional knowledge / Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ).
- The need to strike a balance between development and protection, based on science and TK, with expanded discussion about marine protected areas (MPAs) and concomitant fishery closures.

Bourassa spoke from the community perspective, providing deep insights into some of the challenges associated with Northern economic development. She explained various challenges associated with human resource capacity in communities with small populations wherein it is difficult to find suitable people for industries like construction (with seasonal employment) when competing with full-time employment such as policing and nursing. Furthermore, the Northern resource sector is still marked by boom-bust cycles, where companies have to scale up quickly to meet demand but then have to manage high overhead when activity slows. Finally, she explained the need for flexibility to accommodate lifestyles where Indigenous people balance work schedules with traditional land-based activities.

Woodward spoke to the importance of creating jobs *in* communities, which will be facilitated by investments such as fibre optic cable (which will improve connectivity and economic diversification). She also emphasized infrastructure deficits, including the need to create and maintain different roads in

different seasons, and to balance use of winter roads and waterways for communities without year-round road access. Woodward also held out opportunities for promoting tourism beyond the major population centres (including Indigenous tourism), as well as for fisheries and agriculture to help address food security. During the question and answer period, she conceptualized infrastructure as a “force multiplier,” where strategic investments will lead to wider effects. The political challenge, however, is grappling with the reality that major investments in one region do not bring direct benefits to other regions, thus making it difficult to secure pan-territorial support for expensive, strategic projects. She also noted that women in the NWT are often better educated than men, and that 60% of GNWT employees are women.

Greenland Moving Towards Independence: Political and Global Security Policy Challenges

Canada’s eastern neighbour, Greenland (population 57,000), is looking to resource development as a way to transform its economy. International mining companies – including several Chinese – are exploring the island for minerals they hope will become more accessible as the ice cover retreats on both Greenland and its surrounding waters. These developments are particularly interesting in light of the 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government, the preamble of which recognizes Greenlanders (who are predominantly Inuit) as a people with rights to self-determination under international law. “A principal objective of introducing self-government has been to facilitate the transfer of additional authority, and thus responsibility, to Greenlandic authorities in fields where this is constitutionally possible and based on the principle of accordance between rights and obligations,” the Danish Statsministeriet notes. Although foreign, security, and defence policy remains with Copenhagen, the Greenlandic government will assume greater responsibility for law enforcement and transportation. Most significantly, the act has “radically changed” Danish-Greenlandic relations regarding mineral resource activities. The Greenland Self-Government authorities assumed the right to use the mineral resources found in the subsoil effective January 1, 2010, and will accrue revenues from these activities.

Most commentators believe that full Greenlandic independence remains decades away, suggesting that most Greenlanders take a long view as well and assume that “the long-term objective of independence relies almost mechanically on harnessing the region’s enormous mineral potential on land and at sea” (Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen, *New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region*, 2012, p.78). Greenland is resource rich but capital poor and China is the obvious suitor. For many in Greenland, however, the fear is that Chinese investment will overwhelm this tiny aspiring nation. With less than half the population of Prince Edward Island, Greenland will not be able to provide the necessary labour for this new industry. Foreign companies have, therefore, accepted the need for imported workers (including Chinese labour crews) to operate the mines.

Greenland’s March 2013 parliamentary elections reaffirmed the controversial nature of this issue. The *Guardian* on 15 March 2013 reported that “voters in Greenland feared that ministers were surrendering their country’s interests to China and foreign multinationals and called an end this week to the government of Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist.” The pro-development Kleist was replaced as premier by Aleqa Hammond and her center-left Siumut party who promised a more careful scrutiny of foreign investment and its impact on Greenlandic lifestyles and human rights. Still, Hammond’s election did not represent a decisive change in direction. In October 2013, the Siumut government took the critical step

of removing Greenland's long-standing ban on uranium mining. In 2014, this pro-development stance was reaffirmed in another Greenlandic general election. The Inuit Ataqatigiit, Greenland's leading opposition party, campaigned against uranium production and pledged to reinstate the ban. The victory of Siumut, which formed a government with the support of pro-mining parties Demokraatit and Atassut, represented a significant vote of confidence in resource development.

The future of Greenland arose as a regular topic of discussion and debate at the 2019 ACA. Sessions on "Greenland's Emerging Foreign Policy Questions," "Increasing Engagement between the Greenland and U.S. Research Communities – Bridging the Gap," and a plenary on "Greenland: 'Open for Business'" preceded this panel, which featured three representatives from the Inatsisartut (Parliament of Greenland).

