

SUGGESTED READINGS

Norway and the High North

Andreas Østhagen

At a time when many of us find ourselves working from home in social isolation, NAADSN has invited various Canadian academic subject matter experts to suggest core readings on topics related to North American and Arctic Defence and Security.

The internet is filled with perspectives and opinions. These lists are intended to help direct policy shapers, practitioners, and academics to credible open access sources, available online free of charge, that reflect leading-edge research and thinking. The compilers of each list have been asked to select readings that are accessibly written (ie. they are not filled with excessive jargon), offer a diversity of viewpoints, and encourage critical thinking and debate.

[Arctic Hierarchies? Norway, Status and the High North \(2013\)](#)

Elana Wilson Rowe

This article focuses on one potential motivation for a state's behaviour in international affairs, namely status-seeking, in order to shed light on Norway's Arctic politics and to discuss the role of hierarchies in Arctic politics more generally. The idea that a state's political elite seek national security and economic gain is well established in international relations (IR) literature. However, another key motivation of human behaviour – seeking status and respect – is frequently overlooked as a potential factor shaping states' behaviour. The argument begins with a brief review of post-cold war Arctic politics followed by a discussion of the status-related literature in IR. Norway's position in the Arctic Council (AC) and in bilateral relations with Russia is then examined, with particular attention paid to the extent to which other Arctic states acknowledge and confirm Norway's status claims. Norway's status as an information provider, a convener and a bridge to Russia gives the country a degree of influence in Arctic multilateral settings. Given the Arctic region's relatively peaceful nature and the emphasis on circumpolar cooperation, space has been made for creative approaches to status. Size and military or economic greatness are not always decisive factors for taking a lead in today's Arctic politics.

[At Opposite Poles: Canada's and Norway's Approaches to Security in the Arctic \(2018\)](#)

Andreas Østhagen, Paal S. Hilde and Greg L. Sharp

Canada and Norway are similar in many ways. They share a strong commitment to international law and humanitarian issues, consistently rank amongst the most developed countries in the world, and have aligned themselves with the United States on security matters. They are also two of the five Arctic coastal states that have most actively engaged in northern issues over the last decade. Yet, on the issue of security

in the Arctic, their interests have historically differed. This difference came to the fore during the governments of Stephen Harper (2006–2015) and Jens Stoltenberg (2005–2013). This article compares the divergent approaches to security and national defence in Canada and Norway under the Harper and Stoltenberg governments. It asks what role traditional military concerns in the circumpolar region had for the two countries during the period, and how threat perceptions in Ottawa and Oslo shaped their respective Arctic policies. We argue that, to understand the contrasting approaches to Arctic security, two factors are key: (1) the inherent difference in the two countries' approach to, and utilisation of, NATO as a defence alliance; and (2) a clear difference in the role the Arctic holds for security considerations in the two countries given their disparate geographic locations. Ultimately, we make the case that to understand the different approaches adopted by Canada and Norway during the period examined, the Arctic needs to be understood not as one uniform region, but instead as a series of sub-regions where the dominant security variable – Russia – is present to a greater or lesser degree.

[Enhancing Deterrence and Defence on NATO's Northern Flank \(2020\)](#)

James Black, Stephen J. Flanagan, Gene Germanovich, Ruth Harris, David Ochmanek, Marina Favaro, Katerina Galai, Emily Gloinson

As a founding member of NATO, Norway supports efforts to enhance deterrence, crisis management and regional security in the North Atlantic and High North — a region commonly understood to include territories in Scandinavia and northern Russia, as well as the surrounding waters of the Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea and North Sea. To help ensure effective delivery of these tasks and inform ongoing strategy and policy development, Norway needs insight into other NATO Allies' perspectives on strategic opportunities and challenges in the region. Researchers from RAND Europe and the RAND Corporation combined a targeted document review with expert workshops and field visits to gather and analyse evidence in support of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence's (MOD) strategy development, planning and defence policy. Researchers examined the perspectives of defence officials from Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, the US and NATO institutions and this analysis fed into a summary of findings alongside five strategic options for the MOD to consider.

[Geographies of Security and Statehood in Norway's 'Battle of the North' \(2010\)](#)

Berit Kristoffersen and Stephen Young

In this paper, we explore how 'peak oil' anxieties are woven into the spaces and practices of the state in Norway and the consequences of this for environmental justice and the public sphere more widely. We focus in particular on an ongoing struggle over access to hydrocarbon deposits in the Norwegian Arctic, the so-called 'Battle of the North'. We use this dispute to highlight three wider theoretical points regarding (i) the continuing relevance of the state in the governing of nature-society relations, (ii) the increasingly fragmented and fluid nature of state space, and (iii) the significance of 'security' as a term around which social, economic and environmental tensions pivot. The paper concludes by reflecting on current efforts to prevent new oil activities in the north of Norway.

