

NATO, The EU and The Arctic Literature Review

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Introduction

This literature review explores the renewed importance of the Arctic to NATO's security through the lenses of its alliance states. For the study's length, this paper focuses only on a limited number of countries in the Arctic Policy domain within the current and former EU Members States: The UK, Denmark, Greenland, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The literature review also includes sections on Canada as an important stakeholder in the Arctic debate, China and Turkey, based on their recent interests lead in the Arctic. The citations in the literature review have been sourced from academic articles and government reports published since 2017.

The literature review structure is as follows: each section includes a summary and key arguments about the country, or the organization followed by a thorough summary of academic articles reviewed on the subject matter. Hyperlinked documents or websites are also included in the summaries if the reader wishes to consult on a specific document further.

The NATO and the Arctic

NATO's involvement in the Arctic and some recurring arguments within the literature:

- “In April 2016, Secretary General Stoltenberg [...] confirmed the presence of Alliance in the Arctic underlying that Danish, Icelandic and Norwegian Forces are the main NATO forces in the region” and added that “the Alliance should follow the developments in the region because of Russian military moves there” (Podvorna and Zhovtenko, 2019:172).
- Stoltenberg also advocated for a continued collaboration among the Arctic littoral states to stabilise the level of tensions (Ibid).
- Looking at the tone of the NATO, there has been tendency to count on NATO's Arctic members to take on more proactive role on the discussion of the Arctic security issue for the Alliance (Ibid).
- So far, “the Alliance [has been taking] some actions rather in social, societal, humanitarian, and ecological dimensions” but security (Ibid).
- “NATO allies have been unable to agree on a collective response to the changing Arctic security Environment” (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:350).
- “While Norway regularly advocates for a stronger NATO presence in the area, Denmark, the US and Canada have repeatedly voiced their reservations, emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation over military deterrence” (Ibid).
- Historically being an opponent of NATO's involvement in the Arctic due to sovereignty issues, Canada has only eased its perspective on a proactive NATO in the Arctic in 2017 with the launch of its new defence policy *Strong Secure and Engaged*.
- The same degree of skepticism with respect to NATO's involvement to the Arctic was shared by non-aligned European NATO partners, Sweden and Finland, “both of which fear that a stronger NATO presence in the region could trigger a strong response from Russia and potentially lead to an escalation spiral that could drag the entire region into an arms race and a dangerous security dilemma (Ibid).
- Since 2007, “Russia has steadily increased its military presence and infrastructure in the Arctic, including resuming regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean” (Hamre and Conley, 2017:47).

- However, the Russian military expansion in the Arctic has started playing a greater role in NATO's strategic planning. "This was illustrated by the organization's Trident Juncture military exercises, involving more than 50,000 personnel, which took place in Norway and the Atlantic-Arctic region in October-November 2018. Thus, it seems that hard security is making a comeback to levels not seen since the Cold War" (Gjorv et al., 2020:3).
- However, "the state of military security in the High North is much less uniform" (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:349).
- "The increased build-up of Russian military infrastructure and capabilities in the Arctic has spurred new security concerns among Northern European NATO allies" (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:350).
- "Though the Alliance's presence in the High North becomes more visible, its Allies hold quite reserved position towards its deeper engagement. The only point the Arctic countries have agreed upon refers to Article V, recognizing NATO's importance for their security and defence at large.⁵² One can admit that a kind of unspoken consensus about limited NATO's presence in the High North is established. In consequence, the Arctic has not been directly mentioned in any of NATO fundamental documents and it lacks solid presence" (Podvorna and Zhovtenko, 2019:177).
- "NATO must understand that the Arctic is an increasingly important part of Russian military strategic calculation, as evidence by its growing defence modernization efforts as well as naval and air prowess: (Hamre and Conley, 2017:44).
- Yet, "the major problem corresponds to the fact that NATO does not clearly identify its interests in the region and cannot clearly frame its Arctic policy apart from general statements" (Podvorna and Zhovtenko, 2019:182).
- The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) has been so far "the most vocal for a stronger NATO role in the Arctic region" (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:351).
- The new NATO approach must entail maritime, air and missile defence capabilities to increase regional exercises and drive greater bilateral and regional defence efficiencies (Ibid).
- "A more focused and capable NATO in the North Atlantic involving the Arctic will enhance the Alliance unity, protect NATO from the external threats (Russia and China?) and reaffirm international rules and norms" (Ibid).
- There remains a clack of a collective response to the changing Arctic Environment and the Russian threat within the alliance. Divergences are as follows: Norway regularly seeks a stronger NATO presence in the area, whereas Denmark Finland, Sweden and the US expressed their reservations. Canada, although historically argued for a less NATO in the Arctic, especially in the Canadian Arctic due to matters of sovereignty, it is now more supportive of an increased NATO presence in the Northern Europe (The Department of National Defence, 2017).
- Sweden and Finland, both non-NATO partners but participating states in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program with Russia, fears that a larger NATO involvement in the region may trigger a stronger backlash from Russia (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:351).
- Although Russia and the West's relationship has taken a hit with the recent Russian Annexation of Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014, overall military presence and activities are significantly smaller in scale and far below the Cold War level (Ibid).
- "It seems highly unlikely that [NATO] will try to tackle the internally controversial allied strategy towards the Arctic any time soon. For now, it appears that Arctic

NATO members appreciate the alliance's potential support in the Arctic region, to the extent that it is also compatible with their regional political and economic interests" (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:352).

- Nevertheless “one might conclude that the Alliance consciously and successively tries to avoid producing of the comprehensive document on the region, acknowledging, from one side, interests and positions of its Arctic Allies, and from the other – attempting to avoid its engagement since it might endanger the situation in the region” (Podvorna and Zhovtenko, 2019:174).

Academic articles:

- Foggo, J. and Fritz, A. (2019) “NATO and The Challenge in the North Atlantic and the Arctic” in Olsen, J. (Ed.). (2019). Security in Northern Europe. London: Routledge.