Aleqa Hammond, former prime minister (2013-14)¹ and the chairperson of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee of the Greenlandic Parliament, highlighted how Greenland has the right to become independent from the Kingdom of Denmark when Greenlanders want to do so. She was critical of the US-Denmark military agreement that has been in place since 1951, suggesting that the US has a "free hand" to do what it likes with little benefit for Greenland, which receives nothing more than "tax money from a few Greenlanders" working at the Thule base. Given the new Arctic geostrategic context, she insisted that Greenland must be made part of the this agreement, seeking a "more equal partnership" and "win-win situation" for Greenland. She emphasized that Greenland must be part of international discussions about China's Northern Silk Road project, with its bold investment plans (and implications for NATO), and in light of the reality that Russian military bases are located less than 1000 miles from Thule. Speaking to the Chinese proposal to fund airports in Greenland, Hammond criticized how the US pushed Copenhagen to fund the projects instead, "not based on Greenland's interests but NATO's interests via Greenland." She predicted that Greenland will achieve its independence within her lifetime and asserted that the Danes share a sense that this is "inevitable" (although panelists in other sessions had a very different assessment of such a probability and of Danish/Greenlandic public opinion). She boasted that "Greenland has the strong card in its hands" to renegotiate and assert its place in circumpolar and global affairs. **Mimi Karlsen**, a member of the Inuit Ataqatigiit party and Minister for Culture, Education, Research and Church Affairs, highlighted the need for Greenland to "find other friends to work with to develop its economy," noting Iceland and Canada as particular examples. **Pele Broberg**, Greenland Parliament member for Partii Naleraq, also lamented that Greenland did not have control over its defence and foreign policy, and identified the Arctic Circle Assembly as "a stepping stone to a future where Greenland has control over its own foreign policy."

The question and answer period highlighted the "huge potential" of fisheries, tourism, and the mineral extraction sectors in Greenland. When asked how long the panelists expected independence to take, Hammond anticipated that, in light of the highly educated population "built" in Greenland over the last thirty years, it would be ready to renegotiate the self-rule act within the next three decades. The

¹ In 2014 Hammond stepped down as Prime Minister and leader of Siumut, following a case of misuse of public funds, and after being elected to the Danish Folketing in 2015 she was expelled from Siumut in August 2016 following another case of misuse of public funds, after which she became an independent. She ran in the 2018 Greenlandic parliament election for the Siumut breakaway party Nunatta Qitornai. She studied at Nunavut Arctic College from 1989-1991.

panelists also applauded the role that Trump’s tweet offering to purchase Greenland has played in generating “unprecedented global profile” for their island country.

Several questions examined military topics. When asked about national defence, one of the panelists noted that Iceland did not have an armed forces but was an independent state, so why could the same not hold true for Greenland? In response to my question about whether the panelists could envisage a future where Greenland was not a member of NATO or an ally with the United States, the panelists shared a consensus that this was not a potential eventuality. Instead, they see growing geostrategic interest in the region as a chance for Greenland to leverage its strategic position to extract concessions from the United States and other interested parties. Perhaps most shocking was Hammond’s statement that Greenland should consider the potential political influence of Chinese investments *after* (and not before) Greenland’s independence, suggesting a singular focus on throwing off the shackles of Danish (and American?) colonialism without precautionary regard for other forms of foreign influence that this is likely to bring.

A New Arctic Region for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard

This panel, organized by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) / Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), began with an overview by **Neil O’Rourke**, Assistant Commissioner, Arctic Region of the CCG, about the creation of the new region that he oversees. In a move to put Inuit and Indigenous peoples in the North at the heart of decision-making, he explained how the new DFO/CCG region encompasses the four regions of Inuit Nunangat, reaching from the NWT, through Nunavut, across northern Quebec (Nunavik) to Labrador (Nunatsiavut), encompassing more than 50 per cent of Canada’s coastline. Previously DFO managed the Arctic through regions headquartered in Sarnia, Ontario, with administration split between the Central Arctic region, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Quebec. The new Arctic Region of the CCG represents the first time a federal government department has been structured in this way. It is headquartered in Rankin Inlet, Nunavut, with a new Coast Guard base in Yellowknife. DFO has hired Gabriel Nirlungayuk, an Inuktitut speaker and a former deputy minister in Nunavut, as its new regional director general to be based in Rankin Inlet. Both he and O’Rourke were hired with input from regional Inuit leaders, and Northerners will co-define the boundaries of the new management areas and the activities carried out within them.

