

## SUGGESTED READINGS

# The United States and Arctic Security

Troy Bouffard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer

At a time when many of us find ourselves working from home in social isolation, NAADSN has invited various Canadian academic subject matter experts to suggest core readings on topics related to North American and Arctic Defence and Security.

The internet is filled with perspectives and opinions. These lists are intended to help direct policy shapers, practitioners, and academics to credible open access sources, available online free of charge, that reflect leading-edge research and thinking. The compilers of each list have been asked to select readings that are accessibly written (ie. they are not filled with excessive jargon), offer a diversity of viewpoints, and encourage critical thinking and debate.

Michael R. Pompeo, "[Looking North: Sharpening America's Arctic Focus](#)," U.S. Department of State, 6 May 2019.

A day prior to the official event of the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting for the 2017-2019 Finland chairmanship, United States Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo gave a speech concerning several U.S. perspectives and priorities concerning the Arctic. Pompeo offers the latest on U.S. positions, including rules-based order, legitimate Arctic states, Russian developments in the North, resource access and development, as well as pervasive and growing Chinese influence in the region – all with an underlying or direct reference to impacts on U.S. national interests and security.

General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, USAF. [Statement of NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander Before the Senate Armed Services Committee](#), 13 February 2020. [Or [video of his testimony](#) in question and answer format.]

As the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, General O'Shaughnessy explains why "the homeland is not a sanctuary." He highlights how "revisionist powers Russia and China have changed global strategic dynamics by fielding advanced long-range weapons systems and engaging in increasingly aggressive efforts to expand their global presence and influence, including in the approaches to the United States and Canada." He provides an overview and interpretation of Russian military investments in the Arctic, why "the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall," and why the "Arctic Northern Approaches" to the continent requires an enhanced "ability to detect and defeat threats operating both *in* the Arctic and passing *through* the Arctic."

Heather Conley and Matthew Melino. [America's Arctic Moment: Great Power Competition in the Arctic to 2050](#) (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2020).

What will be the strategic consequences for the United States by 2050 if America's two near-peer military competitors, China and Russia, continue to

develop their long-term economic and security interests in the Arctic, but the United States does not? Russia's growing economic and military ambitions, as well as China's increased physical presence, underscore that both nations have long-term strategic designs for the Arctic region. Data analysis, satellite imagery, and scenario development all demonstrate the continued growth of Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic and heighten the sense of stasis in the U.S. military and economic presence. Unless the United States wishes to lose access to portions of the Arctic and have increasingly diminished capabilities to defend and deter attack against the homeland, the United States must return to the region.

U.S. Senate. [Strategic Arctic Naval Focus Act of 2019](#). 116th, 3080.

The purpose of this bill is to state the policy of the United States regarding the need for strategic placement of military assets in the Arctic, and for other purposes. It is a strong indicator of the direction and political will of the U.S. Senate in developing U.S. military infrastructure and security capabilities.

Ronald O'Rourke et al. [Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress](#) (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 28 April 2020).

The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political, economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Decisions that Congress makes on Arctic-related issues could significantly affect these interests. This report provides an overview of Arctic-related issues for Congress, and refers readers to more in-depth CRS reports on specific Arctic-related issues.

Abbie Tingstad, RAND Corporation, [Climate Change and U.S. Security in the Arctic](#), Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, 19 September 2019.

Tingstad offer through her testimony why climate change in the Arctic matters and what the United States should do with regard to security from the following three approaches:

- The Arctic's ongoing changes in climate promote both challenges and opportunities; these are also influenced by technology, economic, and other factors.
- Climate change in the Arctic matters for U.S. security because of the potential for a real or perceived security void to develop in the absence of additional action.
- Averting a security void requires sufficient capability to promote safety, security, and stewardship in the region; multiple types of investments are needed to do this.

Stephanie Pezard, "[How Not to Compete in the Arctic: The Blurry Lines Between Friend and Foe](#)," *War on the Rocks*, 27 February 2019.

The Arctic defies simplistic views of geopolitical friends and foes. The United States and its allies, such as Canada, do not necessarily agree on key issues in

the region, while in other areas, U.S. strategic competitors — Russia and China — might find common ground with the U.S. position. The blurry lines between allies and adversaries require that the United States fine-tune its defense policy tools in the Arctic to ensure that its actions do not hamper relations with allies and inadvertently shore up the position of adversaries.

Burke, Ryan, and Jahara Matisek. "[The American Polar Pivot - Gaining a Comparative Advantage in Great Power Competition](#)." *Marine Corps University Journal* 10, no. 2 (2019).

This article demonstrates the rationale for the U.S. military to pivot its concentration toward defending the global commons in the polar regions. The article concludes with recommendations on how U.S. military forces and basing should be integrated into a grand strategy to ensure that China and Russia cannot exert their control and influence over the Arctic and Antarctic.

U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. "[A Ten-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region, 2020–2030](#)." Washington, DC: United States Congress, 2019.

This report brings together both qualitative and quantitative data about the region, including an extensive review of natural resource and infrastructure development, and projects four scenarios of vessel activity. This method estimates the number of ships expected in the region over the next decade, was developed specifically for this study, and utilizes publicly available data from 36 different sources of additional vessels. The four scenarios included in this study are the Reduced Activity Scenario, Most Plausible Scenario, Optimized Growth Scenario, and Accelerated, but Unlikely Scenario.

P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Rob Huebert. "[Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security](#)." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20/3 (Fall 2014): 320-33.

For decades, Canada and the United States have been partners in the defence of North America. Bringing into dialogue the two countries' evolving strategies and overarching national security objectives in the Arctic, the authors contend that they are well aligned, highlighting the advancement of security interests, the pursuit of responsible stewardship and strengthened international cooperation. Their claim that, in both countries, the emphasis has shifted from traditional military threats to environmental, economic, human and cultural security considerations may no longer hold true in 2020. They conclude that, although the countries do not share a common perspective on all issues, both stand to benefit from leveraging investments that enhance existing relationships and develop new capabilities to protect North America from external threats that may arise and that contribute to security, safety and stewardship.

## Official Documents

[Department of Defense Arctic Strategy](#) (June 2019)

[United States Navy Strategic Outlook for the Arctic](#) (January 2019)

[United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook](#) (April 2019)

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Arctic-related reports

- United States Government Accountability Office. "[Coast Guard Is Taking Steps to Address Key Challenges, but Additional Work Remains](#)." In *Arctic Capabilities*. Washington, DC, 2020.
  - Given the Arctic region's expansive maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. The Coast Guard is also the sole provider and operator of the U.S. Polar icebreaking fleet – a critical component in ensuring year-round access to the Arctic. The Coast Guard is developing the first of three heavy polar icebreakers – the Polar Security Cutter – it has acquired in over 40 years. This statement addresses 1) the Coast Guard's assessment of capability gaps in the region and 2) key risks facing the Polar Security Cutter acquisition.
- United States Government Accountability Office. "[Navy Report to Congress Aligns with Current Assessments of Arctic Threat Levels and Capabilities Required to Execute Dod's Strategy](#)." In *Arctic Planning*. Washington, DC, 2018.
  - This report provides contextual information with what may be a current transition toward increased capabilities as otherwise stated in this report as "not required." The June 2018 report states that the Navy can execute the strategy with subsurface, aviation, and surface assets. The report notes the significant limitations for operating surface ships in the Arctic, but states that the Navy has the capabilities required for executing the strategy, and so has no plan to design ice-hardened surface ships.