Summary: The article looks at the potential challenges that NATO faces in the North Atlantic and the Arctic today and solutions. The authors pinpoint Russia as the biggest challenge for NATO. The central argument of the piece is that Russia has launched an unprecedented war against the West through its recently advanced military capabilities in the Arctic. According to the authors, Russian actions focused on conflict escalation instead of escalation avoidance with the West. This started with the annexation of Georgia and Crimea inciting tensions in the Baltic Region and followed by the recent occupation of seven former Soviet Union bases in the Arctic (Foggo and Fritz, 2019:123). The apparent militarisation of the Arctic by Russia risks destabilizing the region, which will diminish an era of extensive and peaceful economic cooperation between Russia and its neighbours. The authors list a range of new military technologies such as coastal defence missiles, land-based aircraft and air-defence systems, and, most importantly, the new counter-power-projection bastions that the US fears the most according to the text (Ibid). From the language the authors use, one can identify the text is written with an extremely Russian-sceptical approach: “Russian submarine today are perhaps some of the most silent and deadly in the world” (Ibid).

The authors also express their optimism about Russian one day, leaving its confrontational posture in the North Atlantic and re-joining the rules-based European order (Foggo and Fritz, 2019:137). But until then, they argue that all the NATO members must invest strategically in ways that complement each other’s forces and capabilities and avoid duplicate efforts. They give us an example of NATO’s Command Structure and the inclusion of a new Joint Force Command with a specific focus on the North Atlantic. They also talk about Trident Juncture 2018 in Norway as NATO’s most significant military exercise since the cold war and how we need to expand the scope and scale of military-led exercises as such.

NATO, Russia and Norway on the Arctic

Norway and the Arctic:

- “The largest maritime boundary dispute – between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea – was settled in 2010” (Osthagen, 2019:5).
- “For the Nordic countries, the Arctic integral to national defence policy” which is obvious from Norway’s long term defence plan [The defence of Norway: Capability and readiness](#) which was released in April 2020 (Osthagen, 2019:10).

- Norway is a significant contributor to NATO: Norway's contribution stretches beyond the defence of its own territory and to counter Russian anti-access efforts and secure the maritime domain. Its military is actively engaged in the Baltic and the Middle East (Tamnes, 2017:30).
- Norway shows increasing its defence capability: Norway needs three types of new strategic capabilities to be able to defend the north. These are purchasing 52 F-35, acquiring four new submarines from Germany to replace Ula class and enhancing intelligence and surveillance via acquiring five P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft replacing the P-3 fleet (Tamnes, 2017:20).
- Norway's Dual-track policy: While balancing deterring Russia, Norway, due to its proximity, must work together with Russia in the Arctic. This collaboration is on the areas of fisheries, environmental protection, search and rescue, coastguard. This frequent contact between two countries helps stabilize a potential escalation and the risk of unintentional provocation (Tamnes, 2017:30).

Academic articles:

Tamnes, R. (2017) "The Significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Contribution" in Olsen, A. (2017) *NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence*. [Online]. Taylor and Francis.

Summary: The article has a section on Russia's military capabilities in the Arctic. In this section, the author argues that Russia's objectives in the Arctic are equally ambitious as its objectives in the south – Central Europe and the Middle East. The section outlines Russia's key military capabilities in the north, including the Northern Fleet and the bastion defence, which stands as a strategic challenge to transatlantic defence for NATO. Specifically, the author highlights Russia's submarine capabilities have been identified on the coast of the US and Scotland which is home for UK's nuclear submarines: Trident. According to the author, Russia's hybrid maritime warfare that Russia carries through underwater vehicles and surveillance vessels can damage the US and Europe's surveillance networks. The article also talks in detail about the specific military equipment Russia has been investing for its Arctic Defence, including precision-guided missile technology and modernization of its surface fleet (Tamnes, 2017:20-26).

Overall, the author thinks although NATO has become a heterogeneous organization, it is still the best option as a collective Western response against Russia's expanding military activities in the region. While Tamnes acknowledges that NATO focuses on building a presence in the Baltic states and Poland via land and air forces, he thinks the organization lacks a coherent approach towards the north. In his opinion, a few things need to happen for NATO to refocus its energy on high north: Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces (VJTF) needs to be tailored for a northern crisis scenario that would, by default, involve Norway and Russia. NATO alliance members need to establish their multilateral and bilateral arrangements amongst each other without waiting for NATO as an organization to initiate for them. For this, he gives the example of a joint UK-Norwegian Declaration on Security in the north that was established in 2016. He thinks more of these bilateral joint defence cooperation needs to take place. They need to incorporate not just Alliance members but also non-aligned states such as Finland and Sweden, which are members of the Arctic Council and remain the key stakeholders in the region (Tamnes, 2017:28). For him, this reformed command structure is needed to tackle the Russian threat in the high north.

The piece dedicates a reasonably large section to Norway, its relationship with NATO and Russia. It concludes that from its front-line position due to its geographical proximity to Russia, Norway has a role play in both contributing to NATO's deterrence and defence capabilities in the Arctic but also maintaining its political dialogue with Russia.

The EU, NATO and the Arctic

Summary of the EU's Arctic Policy:

- “There is no formal document setting out firm, legally binding principles for the EU’s engagement with the Arctic” (Airoldi, 2020:338).
- Instead, “there has been a series of political pronouncements by EU institutions that, for a decade, and with different accents, concreteness, and precision, has elaborated on possible and desirable roles for the EU in the Arctic” (Ibid).
- *The EU and the Arctic Region* document, which was published in 2008, remains the most concrete and articulate EU text on Arctic Issues. Please see the document [here](#).
- In 2009, the EU Commission stressed that "the EU's policy approach to the Arctic issued should be based on multilateral governance and on maintaining the Arctic as an area of peace and stability" (Ibid).
- In 2011, the Commission and the High Representative submitted a Joint Communication on developing an EU policy towards the Arctic region. 2011 resolution compared to that of 2009 demonstrated more emphasis on an 'EU-led' Arctic cooperation rather than multilateral governance.
- In 2014, the EU Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic, followed by Council conclusions on *Developing EU Policy towards the Arctic Region*. This initiative demonstrated the growing strategic importance of the Arctic region and invited the EU to enhance its contribution to Arctic cooperation. It also requested proposals for the further development of an integrated and coherent Arctic policy” (Airoldi, 2020:339).
- In 2016, the EU finally launched the *Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic*, which has been approved by the parliament in 2017. Please see the document [here](#). The strategy involves both soft and hard power, as well as autonomous and multilateral solutions in addressing security challenges in the Arctic (Ibid). The document states that the cooperative Arctic requires a cooperative European response.
- Yet, the EU's new arctic strategy does not reveal any ambitions for the EU involving hard security issues in the Arctic, leaving the union's role limited to engaging in ‘soft issues’ and reinforcing diplomatic ties and cooperation with all relevant actors most importantly with Russia.
- These ‘soft’ issues are climate change and environmental security, maritime security and energy security (Ibid).
- In the new EU Arctic Policy, Russia only comes up within the context of ND. "The strategy highlights EU-Russia interdependence and pledges to engage with Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate when both countries' interests overlap" (Airoldi, 2020:340).
- The EU Arctic Policy's priority areas are climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment, sustainable development in and around the Arctic and international cooperation on Arctic issues.
- EU's Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, which was released in June 2016, also mentions the Arctic in The Priorities of our External Action under Cooperative Regional Orders and (EU Commission, 2016:9).

- However, EU's Arctic Policy "with its expressed aspiration to guide EU actions in the coming years, does not really respond to the Council's request for a coherent and integrated policy," and this is due to the divergent interests of the EU member states on the Arctic (Airoldi, 2020:341).
- It is possible that "the main goal of EU Arctic policy was to keep the Arctic as a low-tension area despite renewed Russian military activity in the region, although the role the EU could play to defuse potential security challenges" (Ibid).
- EU's participation in the Arctic Council as a permanent observer is critical. Its admissions are widely supported by the Arctic Council and EU member states such as Finland, Germany, and Sweden.
- Arctic-interested member states within the EU exhibit divergent opinions on the EU's common Arctic policy and the degree to which the EU should be involved in the Arctic matters. Although France, Finland, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy advocated a more intrusive or involved EU Policy in the Arctic, Denmark, and the United Kingdom has a former member showed skepticism.
- Overall, "all Member states with an Arctic interest publicly support the EU's application for Arctic Council observer status" (Raspotnik, 2018:122).
- In 2019, the EU Commission's European Political Strategy Centre released its strategy note [*Walking on Thin Ice: A Balanced Arctic Strategy for the EU*](#). The document talks about the importance of science and research in the Arctic, focusing on the EU's upcoming Horizon Europe Framework Programme.
- The document says that "there should be regular updates regarding Arctic development at the Political and Security Committee and during EU Council meetings" (European Commission, 2019:12).
- Accordingly, the document suggests that the EU Parliament's role should be strengthened in the EU's Arctic Policy formulation (Ibid).

Academic articles:

- Chuffart, R. & Raspotnik, A. (2019) "The EU and its Arctic spirit: Solving Arctic climate change from home?" *European View* [Online] 18 (2), 156–162.

Summary: This article argues that the EU's involvement in Arctic matters can be identified in three ways: climate change and the environment, sustainable development in the Arctic and EU's internal cooperation with other member states on Arctic security and defence issues. Amongst the three, the authors choose the first as the focus of the article. The authors suggest that the EU be more proactive and devote more resources and attention to domestic policy frameworks on energy transition and climate change mitigation to fight climate change in the Arctic. Accordingly, they suggest the EU can leverage its commitment to international multilateral agreements like the Paris Climate Change Agreement 2015 to ensure regional governance, including the European Arctic. Although the article does not talk about Arctic security matters for the EU, albeit it is a useful article to understand why the EU's involvement in the region has been historically through the promotion of environmental protection over common defence policy.

- Riddervold, M. & Cross, M. K. D. (2019) "Reactive power EU: Russian aggression and the development of an EU Arctic policy" *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 24 (1), 43–60.

Summary: This article looks at the development of an EU led Arctic Policy and its factors. According to the authors, the two main factors that catalyzed or facilitated the EU to re-shift

its focus on the Arctic were: the Arctic being part of Global Commons and the rise of a Russian threat near geographies of the Bloc, the Baltic Sea.

The EU's development of its collective defence policy in the Arctic dates to the start of Russian aggression in Crimea in 2014. Neither environmental concerns nor pure economic interests can explain this development. According to the authors, this is an example of a demonstration of reactive power by the EU when facing common geopolitical threats like Russia. As authors mention, the member states such as Finland, Sweden and the Baltic States, which formerly argued for a stronger Northern dimension to EU's foreign and security policies but turned down by other states, finally received the support by the rest of the union. In other words, the authors argue, "EU tends to react to emerging power threats in other regions with new common policies in related areas, giving the EU more capacity to influence international outcomes as a single, coherent actor" (Riddervold and Cross, 2019:8).

The continuous foreign policy challenges that the EU has faced with Russia in the near geographies of the union, such as the annexation of Crimea, has played a catalyst role in EU's motivation to update its own Arctic policy in 2016. With its new Arctic policy, the EU has shifted its focus from soft-power issues such as the environment and development into a more foreign and defence policy-focused. The authors find that in fragile 'geopolitical' environments, the EU states prefer to develop common policies to counter powers and gain more influence over future developments. So, the first hypothesis is that the EU's involvement in the Arctic is instead a response against Russia's self-declaration of a major power in the Arctic. Overall the main argument of the article is that the EU's 2016 push on a common Arctic Policy demonstrates how collective policies in one policy-area are formed in response to perceived threats in another interrelated policy area. As a second hypothesis, the authors also add that the Arctic is in the Global Commons that also encouraged the EU to act and develop a new foreign policy field wouldn't be able to do otherwise. "First, as discussed above, we expect that the Arctic is part of the Global Commons had some bearing on enabling EU power in this case" (Riddervold and Cross, 2019:17). We expect that the Arctic is part of the Global Commons and has some bearing on enabling EU power in this case. "The future order of the Global maritime Commons is still in the making, and these are therefore areas where the EU might be better able to play a bigger and more significant role than in other, more conventional foreign policy areas" (Ibid).