To set the context, O’Rourke highlighted increased risks to navigation and to Inuit conducting traditional activities in maritime areas. Traffic patterns in 2018 showed that the majority of large shipping activity occurred in the eastern Arctic, and no passenger vessel transited the entire Northwest Passage (NWP) owing to ice conditions – although the numbers have “bounced back” this year. He outlined how DFO/CCG had undertaken more than fifty engagement sessions over the last eight months, and it has delivered its “what we’ve heard” report to its key partners (although there is no indication that this report has been or will be made public) identifying where Northerners want to see service enhancements. Governed in the philosophy of co-management and co-decisions with land claim organizations, the new region is expected to be more responsive to each community’s needs. Key principles identified during the consultations include:

- Policy making needs to be done in the North, by Northerners, and must accommodate regional variation
- Improved capacity for program and service delivery in the North to better reflect what Canadians in the South receive (eg. SAR, environmental response, small craft harbours, and communications)
- Traditional knowledge must be included alongside Western science when making resource management decisions
- Removing employment barriers and creating job opportunities in Northern communities
- Need to meet high expectations in migrating from talking to implementing/doing

Madeleine Redfern, the Mayor of Iqaluit, emphasized collaborative policy development and engagement, reiterating the importance of a “from the North by Northerners” philosophy (rather than policies developed in Ottawa” because, “as Inuit, we know what we know.” She referenced capacity issues at all levels of government that must be addressed and factored into plans. She was optimistic that the new Arctic Regional Office will be able to better inform Ottawa of where adjustments need to be made.

Kaviq Kaluraq, Nunavut Arctic College and Acting Chairperson, Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB), explained how her home community of Baker Lake relied on shipping activities that come into her community from Hudson Bay. She emphasized the high degree of interest in marine issues in Nunavut, noting that the NIRB consultations on the Baffinland Mary River iron ore project largely revolved around this topic. Observing that federal government representatives sent to Arctic meetings often had no previous experience living in the North, she highlighted how Inuit filled in the knowledge gaps. One such mechanism is the Nunavut Marine Council, which plays an advisory and advocacy role, which released a strategic plan last year (http://www.strata360.com/dev/nmc/180703-NMC_2018-2023_Strategic_Plan-OPAE.pdf) and is currently developing a marine tool kit. She also described the role of the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA) in concluding the Tallurutiup Imanga and Tuvaijuittaq agreements with the Government of Canada, explaining that the Inuit Guardian program reframes power structures about how things will be managed in Arctic waters. She also emphasized the QIA’s role in ensuring community-level input for preparedness and capacity-building efforts. Inuit were regaining their capacity, but were often underfunded and needed adequate resources to match their growing control. She used the example of a Baker Lake body recovery effort, which she helped coordinate as a member of the local SAR team, as a case in point. Kaluraq also spoke extensively about the importance of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, noting that it was “the responsibility of the rest of Canada to learn how to listen to what Inuit express and know.”

Beverly Foster, Manager, Indigenous Relations and Partnerships, CCG Arctic Region, spoke of the responsibility “to have great discussions and to collaborate” to identify shared priorities and interests. She defined IQ as “what Inuit have always known” – they knew “naturally how to survive in the harshest environment.” She stressed the importance of sustained, long-term engagement and the incorporation of IQ into government work, and the need to respect multiple viewpoints. She celebrated the creation of community engagement coordinators to create a permanent CCG presence in the Arctic guided by the

spirit of “let us see them, let us hear them.” She concluded that what the CCG was “doing is historic, is very important.”

Robert Young, Senior Science Advisor, Freshwater Institute, DFO, reflected on how the federal department was advancing reconciliation with Inuit through “a lot of atoning for what we have done in the past.” He emphasized the need to learn to listen, ask communities what their priorities are, live up to obligations made in land claim agreements, and make organizations more representative of the communities that they wish to serve. He cited the Beaufort Sea Partnership as a model of a private-public partnership to develop priorities for an Arctic region. Other topics of discussion included commercial fishing, small craft harbours, and efforts to modernize and expand the inventory of nautical charts to enhance safety.

The question and answer period touched on several themes, including the important of laying a solid foundation (rather than rushing to implement half-baked ideas), bringing employment opportunities to the North (rather than drawing away Northerners to serve in the CCG down south), discerning synergies between Northern-based service and the two Arctic offshore patrol vessels recently announced for the CCG, and the need to train and develop the crews of the future. A final take-away comment emphasized that “a lot of silo-breaking needs to happen” to have IQ and innovative relationships better integrated into government policy and practice.

