Arctic Military Development in 2020: Three Key Trends

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While COVID19 had a sizable impact on Arctic military activities during the first few months of 2020, some of which are still being felt, the pandemic has not derailed the overall trajectory of action in the region. Indeed, events in 2020 amplified three interrelated trends in Arctic military affairs which are influencing and will continue to influence the geopolitical and security situation in the region for the foreseeable future, specifically:

1) Overall increasing military presence and posturing in the Arctic;
2) The ‘seams’ between Arctic sub-regional environments as sites of increasing military activity and focus, and relatedly the growing ‘gaps’ in terms of military jurisdiction and responsibility; and
3) The development and future deployment of advanced weaponry in the Arctic blurring the ‘offence-defence’ balance

With these trends in mind, the value of institutions, initiatives, and protocols to avoid accidents and misunderstandings becomes increasingly acute.

Increased Arctic Military Presence and Posturing

2020 has seen rises in both the actuality of military activities in the Arctic and in the rhetoric pertaining to them. However, care must be taken in making the leap between higher levels of military exercises and the perception that military confrontation in the region is being planned. While exercises and other visible manifestations of military assets in the Arctic are intended to enhance Arctic warfighting capability, they are also efforts to demonstrate Arctic presence, the extent of political attention being paid to the region, and capacity for action. The Arctic is a region in which competition is reflected and exacerbated, and by visibly demonstrating military activities the intent to remain engaged and not cede military, economic, or political advantage is demonstrated.

Military activities do not occur in an Arctic vacuum, taking place in the context of a web of geo-political tensions. Nevertheless, the extent of Arctic military activities in 2020 is such that highlighting some of the ongoing efforts to demonstrate and develop a position of military strength is illuminating. In the North American Arctic, Canada’s long-running annual Operation Nanook Arctic exercise re-
occurred in 2020. In addition to a whole-of-government exercise focusing on maritime disaster response, the defence-focused components of the three-part programme included “domain presence and awareness in the Northwest Passage” and activities to “hone and demonstrate the abilities of the Canadian Armed Forces to operate in the High Arctic”, and this year’s iteration involved U.S., Danish, and French forces. While a major focus was enhancing warfighting capability and interoperability, the indication that the exercise was to “demonstrate” capability and was “a key activity to increase presence in the Arctic over the long-term” emphasises the role of exercises in highlighting the extent to which the Arctic has become an area of political focus.

In addition, the U.S.-hosted bilateral (U.S.-Canadian) Arctic Edge exercise in March was a further indication of the emphasis on the Arctic and the joint nature of many North American Arctic military activities, and is likely to be extended in the future. Overlapping with Arctic Edge, NATO’s 2020 iteration of its Cold Response exercise series in Norway, which was ultimately scaled back due to COVID19, was originally intended to bring together around 16,000 NATO personnel from ten states to practice “fighting under winter conditions”, thereby ensuring “credible defence”. Nevertheless, while the level of expected participation did not indicate a radical increase from recent years, the resources expended are an indication that NATO considers the European Arctic to be an area in which demonstrating military competence is important.

One of the highest-profile training incidents, however, was a numerically-small Russian high-altitude parachute drop. This was not the only airborne activity in the Arctic, but was the most ambitious. However, as the NATO, Canadian, and U.S. exercises should not be seen as preparation for offensive action, this jump should not lead to an assumption that Russia expects to perform such action in combat in the Arctic. Despite the technological sophistication, the operational utility of this capability in the current Arctic context (at least in North America) is limited. The degree of coverage that it received, though, is an indication of the visibility of Arctic actions as a marker of the degree of seriousness with which the area is being approached by military leadership.

Three naval exercises were also notable: a U.S. and British exercise represented the first U.S. exercise in the Barents Sea since the mid-1990s; the Russian Pacific Fleet exercised in the Bering Sea in the largest such exercise for that fleet since the end of the Cold War; and joint anti-submarine training by U.S., Norwegian and British vessels in September took place within the Exclusive Economic Zone claimed by Russia, and in relatively close proximity to Russia’s Northern Fleet base. NATO’s annual Dynamic Mongoose exercise, hosted in 2020 by Iceland, frequently practices anti-submarine capability in the North Atlantic. However, rolling this activity into other regions of the Arctic is an important extension. In combination with public comments by the U.S. Department of Defense indicating concern about the development of Russian Arctic capability, the potential for unwanted escalation to emerge from efforts to project an image of capability and focus on the region is real and concerning. Furthermore, while maintaining submarine operations there for decades, the resumption of naval surface deployments and strategic bomber patrols throughout the region indicates a significant augmentation of the Arctic in U.S. defence priority, largely justified as a response to Russia’s Arctic military build-up and increasing concern of a possible future Chinese military role and presence there.

The Arctic military ‘footprint’, however, should not be seen solely in geo-strategic terms. A more
permanent military presence may not universally result in negative outcomes for local populations but the potential for harm remains, and planning for future activity must take into account the way in which it may impact local communities and fragile ecosystems.\textsuperscript{12} Failure to do so could also lead to strained relationships between Northern communities and central governments, which may have longer-reaching political implications.