Denmark and the Arctic:

- Denmark supports the EU's application as a permanent observer to the Arctic Council (Raspotnik, 2018:120).
- "Unlike other Western countries, the Danish Government was careful to keep Russia's criticisms out of Arctic forums during the Ukraine Crisis, and Denmark remains skeptical of the value of enhances role for NATO in the region" Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:183).
- Given Greenland's geographic proximity to the Arctic, Denmark is the only EU member that is also a member of the Arctic Five" and NATO.
- "Present-day sources of agitation in Greenland and Denmark include minerals extraction and transport development projects involving China and others [...] as well as environmental security issues, liked to the US military presence in North Greenland" (Airoldi, 2020:345).

- “In 2011, Denmark adopted a special Arctic strategy: in 2012, it merged its military assets in the High North into a new joint Arctic Command” (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2020:351).
- As opposed to other Scandinavian EU Member states, Denmark has not joined the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO).
- “Greenland [a]s a regional entity within the Kingdom of Denmark [...] has more autonomy than any other subnational actor in the Arctic and, unlike other Inuit polities, it has a clear path to independence codified in the 2009 Self-Government Act” (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2020:176).
- Interestingly “this makes it most likely to place to see the impact of Inuit empowerment and local authority structures on security dynamics” (Ibid).
- “The opening of the Arctic has altered political-military security dynamics in Greenland in four ways: increasing Greenland’s influence over Danish-American relations, introducing other great-powers players into Greenland (such as China), engaging Denmark in regional diplomacy, and necessitating active uranium safeguard management (Ibid).
- "Military tensions in the Arctic would stretch Denmark's limited Arctic capabilities and necessitate investments in High North defence and a strengthened American presence in Greenland" (Ibid).
- This may weaken Denmark's ability to demonstrate its sovereignty over Greenland and further complicate its strained relationship.
- Greenland and Denmark are signatories of the [Ilulissat Declaration](#) 2008 alongside other Arctic states: the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark.

Finland and the Arctic:

- “Both Finland and Sweden [historically] expressed their general intention to support an explicit EU policy for the Arctic region” (Raspotnik, 2018:119). This was in contrast with Denmark, which perceived the EU’s multilateral governance approach towards the Arctic as an ‘aggressive outsider wanting to enter the Arctic stage’ (Ibid).
- “In its 2010 Strategy for the Arctic Region, Finland referred to the EU as a ‘global Arctic player’ and discussed the EU’s Arctic role the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and [Northern Dimension](#) (ND)” (Raspotnik, 2018:120). ND is a joint policy framework developed between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland in 1999.
- Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013) focuses on seven priorities: security, environment, economy, infrastructure, indigenous peoples, institutions and the EU.
- In 2016, the Finland Government updated its *strategy for the Arctic Region 2013* with an emphasis on four main priority areas: a strong role within the Arctic Council and leadership position in the EU Arctic Policy, increased arctic expertise, sustainable tourism and new infrastructure including the regions’ wireless network project and the Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel project which the feasibility studies are taking place to this day (Prime Minister’s Office Finland, 2016).
- Finland aims to strengthen security policy stability in the Arctic in line with sustainable development (Ibid).
- Finland identifies the Arctic Council as a forum for discussion and decision making and suggests strengthening the Council by installing better burden-sharing and joint budget amongst members.

- Along with Sweden and Denmark, Finland places significant importance on the EU's Arctic Policy, advocating for the EU as a supranational organization to admit to the Arctic Council as a permanent observer.
- "Finland sees the EU as a key actor in the Arctic region and supports efforts to consolidate the EU's Arctic Policy" (Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2017:2).
- "From Finland's perspective, Arctic policy should be made one of the priorities of the EU's external relations" (Ibid).
- "As the strategic importance of the Arctic region is increasing, the EU's common foreign and security policy (CSDP) should pay more attention to it" (Ibid).
- Finland will facilitate the implementation and monitoring of the EU's third Arctic Communication at the national and EU levels.

Sweden and the Arctic:

- Historically, "Swedish security perceptions remained firmly rooted in the Baltic State region (BSR)" (Gjorv et al., 2020).
- Swedish geopolitical and military security concerns are majorly on BSR.
- Unlike Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea, Sweden does not include the Arctic in its hard security issues. "Ideas exist about how these relate to the Arctic as a security-political context, but they only rarely come to the fore in Swedish [domestic] politics" (Eklund, 2020:209).
- "The lack of hard security agenda in the Arctic Council has contributed to Swedish success" (Eklund, 2020:208).
- Sweden recognizes the Arctic as mainly a climate change issue, not on security issues, and this partly stems from the fact that Sweden is not part of NATO as a result of its military non-alignment policy.
- Swedish public opinion on NATO membership has always been in flux. Even after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, half of the population believed that Sweden's interests would be the best serviced outside of a NATO membership (Simons et al., 2019:8).
- To this day, "the doctrine of non-alliance and neutrality in a European war is deeply rooted in the Swedish political self-image and among most Swedish citizens," which is reflected in Sweden's reluctance to get involved in the ongoing conflict with Russia in the Arctic (Eklund, 2020:211).
- "Swedish involvement in NORDEFCO may over time increase the priority of Arctic security concerns for Sweden due to Norwegian influence" (Eklund, 2020:210). Nevertheless, the likelihood of a direct or immediate Swedish involvement in Arctic Security is very low.
- "Sweden has forged closer security-political ties with Europe via the EU" and "through the development of particularly close ties with the countries of the Baltic Sea Region" (Eklund, 2020:209).
- Although Sweden is not a NATO member, it has spurred expanded cooperation with NATO by actively participating in NATO-led military activities under the Partnership for Peace umbrella (Ibid).
- A potential NATO membership for Sweden can be a game-changer facilitating a shift in Swedish security perceptions toward the Arctic (Eklund, 2020:213).
- While its European and Scandinavian counterparts would most welcome Sweden's accession to NATO and gaining a distinct role in the Arctic Security, this may spur a potential Russian reaction against Sweden (Ibid).