Enhanced Arctic Security Cooperation

This special Arctic Circle breakout session, organized by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the Institute of International Affairs at the University of Iceland, offered competing perspectives on Arctic security matters. While the Arctic has historically been a region of peaceful cooperation, the organizers highlighted that the “melting” of the Arctic heightens its geo-economic importance for both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Further compounding uncertainty, different interpretations of international law governing the region create tension while human activity in the Arctic is increasing. While some member states of the Arctic Council promote and protect national sovereignty and sovereign rights to Arctic resources, other non-Arctic or “near-Arctic” states assert that the challenges and opportunities of a transforming region are global and cannot be considered the private preserve of Arctic states. This session set out to explore ways to enhance dialogue on security matters and thereby seek ways to enhance circumpolar Arctic security cooperation. The panel was moderated by **Margrét Cela**, Project Manager, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland.

Commander Andreas Hildenbrand, Program Director European Security Seminar North, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies based in Munich, Germany, observed that military power projection is already in play in the Arctic and can no longer be isolated from what is happening elsewhere. A reduced military presence or footprint since the end of the Cold War does not mean less power projection, with the emergence of new technology, etc. The Arctic coastal states’ resistance to the “internationalization” of the region has been “overtaken by reality.” Furthermore, he suggests that military tensions between Russia and the West has affected Arctic cooperation and precipitated a “new Cold War.”

Hildenbrand noted Russia's dual messaging that oscillates between civilian cooperation and military competition in Arctic security affairs. He also highlighted three nuclear risks and possible threats: the first floating nuclear power station recently carried through the NSR; an increasing number of new polar icebreakers; and nuclear wastes associated with the submarines of the Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, that are integral to perimeter defence to preserve Russia's second strike nuclear assets. He emphasized that Russia's Arctic ambitions factor into its global ambitions, including area denial / area access.

With respect to China, he noted the two different versions of that "near-Arctic" state's Arctic white paper: one for internal audiences in Chinese, and another in English for outside audiences. In both, China proclaims itself an "important stakeholder in Arctic affairs."

Hildenbrand concluded by identifying various areas of potential Arctic conflict: the assertion of freedom of navigation through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) or Northwest Passage (NWP); disputes over maritime boundaries and extended continental shelves (once the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf renders its decisions on Arctic coast state submissions); Central Arctic Ocean fisheries; and Greenland's aspirations for independence and its security implications.

Ambassador Marie-Anne Coninx, the EU Ambassador at Large for the Arctic, reiterated the EU's primary objective sustaining the Arctic as a low tension, high cooperation region, "including solid political *and security* cooperation" (emphasis added). Addressing the latter may indicate a need for the EU to update its 2016 Arctic policy, which did not reference defence and security issues. She outlined the geoeconomic implications of Arctic warming that affect major sectors of the EU: energy imports and security; shipping (because EU member states, combined, have the largest shipping fleet in the world); and minerals. She then discussed the geopolitical implications of the Arctic as "one of the most dynamic geopolitical regions in the world." While often described as "volatility," the ambassador argued that it is in Russia's economic interests to keep the region peaceful. The US views the region as a theatre of strategic competition, exemplified by Secretary of State Pompeo's statements earlier this year, as well as maintaining a strong focus on cooperation. Much attention is now directed to "new" actors, particularly China. Coninx dedicated her attention to the EU, pointing out that it is not a "near-Arctic" actor because it has member states that are in the Arctic. The EU favours inclusivity in Arctic discussions because this is essential to secure global support for climate change mitigation and ensure broad respect for international law.

Coninx emphasized that a revised EU Arctic policy will have to include security. As the Finnish minister of foreign affairs quipped, "you cannot put a 'do not disturb' sign on the Arctic" and expect the world to stay out. That stated, soft security issues continue to pose the greatest short-term challenges, which are covered (at least implicitly) by the EU Marine Security strategy and its strategy on satellites and outer space. The ambassador assesses a low level of hard security risk in a region with an abiding "spirit of cooperation," but does see the risk of spillover from outside conflicts. She also points growing indications of the EU's need to discern a specific role in Arctic security, such as Germany's recent Arctic strategy which notes that the EU and NATO should amplify their security efforts in the region. Coninx suggests that there are governance gaps in terms of military security and suggests the need for confidence-building measures, but offers no suggestion as to where these should be addressed.

Ólöf Hrefna Kristjánsdóttir, Director International Operations / Director ICRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iceland, provided an overview of Iceland's Arctic security interests. Expressing hope that the

Arctic region will not become “militarized,” she points to several core challenges: climate change (which requires international cooperation), challenges to the international legal framework (marked by Russia’s flagrant violations of international law and state sovereignty), and great power competition. In terms of the latter, she discussed China’s ambitious Arctic policy, the United States’ renewed interest in the North Atlantic and Arctic (exemplified by Trump’s proposal to purchase Greenland and recent visits by Spence and Pompeo to Iceland), the increasing tempo and scale of Russian military activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic (submarines and long-range bomber flights), and NATO’s renewed focus on the North Atlantic and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. While the Arctic Council does not have a military security mandate, it continues to serve as an important venue for dialogue and confidence building.