Space and Timing: Why was the Barents Sea Delimitation Dispute Resolved in 2010? (2011)

Arild Moe, Daniel Fjærtøft, and Indra Øverland

An explanation of the timing of the 2010 agreement resolving the marine delimitation dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea must be sought mainly on the Russian side. Russia's willingness to compromise on the spatial disagreement between the two countries at this specific juncture was not, as sometimes assumed, driven by a thirst for the energy resources in the formerly disputed area, but instead by broader Russian foreign policy considerations. These include a general effort to reduce the risk of conflicts with neighboring states by clearing away as many territorial disputes as possible, the intention to improve Russia's image as a rule-abiding player on the international arena, and interest in strengthening the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the framework for Arctic governance.

Partners or Rivals? Norway and the European Union in the High North (2017)

Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik

Ever since the European Union (EU) became actively engaged in Arctic affairs, its relationship with Norway - as its immediate Arctic/northern neighbour - can be characterised as paradoxical. Although Norway has pro-actively worked to get the EU more involved in Arctic governance issues, it has, from the European Commission's first Communication on Arctic issues in 2008, been sceptical of various policy and legal steps taken by the EU. Chapter 5 investigates the complex and ambiguous relationship between Norway and the EU.

Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination? (2018)

Julie Wilhelmsen and Kristian Lundby Gjerde

The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic—an area and a relationship long characterized by a culture of compromise and/or cooperation? Here we start from the theoretical premise that states are not pre-constituted political entities, but are constantly in the making. How Russia views its own role and how it views other actors in the Arctic changes over time, calling for differing approaches. That holds true for Norway as well. To clarify the premises for interaction between Russia and Norway in the Arctic, we scrutinize changes in official discourse on Self and Other in the Arctic on both sides in the period 2012 to 2016, to establish what kind of policy mode—“realist,” “institutionalist,” or “diplomatic management”—has underlain the two countries' official discourse in that period. Has Norway continued to pursue “balancing” policies undertaken in the realist mode with those in the diplomatic management mode? Which modes have characterized Russia's approach toward Norway? Finding that realist-mode policies increasingly dominate on both sides, the authors conclude how the changing mode of the one state affects that of the other, and why a New Cold War is now spreading to the Arctic.

[The Politics of Presence: The Longyearbyen Dilemma \(2017\)](#)

Torbjørn Pedersen

The large presence of Norwegian citizens in Svalbard has subdued the misperception that Norway's northernmost territory has an international or internationalized legal status. Now this Norwegian presence in the archipelago is about to change. Amid tumbling coal prices, the state-owned mining company Store Norske is shrunk to a minimum, and no current or proposed business in Longyearbyen has the potential to compensate for the loss of Norwegian workers, in part due to their international character and recruitment policies. This study argues that the likely further dilution of Norwegians in Longyearbyen may ultimately fuel misperceptions about the legal status of Svalbard and pose new foreign and security policy challenges to Norway.

[Managing Conflict at Sea: the Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone \(2018\)](#)

Andreas Østhagen

In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around Svalbard, yet avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose. In the late 1990s, Norwegian enforcement of fisheries regulations became stricter, as fish stocks were in decline. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow. In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue. Today, an event in the maritime zone is of concern to both Norwegian and Russian authorities. Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how do Norway and Russia manage to avoid escalation in the case of a crisis? Whereas previous scholarly work has explicitly focused on the legal status of Svalbard and its maritime zones, or looked at how Norway manages fisheries in cooperation with Russia, this article brings forth new knowledge by examining the specific incidents in the Zone and placing these in the wider context of conflict theory. Limited to Norwegian perceptions of the dispute only, this article adds to our understanding of this specific issue of Arctic conflict management and governance. Based on several years of data collection through interviews, the argument put forth is that Norwegian and Russian cooperation is based on both mutual interests and the socializing effects of cooperative mechanisms, which are key to avoid escalation in crisis-scenarios. In sum, we need to recognise how a combination of economic interests and the effects of socialisation have enabled Norway and Russia to keep conflict levels low, when incidents at sea have occurred.

Official Documents

The Government of Norway: [Norway's Arctic Strategy – Between Geopolitics and Social Development](#) (2017)

The Government of Norway: [Norway's Arctic Policy](#) (2014)

The Government of Norway: [The High North: Visions and Strategies](#) (2011)

The Government of Norway: [New Building Blocks in the North: The Next Step in the Government's High North Strategy](#) (2009)