- "There is an increasing level of cooperation and collaboration with NATO, short of official membership at this stage" (Simons et al., 2019:11). However, NATO membership is still a divisive issue for Swedish society. This is based on concerns over Sweden's neutrality and the presumed existential threat from Russia with its historical roots.
- Both Sweden and Denmark partake in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program (Airoldi, 2020:349).

Academic articles:

- Efjestad, S. (2019) "The Nordic Region" in Olsen, J. (Ed.). (2019). Security in Northern Europe. London: Routledge.

Summary: This article, divided into two main sections, first offers a historical overview of the Nordic cooperation from the cold war to this day then talks about the foundation of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO), which includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. More specifically, the author dives into the seven elements of the cooperation: policy discussions, exchange information on the assessment of international security, technological interoperability (the adoption of NATO procedures and standards), cross-border training, the ability for military deployment across the partners' territories at short notice, international peacekeeping operations and lastly extension of military equipment. We can argue that although NORDEFECO is not cooperation overtly established on Arctic Defence per se, many of the elements Efjestad outlines are by default indicate how deeply NORDEFECO is engaged in the Arctic. An excellent example of that would be the biannual [Arctic Challenge Exercises](#) (ACE), which the last one was conducted in 2019 and organized by Norway, Sweden and Finland. ACE 19 provided an opportunity to train large-scale planning and lead air operations in a real-like operating environment that involves a wide range of aircraft and forces of modern air warfare. Nevertheless, as Efjestad reminds us, none of these operations can replace the NATO operations. The Nordic states do not see NORDEFECO as an alternative by any means or the EU, but rather a collective intra-Nordic effort that complements the broader institutional framework for security cooperation.

Although NORDEFECO shows some high strength on specific aspects of collaboration, such as northern challenge exercises amongst the members, nevertheless, this level of cooperation does not apply to all aspects of NORDEFECO or does not exist amongst all member states. For example, the collaboration between Sweden and Finland seems to be the strongest via a set of programs to which they subscribed. These are Enhanced Opportunity partners of NATO, agreed to the Host Nation Support agreements with NATO, are associated with NATO Readiness Forces and participate in German-led Framework Nation Concept and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (Efjestad, 2019:43). On the other hand, Denmark and Norway do not exhibit the same level of collaboration on long-term joint defence planning. This problem partly stems from Denmark not being a NATO alliance (Efjestad, 2019:42). Overall, for NORDEFECO to be a complementary force to the EU and NATO on their Nordic defence planning, all participatory countries should work on long-term joint defence plans which would facilitate the development of joint defence procurement and joint invention.

- Osthagen, A. (2019) “The New Geopolitics of the Arctic: Russia, China and the EU” *Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies* [online]. Available [here](#).

On NORDEFO, Osthagen claims that “in recent years NORDEFECO’s aspirations have grown. However, it is plagued by the same challenges faced by the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, namely diverging approaches to security and defence, and a preference by some members to operate within the NATO framework” (2019:10).

- Mazurier, P., Delgado-Moran, J. and Paya-Santos, C. (2019) “The Meta-Tragedy of the Commons. Climate Change and the Securitization of the Arctic Region” in Olsen, J. (Ed.). (2019). *Security in Northern Europe*. Routledge.

Summary: The article looks at the interactions between the three main dimensions of the Arctic region's securitization process. These are the Arctic ecological change due to Climate Change, the new business opportunities for transnational actors due to the energy reserves and the logistical trade services the Arctic offer, and national and transnational securitization of the Arctic. It argues that if we combine these three dynamics, given the Arctic international affairs' current intergovernmental structure, the outcome will prioritize both business and security over ecology. One interesting point about this article is the section on the participation of Asian partners' involvement in the Arctic in the past couple of years. For the authors, their acceptance represents a process of international recognition for their key position as new emergent powers.

Another important point the article also makes is that while "sovereign disputes and economic race are strongly played in the bilateral, intergovernmental and local scenarios, the institutional ecosystem related to the United Nations is focused primarily on the environmental struggle" (2019:60). At the same time, the article talks about European states' individual state-level interests in Section 6 (2019:69-70).

The section on China and its dispute with Denmark over Greenland (pp.70-71):

One finds Section 7 on China's Arctic Policy very convincing. China obtained its 'observer' status within the Arctic Council in 2013. Mazurier et al., think that this acceptance, which was mainly supported by the Nordic countries, was to counterbalance the US and Russia power within the Council (Mazurier et al., 2019: 71). After its accession into the Council as an observer, China signed its first free-trade agreement (FTA) with Iceland.

In 2018, China announced that it would invest 2 billion dollars in Greenland’s mining sector, which would allow Greenland to become a significant exporter of uranium. This generated massive political predicament to Denmark’s securitization of Greenland. Greenland is still an apart of the Kingdom of Denmark but with its substantial political autonomy, and one can imagine the Chinese economic interest in Greenland may play a role in ongoing debates over future Greenlandic independence. According to Mazurier et al., there are two arguments about China’s ongoing involvement in the Arctic. The first one is more reassuring China’s collaborative behaviour in the region. With the development of its bilateral trade relationship with Iceland and Greenland, China is consolidating it imagines as a powerful nevertheless, a ‘collaborative’ regional actor. Therefore, one can determine that China’s ongoing involvement in the Arctic would not create a short-term or middle term concern for the Western countries. China’s interest in the region can be recognized as purely economic. The second one is more skeptical. With its attainment of an observer status within the Arctic

Council, China is intended to internationally expand its network of logistics and commercial initiatives via projects such as Polar Silk Road and Silk Road Economic Belt over the Arctic.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to see all these projects as purely economic. Through its involvement in the Arctic, China aspired to become a major responsible power that can help the minor countries in the region and equally create a risk for the fragile Arctic environment. China may do this via accelerating the race of exploitation for natural resources and establishing itself as a major political power against Russia and the US.

- Olsen, J. (Ed.). (2019). *Security in Northern Europe*. London: Routledge.

Summary: This book analyzes individual EU and EEA policies and stances on a comprehensive Arctic Security Policy. While Sweden, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland and Germany primarily are the Baltic Sea oriented, the United Kingdom the Netherlands and Norway take a greater interest in the North Atlantic region against the Russian threat. This is in the context of growing capabilities and expanding military force of Russia and employing this to achieve political ends. The annexation of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 demonstrate that Russia is prepared to violate international law to address its own national and regional ambitions, which sharpens NATO's focus on Russia, and there still exists diversity and distinctions amongst allies and partners.