P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North at Trent University in Canada, presented a North American perspective on the changing Arctic defence and security environment. He began by highlighting the importance of narratives in framing our understandings of and expectations for the future of the region, noting various historical and contemporary “myths” or debates (ie. the “Sovereignty on Thinning Ice” idea that once dominated academic discussions and still lingers in news media and public perceptions) as well as domestic, continental, and international frames applied to the Arctic interests of Russia, a rising China, and the United States. He highlighted the need to distinguish between grand strategic threats, which often had an Arctic nexus but are best assessed and met through a global lens, and Arctic regional risks or threats emanating from regional dynamics or conditions themselves. Lackenbauer questioned the utility of talking about “the Arctic” as a singular whole rather than conceptualizing it as a region of regions, noting key geopolitical and demographic differences between the European Arctic, Russian Arctic, North American Arctic, and Central Arctic Ocean. He also emphasized Canadians’ tendency to look to Indigenous Northerners (particularly Inuit) as priority partners in defence, security and safety.

Lackenbauer referenced Canadian defence documents articulating that there remains no direct conventional military threat to Canada’s security in the North; that climate change is a key driver of regional environmental, economic, and cultural change; and that “in most cases, [the Department of National Defence (DND)] will not be the lead department responding to or dealing with developing situations or incidents in Canada’s North.” He asserted that Canada has adopted broadened definitions of security, coupling national security (defence and “hard” security) with alternative understandings of security that emphasize economic, social, cultural and environmental concerns that became entrenched in the post-Cold War period. He explained how this understanding frames Canada’s emerging Whole of Society approach to Arctic security which involves many departments and agencies, at various levels of government, as well as Northern community stakeholders.

He then provided what he sees as the main elements in “the emerging narrative” of the Arctic security environment. There is a resurgent great power rivalry between Russia and the West which may have “spill over” effects on circumpolar security, but there is little likelihood of conflict generated by Arctic resource, boundary disputes, or governance issues. He also reiterated that there is a valid, ongoing debate about the emerging/evolving Arctic “security” environment, but we need to distinguish between what he called “Grand Strategic” level drivers (such as Russia-NATO relations; China’s global aspirations; economic security; energy security; and global climate change mitigation) and “Arctic” level ones (such as community safety issues; climate change adaptation; safe Arctic shipping; and

“sustainable” Arctic resource development) that must also account for differences in North American and Eurasian Arctics. He anticipates that competition between Arctic states is likely to continue, but that this does not inherently portend conflict and does not inherently preclude cooperation on Arctic issues.

Lackenbauer framed these considerations in terms of Canada’s Arctic international security priorities, calling for strategic messaging that combines both dialogue and deterrence. Canada’s role in enhancing NATO deterrence (eg. Latvia) does not imply that conflict over Arctic territory or resources is more likely, but it must not also allow the desire to enhance Arctic cooperation to dilute its stance on Russia’s transgressions of international law in Ukraine. In answer to the panel theme, he noted various limitations to multilateral defence and security cooperation. The Arctic Council has no hard security mandate as per Ottawa Declaration (1996), and Lackenbauer insisted that there are no clear benefits to having it assume one. Northern Chiefs of Head of Defence meetings have been suspended since 2014, and Canada expressed reticence to have NATO assume an explicitly “Arctic” focus for much of the last decade. Lackenbauer suggested that former Prime Minister Stephen Harper kept discussions on a role for NATO in the Arctic to a minimum because he did not want to draw attention to ongoing legal disputes about the status of the Northwest Passage and the boundary between the U.S. and Canada in the Beaufort Sea – or to provoke the Russians given their deep-seated concerns about NATO encirclement.

The Canadian position on NATO’s Arctic role has shifted significantly, and its recently-released Arctic and Northern Policy Statement (September 2019) identifies NATO as “key **multilateral** institution” in the Arctic. This builds upon Canada’s 2017 defence policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)* which observes, in the “state competition” section that immediately precedes the discussion about a changing Arctic, that “NATO Allies and other like-minded states have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a ‘near-peer.’” Highlighting that “NATO has also increased its attention to Russia’s ability to project power from its Arctic territory into the North Atlantic, and its potential to challenge NATO’s collective defence posture,” the policy notes that “Canada and its NATO Allies have been clear that the Alliance will be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches to Allied territory in the North Atlantic.” Lackenbauer explained, however, that there is neither the intent nor a perceived need in Canada to involve NATO in the defence of the Canadian Arctic. Furthermore, we need to carefully distinguish between military threats to North American/ North Atlantic/ Nordic security that may *pass through* regions of the Arctic and risks/threats arising *from* Arctic disputes. Finally, while Lackenbauer applauded the official call for joint exercises with Arctic allies and partners “to support the strengthening of situational awareness and information sharing in the Arctic,” he encouraged careful consideration of what second and third order effects a projection of force had across the Arctic.