One argument is that the Baltic-Nordic region could easily defend itself against Russia with its combined GDP higher than Russia's combines and its significant military resources. But according to Edward Lucas (cited in the book), the issue is that the region's military potential suffers from divisions with Sweden and Finland not being in NATO. Some are not belonging to the EU (therefore cannot fully join CSDP and PESCO). While the existing security and defence cooperation organization such as Nordics and NORDEFECO indeed represent a step further in the right direction, nevertheless, it excludes the Baltic States and Poland. Accordingly, the cross-border training for air forces, within the framework of NORDEFECO, the biannual *Arctic Challenge air exercise* now represents and of the biggest and most complex air exercises in Western Europe in which the US, France and the UK have participated. The Nordic ministers of defence have agreed to develop *the Arctic Challenge* further into a flag exercise, which might become more complex and demanding in time. The book's key message is that a combination of a two-fold track of deterrence and defence combined against Russia can only be achieved if all NATO allies demonstrate a profound understanding for each other countries' individual but as well as common needs.

- Schaller, B. and Sam-Aggrey, H. (2020) "NATO, The OSCE, and the Arctic Region" in Gjørsv, G., Lanteigne, M. and Sam-Aggrey, H. (2020) *Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security*, Routledge.

Summary: This article discusses the roles, approaches and relevance of the Arctic for NATO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which is the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization.

- The OSCE is the world's largest intergovernmental security organization established and accomplished in 1975 in Helsinki as a part of the Helsinki Accords (OSCE, 2020).
- "The OSCE follows a comprehensive approach to security in its area of jurisdiction [so] unlike the Arctic Council, it covers aspects of security across the entire spectrum,

ranging from traditional politico-military security to environmental and economic security, all the way to human security, holding that each dimension affects the others" (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2019:353).

- "As with NATO, the Arctic does not feature prominently on the different OSCE agendas" (Ibid).
- In the politico-military security dimension, the Arctic only seems to be a peripheral region to the OSCE. In the past few years, OSCE has done some work on climate-related risks and environmental security in the Arctic.
- The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE (OSCE PA) is the most active body of the organization with respect to Arctic issues. In 2019, OSCE PA appointed Torill Eidsheim from Norway as Special Representative on Arctic Issues with a mandate to contact and follow up on the work of the OSCE regarding Arctic Issues. There is an informative article on Eidsheim's role [here](#).
- Although a supportive member of the organization, Canada has opposed further involvement of OSCE in the Arctic due to sovereignty concerns in the High North. These concerns are "the disputed legal status of the Northwest Passage and unresolved border issues with Denmark and the US" (Ibid).
- "There is significant potential for an enhanced OSCE role in Arctic security issues. However, given the current lack of a political consensus for greater involvement of the OSCE in Arctic issues" as well as some Arctic states' hesitancy to open the region to any third party, such as Russia and Canada] coupled with financial constraints within the organization, it is unlikely that the OSCE will take a more substantial role in the Arctic in the near future, it is doubtful that the OSCE will take a stronger role in the Arctic in the near future (Schaller and Sam-Aggrey, 2019:356).

The UK and the Arctic:

- "UK published its Arctic policy framework in October 2013. Unsurprisingly, the EU was hardly mentioned and only directly referred to with regards to a cooperative approach on matters of sustainable Arctic fisheries and management" (Rasputnik, 2018:121).
- "Part of what drives British interest in the Arctic, alongside commercial interest in resource extraction and shipping-related activities, is an awareness of how technological developments and innovation is creating new knowledges and new opportunities in the Arctic" (Depledge et al., 2019:3).
- "The UK is probably the only [former] European power that could credibly take command of NATO maritime forces in the North Atlantic, given its comparative advantage in [maritime] capabilities" (Chalmers, cited in Olsen, 2017:39).
- Like the other Member States, the UK has long supported EU's case for permanent observer status within the Arctic Council.
- Like other EU Member States, the Ukraine/Crimea crisis in 2014 and diplomatic standoffs with Russia encouraged the UK to make the High North a priority in its defence and security policy (Depledge et al., 2019:2).
- "American concerns about the possibility of future Chinese military activity in the Arctic are also being raised in the UK, although London has not gone as far as to use the same kind of confrontational language coming out of Washington" (Ibid).
- Accordingly, the UK published its latest Arctic strategy [*Beyond the Ice: UK towards the Arctic*](#) in 2018.

- The strategy “illustrated UK attempts to address four major environmental hazards in the region: threats to the marine conversation, marine litter, pollution and dangers to local bird populations” (Sam-Aggrey and Lanteigne, 2020:108).
- The UK’s scientific research in the Arctic as well as its economic activities in maritime sector constitutes an integral part of the EU’s credentials in the Arctic and therefore, there is no doubt that UK’s exit from the EU will have concrete implications for the EU’s role in the Arctic (Raspotnik, 2018:122).
- “While the UK would like to see greater alliance unity with regard to the High North, its more immediate focus has been on enhancing its defence partnerships with northern European nations and the United States” (Depledge et al., 2019:5).
- Considering the impacts of the Brexit on the UK’s approach to the Arctic “it is no longer possible to understand the future politics of the North Atlantic and [the Arctic] without also having some appreciation of the multinational character of the UK state [after the Brexit]” (Chalmers, cited in Olsen, 2017:39).
- The departure of the UK from the EU will allow the country to bear less burden to protect the EU’s eastern and southern borders and instead focus on NATO and potentially the North Atlantic and Arctic (Ibid).
- The UK’s ongoing partnership with Norway and the US which has been enhancing interoperability between the Royal Marines, US Marine Corps and Norwegian armed forces are likely to continue and potentially improve after Brexit.
- One complication the UK will be facing after Brexit is its relationship with Scotland which has been increasingly assertive in pushing and defining its own Arctic credentials since 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum (Depledge et al., 2019:6).
- According to Kruse, Scotland could release its own Arctic policy in the near future as “remaining a sub-national state does not exempt the country from the possibility of developing an Arctic policy of its own” yet facing limitations when it comes to hard security issues due its constitutional position with the UK (2016:8).
- Consequently, Scotland has launched its own Arctic Policy Framework called [Arctic Connections: Scotland’s Arctic Policy Framework](#) in 2019.
- If the US lessens its support for the NATO as we are currently seeing from the Trump Administration’s ongoing skepticism and anti-Europe rhetoric, this may trigger a more influential the UK and EU member state contribution to the NATO in post-Brexit times. UK can increase its commitment to NATO via increasing its defence spending. The EU member states can do the same via their commitment to Permanent Structured Cooperation 2017 (PESCO) as a part of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Details are to be seen.
- “The 2019 launch of an Arctic defence strategy by the MOD is also fully mindful of the reality that the UK still needs European partners, drawn both from NATO and EU as well as from non-NATO and non-EU friends and allies” (Depledge et al., 2019:8).

Canada and the Arctic:

- Perry, D. (2019) “Canada and Security in Northern Europe” in Olsen, J. (Ed.). (2019). Security in Northern Europe. London: Routledge.

Summary: This article talks about Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy within the scope of its new defence policy ‘Strong Secure and Engaged’ 2017 (SSE) and its perception of the Russian threat in the Arctic. The author indicates that Canadian officials acknowledge the

modernization of the Russian military and its strategic capability in its Arctic territory. This represents a significant upgrade of Russia's globally deployable strategic forces, which, while based in the Russian Arctic, can be employed anywhere in the world (Perry cited in Olsen, 2019:114). According to Perry, under the Trudeau Government's new defence policy SSE 2017, Canada recognizes both the need to invest with the US in the Arctic of North American defence via NORAD and the growing importance of the Arctic to NATO. SSE 2017 signals that Canada's long-term plans for military investment include multiple enhancements to Canada's Arctic military capability, specifically in North American Defence such as North Warning System early-warning radar: intelligence and surveillance, space-based communications and logistical arrangements including the Forward Operating Locations for the RCAF. Under the SSE, Canada now also appears to be more supportive of NATO operations in the Arctic, which presents a significant change to Canadian policy, given the fact that under the Harper Government, Canada always opposed NATO's involvement in the Arctic due to sovereignty issues.

Nevertheless, one can say that Canada's arctic policy towards Russia is somewhat convoluted. On the one hand, Canada does not recognize an immediate active military threat presented by Russia in its Arctic border. However, on the other hand, it seems keen to support collective defence through NATO in North-eastern Europe (Perry cited in Olsen, 2019:116).

China and the Arctic:

- In 2018, the Chinese government officially released a White Paper on China's Arctic Policy (Xinmin, 2019:1).
- "China is developing an increasingly capable blue water navy capacity that finds its way into all the globe's strategic water spaces. The Chinese navy is increasing its exercises with Russia in the Pacific, Atlantic, and the Arctic. It is also increasingly interested in 227 DSCFC 19 E 3 protecting shipping routes for Chinese commerce across all major global seas – to include the new shipping route in the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route (NSR)" (NATO, 2019:2)
- "As several Chinese briefers noted, developing useable sea lanes of communication in the Arctic is of great strategic importance to China. They noted that China seeks to also be a partner in the joint development of Arctic resources. In addition to the value of saved time and distance of the NSR, it was said, Arctic sea routes also have the benefit of avoiding the piracy threats in the Malacca Straits and in the Gulf of Eden." (NATO, 2019:5).
- China outlines four major policy goals in the Arctic: to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic" (SCIO, 2018), and these goals are guided by four main principles "respect, cooperation, win-win result and sustainability" (Xinmin, 2019:5).
- China has acquired its 'observer status' in the Arctic Council in 2013 (Mazurier et al., 2019:70).
- China recognizes that the Arctic does fall into national jurisdiction and the only the high seas and the area beyond national jurisdiction within the Arctic belong to the global domain (Xinmin, 2019:1).
- This special status of Arctic both involving national jurisdictions and the global domain, which give both Arctic and Non-Arctic states an opportunity and 'right' to get involved. China bases its involvement in the Arctic on these rationales (Ibid).

- “China is committed to the existing framework of international law including the UN Charter, UNCLOS, treaties on climate change and the environment, and relevant rules of the International Maritime Organization, and to addressing various traditional and non-traditional security threats through global, regional, multilateral and bilateral mechanisms, and to building and maintaining a just, reasonable, and well-organized Arctic governance system” (SCIO, 2018).
- Chinese government's position on the existing international governance mechanisms on the Arctic is that "while [they] should be maintained and respected, they be also developed so as to meet the changing needs overtime” (Xinmin, 2019:4).
- “The Chinese side endeavours to work together with all relevant parties, and, in the spirit of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, to continue to promote the steady and orderly development of international governance of the Arctic” (Ibid). "As the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister stated, China will not overstep and has no intentions to pose any challenge against the territorial sovereignty of the Arctic States” (Ibid). Nor is China intended to intervene in the internal affairs of the Arctic States. In this respect, China will also guide Chinese entities to carry out their business activities in the Arctic with respect to the law (Ibid).
- China’s interest in the Arctic:
 1. Geographical proximity: China being a near-arctic state and close enough to the Arctic, is prone to be affected by the changing natural conditions of the Arctic. Certainly, the ongoing climate change and melting ice in the Arctic with rising sea levels are transforming China's agricultural, forestry, fishing and marine industries (Ibid).
 2. Tackling climate change: China sees itself as bearing responsibility in maintaining international peace and security in the Arctic. "China also enjoys rights and bears corresponding obligations about scientific research, navigation, overflight [...] resource exploration and exploitation in the high seas and the area within the Arctic Ocean" (Ibid).
 3. Commercial interests: As a major trading nation and energy consumer, China is interested in utilizing sea routes, namely the north-east passage, which offers a faster route to many ports. This is alongside China's interest in the exploration and development of resources in the Arctic, such as uranium in Greenland, as mentioned earlier in Mazurier et al., 2019. According to Xinmin, “it may thus be anticipated that China’s capital, technology, market, knowledge and experience will play a major role expanding the network of shipping routes in the Arctic and facilitating the economic and social progress of the coastal States along the routes” (2019:5).
- Overall, we can argue that Arctic affairs are of concern to China's interests in terms of its natural ecological environment, economic and social interests, and sustainable development (Ibid).