Lackenbauer then looked at enhanced security cooperation through binational and bilateral mechanisms. Canada considers the United States its “premier partner” in the Arctic, and the **binational** North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has long played a central role in the protection of North American security and is a central element of the new Arctic security environment more generally. To improve NORAD’s ability to respond to the new military technological elements of the threats, Canada has committed to modernize the North Warning System (the successor to the DEW

Line), and it has launched a series of studies to determine what is needed to meet emerging and future threats (such as hypersonic cruise missiles and new ballistic missiles).

Canadian policy also affirms the compatibility between exercising sovereignty and collaborating with international partners. “Canada remains committed to exercising the full extent of its sovereignty in Canada’s North, and will continue to carefully monitor military activities in the region and conduct defence operations and exercises as required,” SSE explains. Concurrently, “Canada’s renewed focus on the surveillance and control of the Canadian Arctic will be complemented by close collaboration with select Arctic partners, including the United States, Norway and Denmark, to increase surveillance and monitoring of the broader Arctic region.” Lackenbauer talked about **bilateral** options to enhance security cooperation with its allies, specifically identifying the United States with respect to maritime control, land forces, cybersecurity, and emerging domains; Greenland / Kingdom of Denmark on its eastern (North Atlantic/European) and western (North American) dimensions, as well as the Canadian model for integrating local Northerners in its defence team through the Canadian Rangers; and Norway. He emphasized that Russia and China were not likely partners for military cooperation, but that this did not portend conflict. In looking to areas of Canadian Arctic cooperation with Russia, he highlighted how the recent Arctic and Northern Policy Framework committed to “restart a regular bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues with Russia in key areas related to Indigenous issues, scientific cooperation, environmental protection, shipping and search and rescue” that could facilitate the sharing of best practices, ensure that Arctic coastal state sovereignty and sovereign rights are respected internationally, and build trust outside of the military sphere.

Finally, Lackenbauer looked to ways that Canada might enhance security cooperation **domestically**. While Canada will partner with like-minded states for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance solutions that are specifically tailored to the Arctic environment (incl. space-based assets) where appropriate, national interests dictate that it will act unilaterally as required to ensure all-domain awareness. Improved awareness of who is entering Canada’s Arctic and what they are doing here is essential to ensure that foreign interests (economic, scientific, and political) do not negatively influence the ability of Northerners, and Canadians more broadly, from pursuing a long-term Arctic strategy that is consistent with Canadian values and interests. Lackenbauer also pointed to the need for improved federal-territorial-provincial search and rescue (SAR) and Emergency Management governance, and better horizontal cooperation consistent with a “whole of society” approach to security and safety. Clarifying the practical roles that the Canadian Rangers and other community-based organizations play in emergency and disasters response efforts, as well as SAR operations, and coordinating training opportunities will also help to improve operational effectiveness. Finally, in emphasizing the Canadian Arctic as an Indigenous homeland, he promoted deeper collaboration with Indigenous communities and Land Claims Organizations to enhance Arctic marine safety and security, given changing activity patterns in the region and the importance of preparedness.

The question and answer period expanded discussions about China, strategic competition, and NATO’s role. One audience member asked whether the panelists were naïve in not conceptualizing China as a threat to the Arctic? Lackenbauer’s reflections encouraged thinkers to discern between unique or distinct threats that China poses in an Arctic context that are not covered by national strategies for dealing with China more generally. He also suggested that the “prestige” factor associated with Chinese aspirations to participate in Arctic governance, thus signalling truly global engagement

with other leading powers, is underestimated in our prioritizing of Chinese interests. Ambassador Connix also noted that the EU has a China strategy, and that it is important to engage with that country without being naïve. The EU's connectivity strategy for Europe and Asia is in favour of engagement and cooperation but "according to our rules of transparency and the rule of law." Mechanisms exist to prevent strategic investments in the EU contrary to European interests by third parties. Inclusiveness is essential to promote cooperation with China to mitigate climate change, and it is reassuring that China references the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) many times in its white paper. Finally, as one audience member quipped, "why would China not have an interest in the Arctic?"