Academic articles:

- Mazurier, P., Delgado-Moran, J. and Paya-Santos, C. (2019) “The Meta-Tragedy of the Commons. Climate Change and the Securitization of the Arctic Region in Olsen, J. (Ed.). (2019). Security in Northern Europe. Routledge.

The section on China (2019:7, 70-71):

China obtained its 'observer' status within the Arctic Council in 2013. Mazurier et al. think that this acceptance, which was mainly supported by the Nordic countries, was to counterbalance the US and Russia power within the Council (Mazurier et al., 2019: 71). After its accession into Council as an observer, China signed its first free-trade agreement (FTA) with Iceland.

In 2018, China also announced that it would invest 2 billion dollars in Greenland's mining sector, which would allow Greenland to become a large exporter of uranium. This generated massive political predicament to Denmark's securitization of Greenland. Greenland is still an apart of the Kingdom of Denmark but with its own substantial political autonomy, and one can imagine the Chinese economic interest in Greenland may play a role in ongoing debates over future Greenlandic independence. According to Mazurier et al., there are two arguments about China's ongoing involvement in the Arctic. The first one is more reassuring China's collaborative behaviour in the region. With the development of its bilateral trade relationship with Iceland and Greenland, China is consolidating it imagines as a powerful nevertheless, a 'collaborative' regional actor. Therefore, one can determine that China's ongoing involvement in the Arctic would not create a short-term or middle term concern for the Western countries. China's interest in the region can be recognized as purely economic. The second one is more skeptical. With its attainment of an observer status within the Arctic Council, China is intended to internationally expand its network of logistics and commercial initiatives in the north. It is planning on doing this via projects such as Polar Silk Road and Silk Road Economic Belt over the Arctic, yet its intentions are not purely economic. Through its involvement in the Arctic, China aspired to become a major responsible power that can help the minor countries in the region and equally create a risk for the fragile Arctic environment. China may do this via accelerating the race of exploitation for natural resources and establishing itself as a major political power against Russia and the US.

- Xinmin, M. (2019) “China’s Arctic policy on the basis of international law: Identification, goals, principles and positions” in Marine Policy

Summary: The article analyses China’s very first White Paper on its Arctic Policy, which was launched in 2018. For this, it looks at the six critical issues outlined in the White paper: China’s views on the legal status on the Arctic, China’s role in the Arctic, China’s perspectives on the legal order the Arctic, reasons for China to partake in Arctic affairs, policies forming China’s participation in the Arctic affairs and China’s involvement in Arctic Affairs. According to the article, policies and positions that guide Chinese interest in the Arctic are scientific research and expedition, protection of environment and ecosystem in the Arctic, utilization of resources via Chinese enterprises exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mineral in the Arctic (Xinmin, 2019:7).

Turkey and the Arctic:

- [The Polar Research Centre](#) (PolRec) at Istanbul University was founded in 2015 to conduct scientific research in Antarctica and the Arctic and act as a research institute among various Turkish universities. Thorough the conduct of scientific research in both poles, Turkey aims to improve its visibility on the subject matter and contribute to ongoing scientific studies around the world.

- Consequently, the Turkish Ministry of Industry and Technology has also launched “The National Polar Science Program,” which aims to be conducted between 2018-2022 (The Ministry of Industry and Technology, 2018:3).
- Consecutively Turkey established [the Polar Research Institute \(PRI\)](#), which was established under the Scientific and Technological Research of Turkey (TUBITAK) in 2019. This new institute, which is focused on the Arctic and Antarctica, is to enable Turkish scientists to partake in international research in the Arctic with the collaboration of other countries including the UK, Canada and Ukraine, and ultimately promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation on polar sciences.
- Turkey has conducted three scientific excursions to Antarctica in 2016, 2017, 2019 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2020) and now has one research station in Horseshoe island in Antarctica (The Ministry of Industry and Technology, 2018:23).
- Turkey currently has an observer status in the Antarctic Treaty System, The recent efforts of Turkey through its scientific research in the continent reflects Turkey’s aim to become a signatory state in the treaty system (BBC News Turkey, 2019).
- Turkey aspires to list PRI as a member of various research institutions on Arctic and Antarctica. These organizations are [Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs \(COMNAP\)](#) which has now 30 members including Chinese and Korean polar research institutes, [Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research \(SCAR\)](#) and [International Arctic Science Committee \(IASC\)](#).
- “Even though the National Polar Science plan makes it clear that Antarctica is the priority, Ankara also has ambitions in the north” (Depledge et al., 2020:1).
- In 2015, Turkey applied to become an observer member of the AC, and the application is still yet to be approved.
- “As interest in the Arctic has grown around the world because of climate change and the promise of commercial opportunities and [new sea routes],” Turkey is not alone with its aspirations to become an observer country in AC (Depledge et al. 2020:2).
- Turkey’s ongoing activities in the Arctic are not solely about acquiring a say or prestige in the international community but also linked to its commercial interest in the region (Ibid:3).
- “Turkey may also be looking to mimic other polar powers such as the UK, which have linked the need for polar science to the possibility of generating commercial spinoffs” (Ibid).
- Thorough its recent scientific excursions in the Arctic, aside from retaining an observant status in the AC, Turkey also aims to become a signatory country to Svalbard Treaty, which it believes will enable the country to conduct business in various sectors from fishing to logistics.
- Being aware of the need to enhance its credentials for its observer status membership for the AC, Turkey has conducted its very first scientific research in the Arctic in July 2019 and established its very first research station in Svalbard Islands thorough the PolRec.
- The first national scientific expedition to the Arctic was sponsored by one of the biggest private banks in Turkey. You can see the video advertisement [here](#).
- Thorough its recent scientific conduct in the Arctic, Turkey sees scientific activity as an opportunity for engaging in science diplomacy with the rest of the leading countries on Arctic issues (Depledge et al., 2020:2).

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