NATO's strategic concept documents do not mention the Arctic. Panelists discussed how this reflects the past reticence of some NATO members, particularly Canada, to adopt an explicit Arctic mandate. NAADSN member Dr. Andreas Osthagen noted that NATO strategic documents may not refer to the Arctic, but they do talk a lot about northern flanks and the North Atlantic. Questions were posed about whether discourse about the Arctic as a "low tension" area can be maintained if the region is mentioned directly in NATO declarations, and whether NATO exercises (such as Trident Juncture) unnecessarily provoke Russia by projecting power (designed to bolster deterrence). Lackenbauer argued that Russia does not pose a serious military threat to the North American Arctic, but Russia has developed advanced capabilities that could pose a threat *through* the North American Arctic, such as hypersonic Kinzhal missiles and the Kh-101 / Kh-102 Raduga line of convention and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles demonstrated in strikes on ISIS targets in Syria.

In terms of institutional mechanism for enhanced Arctic security cooperation, none of the panelists advocated a military role for the Arctic Council, concurring that the forum's ongoing vitality in the face of tensions between members elsewhere shows the strength of not introducing a defence dialogue into that body. Audience member Andreas Osthagen (a NAADSN core team member) posed the question of whether existing security cooperation mechanisms were sufficient, or whether we needed to create new ones? Lackenbauer stressed *enhancing security cooperation* as the operative concept, highlighting the need for more consistent and coherent strategic messaging and better use of existing institutions, mechanisms, and relationships.

The Polar Silk Road: Pan-Arctic Cooperation, Implementation and Impact

Dr. Marc Lanteigne, Canadian-born Associate Professor of Political Science at UiT: the Arctic Institute of Norway, presented on Ice Silk Road in Sino-Russian Cooperation, arguing that China is a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic pursuant to economic development. China's National Development Research Council and SOA in 2015 cited the Arctic as a "blue economic passage," thus anticipate the Ice Silk Road (ISR) articulated in its 2018 white paper. Russia recently has become fully invested in building icebreakers to facilitate cargo vessel traffic from China / East Asia, with Putin hoping to boost NSR shipping from 18M tonnes last year to 80M tonnes by 2024. It is unclear how Russia's proposed NSR rules (including 45 day advance notification) will affect Chinese shipping.² The Kirkenes-Rovaniemi Rail Link (Arctic corridor), a long-sought link to extend the Nordic railway system north beyond Bodo, would

² During the question and answer period, Luke Coffey (Heritage Foundation) critiqued the Russian figures of NSR "transits" last year, saying that we may be excessively "hyping" the practicality of these routes.

connect Nordic Arctic to southern Europe and beyond. Chinese firms have indicated an interest in investing in this project, but critics worry about debt load, environmental impacts, and effects on Indigenous peoples. Dr. Lanteigne observed that China has not overtly challenged international laws and rules in the Arctic, but it is interested in shaking up norms, particularly in terms of economic development and investment. If China is ejected from the “Arctic clubhouse,” it “may build a new one with Russian help.”

What will be the relationship between China and Russia over the Arctic moving forward? Russian government figures would prefer a diverse number of partners for the Yamal pipeline project, but sanctions have limited its options for projects of this scale. Is this really a Sino-Russian “partnership”? Russia harbours lingering concerns about its sovereignty, but at the same time joint military manoeuvres indicate a tightening relationship.

EU Arctic Policy: Geostrategic and Security Gaps

During a plenary panel, EU Arctic ambassador **Marie-Anne Connix** observed that the EU is not undertaking a new Arctic policy at this time, but there were various calls at Arctic Circle for it to do so given the major changes that have taken place in the region, and globally, over the past four years. She notes expectations that the EU be more strongly engaged to mitigate climate change, promote sustainable development, and enhance international cooperation. The policy will have to encompass geoeconomic, geostrategic, and security implications of a warming Arctic, and the process will continue to engage with Indigenous peoples and state stakeholders to ensure a safe, secure, prosperous region. Stressing the importance of a “common European front” on Arctic policy, the absence of any reference to the Arctic in the EU’s recent hearings on security constitutes a major oversight. While Germany’s recent Arctic policy calls for more active EU and NATO role in Arctic security matters, the EU’s 2016 Arctic policy does not address geopolitical and security challenges. China’s increasing interest has propelled reconsideration, as has the Trump administration’s growing interest (marked by his Tweet to purchase Greenland).

French president Macron’s comment that the opening of Arctic routes will harm us in the end because it is the product of “our irresponsibility” and should not be used. French shipping companies, as well as Hapag Lloyd, have refused to use the NSR. (The French Senate report has forbidden French shippers from using heavy fuel oils.) The panelists also noted uncertainties about the safety and security of the NSR. China is needed as a partner in dealing with global climate change, but is also “a systemic level rival” to the EU.

Collaborative Innovation in the Canada’s Arctic

This session was organized by Mitacs, a non-profit national research organization that, in partnerships with Canadian academia, private industry and government, operates research and training programs related to innovation. Leading off this panel, **Dr. Ken Coates**, Canada Research Chair in Regional Innovation at the University of Saskatchewan, said that our technological innovations today are both overblown and underestimated. Social media has exceeded expectations, while telemedicine in the north has not lived up to expectations. Most scientific and technological innovation is being done in the

south and in urban areas, thus exacerbating the north-south divide. The “for the north by the north” philosophy tends to play out in traditional resources sectors (eg. mining) and the environment (eg. wildlife monitoring), but not housing or water quality. He highlighted the possibilities brought by 3D manufacturing systems that would negate high transportation costs and lag times for receive spare parts, as well as deployable robotic medical systems, drones and mineral exploration and SAR, new transportation systems like dirigibles resupplying mines, alternative energy sources (including small, mobile nuclear reactors), and remotely controlled machinery or entire mining operations. **Gloria Song**, senior policy analyst at Polar Knowledge Canada, spoke about the role of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Arctic research. Research priorities include renewable energy (to reduce high costs of dependence on diesel), wastewater management, identifying waste-to-energy technologies (including knowledge-sharing and Indigenous partnership, building on an Alaskan model), and looking at “tiny homes” to address the housing shortage in the Canadian Arctic. **Tasha Carrothers**, who works with CARPA 3D Construction Corporation (an engineering company with social ambitions), is looking at concrete-3D printing houses as solution to the housing crisis in First Nation and Inuit communities. The challenge for most Arctic housing construction is logistics costs and environmental conditions. CARPA test houses are cheaper, faster, easier, and customizable. Need further research & development on new concrete materials specifically engineered for 3D printing that are better suited to Arctic climates.

Military Security and the Arctic Council

This session, moderated by **Heather Exner-Pirot** (consultant and the managing editor of Arctic Yearbook, as well as a NAADSN member), asked the general question: how can we maintain circumpolar stability and keep the region one of peace?

Benjamin Schaller, a PhD candidate at the Center for Peace Studies at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, framed his discussion around trust and distrust, and how this informs confidence-building in the Arctic. Building off of a theoretical framework conceptualizing trust at the systemic level in international relations (IR), he outlined a case study methodology analyzing Norway, Sweden, Canada, and Russia through interviews with 17 military representatives (7 from Canada), analysis of defence strategies, and focus group discussions with military attaches in Moscow. In his presentation, he provided a visual representation of all defence relations between these four actors to facilitate structural analysis, yielding results that show Russia’s relative marginalization from the trust relationships between Norway-Canada and Norway-Sweden. He looks bilaterally at Norwegian-Swedish and Norwegian-Canadian defence and security relations as marked by generalized and particularized trust. With Russia, Norway has a broad spectrum from generalized distrust (deterrence) to generalized trust. Swedish-Canada cooperation, without a shared NATO relationship, is particularized trust in the sphere of reassurance. Canada-Russia and Sweden-Russia relations are marked by generalized and particularized mistrust. His analysis of Russian views on relations range from full-spectrum of trust/distrust with Norway. Interviews suggest that military experiences of positive cooperation/interaction on the ground are not sufficiently reflected in policy-making. Military cooperation tends to lead to political rather than military considerations, leading to dissatisfaction.

Schaller concluded that the Arctic Council has remained a forum of cooperation because it does not address military security. Regional cooperation is derived from common economic interests, and the Arctic is not isolated. He emphasized that we need to consider mechanisms to maintain cooperation, reduce uncertainty, and prevent unintended escalation (eg. CSBM). Too often, however, trust-building in the Arctic (and other regions) *misses the point*, by addressing the wrong policy areas or the long level in the chain of command (such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum which focuses on tactical relationships which is not where the problems area) or is mistaken as a form of “business as usual” with Russia. Finally, he suggested the need to use the Arctic as a region for *positive spillovers* into other parts of the world.

Sandra Maria Rodrigues Balao, Associate Professor at the University of Lisbon, offered a critical reading of US security interests in the Arctic through strategic documents from 2013-19. She observed that the “soft” option of 2013 had been replaced by “hard” assessments of the Arctic region constructed around threats posed by Russia and China. Washington now sees the Arctic as fundamental to US national security interests, with deterrence the “renewed” doctrine (which assumes the potential for conflict). The US Arctic strategic documents do not identify China as a near-term military threat to or in the Arctic, but do reinforce concern about that country’s global aspirations and the possibility that it could emerge as a military competitor in the region in the future.