Growing Seams and Gaps in the Arctic

There are three Arctic subregional environments – the North American Arctic, the European Arctic (also commonly referred to as the ‘High North’) and the Eurasian (or Russian) Arctic. While military developments are occurring within all three, to varying intensities and purposes, the ‘seams’ between them are becoming sites of increasingly competitive military activities and positioning. There are several such seams – including the Bering Sea and Greenland (where the US is trying to curb Chinese influence\textsuperscript{13}), and the Central Arctic Ocean may emerge as another in the future. The most important seam, however, is that of the Norwegian and Barents Seas.

The Norwegian and Barents Seas, connecting the European and Eurasian Arctics, are of central military importance for Russia for two reasons: 1) it supports the extension of its re-constituted bastion strategy to protect its nuclear-ballistic missile fleet which is based in nearby Murmansk; and 2) it allows its naval, specifically attack submarine, forces to transit into the Atlantic Ocean and other regions. Conversely, ensuring the defence of its northern European flank in Norway is becoming a growing priority for NATO. The public displays, a very rare occurrence, of American nuclear-attack submarines visiting Norway, as well as Oslo announcing plans to build stockpiles to facilitate the hosting of NATO forces, further signals the region’s growing importance for NATO and the U.S.\textsuperscript{14} In addition, Sweden and Finland, non-NATO members, continue to further defence cooperation with one another, and with Norway and the U.S., to counter Russia’s regional military developments.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, as mentioned above, several NATO states conducted anti-submarine operations and strategic bomber patrols in the region this year, which may be indicative of a new area of alliance focus and priority alongside the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap further to the west and south. This latter area has, historically, been NATO’s ‘frontline’ in detecting and monitoring Russian naval, specifically submarine, movements out of concerns that these could disrupt NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) between North America and Europe in the event of a conflict.\textsuperscript{16}

Part of this shift may be motivated by the desire to track and engage Russian naval and air forces as close to Russian territory as possible, and to ensure that Norway and their maritime approaches do not fall under a Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) envelope. This is of particular significance given Russian long-range strike capabilities and concerns that Russia is attempting to construct an A2/AD bubble to preclude NATO’s ability to operate in these spaces during a conflict. Relatedly, another seam which may be of importance in the future is the Central Arctic Ocean, especially if the U.S. and/or NATO decides that the periodic deployment of ballistic missile defence-capable naval vessels and other surveillance assets in closer proximity to Russian coastline is needed in order to overcome any such A2/AD bubbles or intercept long-range strike forces. Such actions are likely to result in Russian efforts to counteract what they see as Western military encroachments on them.\textsuperscript{17}

As a result of these seams, several ‘gaps’ have emerged in terms of military priority, responsibility and jurisdiction within NATO Arctic members and
the organization as a whole. The first gap is the continued determination of the U.S. and Canada to manage North American continental security in a bilateral, not NATO, setting. This was evident with the establishment of a NATO Atlantic Command this year having jurisdiction across the Atlantic Ocean and into the High North, but not the North American Arctic. \(^1\) Such a division most likely means that any development of a NATO policy or strategy for the Arctic would be in relation to the European Arctic, particularly the deployment and stationing of multi-national forces. However, the U.S. and Canada will want to leverage NATO domain surveillance feeds and assets to support building its operating picture for North American defence, and invite NATO members, but unlikely the entire organization, to military exercises in the region.

In addition, a second gap is between the U.S. and Canada with respect to continental defence. Within the U.S. there are ongoing debates about establishing a hierarchy among combatant commanders with jurisdiction in and over part of the Arctic, with NORTHCOM taking the lead and having the ability to pull data and task assets from other commanders in monitoring and detecting military activities in and through the Arctic in the name of continental defence. \(^1\) Furthermore, any possible shift in NORAD becoming more ‘offence for defence’ oriented, specifically in relation to conducting operations outside the continent, will most likely generate differences with Canada who may, as a result, want to continue to be able to selectively determine what aspects of continental defence they participate in, as evidenced by their absence from the Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Given, however, the push towards the integration of all information streams into one Common Operating Picture (COP) and technological advances blurring the distinctions between cruise and ballistic weaponry, Canada may find it increasingly difficult to do so, especially with requirements for new major replacement projects needing to be determined soon. \(^2\)

Finally, these developments have highlighted a third gap - the lack of region-specific institutions which deal with military security issues. This matter will be further addressed in the last section of this report.

These seams and gaps are not unprecedented, as many of them were active sites of military operations during the Cold War as well. The key is whether NATO Arctic States and Russia can re-learn the lessons from these past eras and ensure such tit-for-tat developments do not unnecessarily amplify security dilemma dynamics with ‘defensive’ measures of one being interpreted as ‘offensive’ in nature by the other.

Advanced Technologies: Altering the Offence-Defence Balance?

Technological advancements in a number of areas, including unmanned aerial and submersible systems, terrestrial and spaced-based surveillance, and specifically hypersonic missiles, have generated widespread debate about their impact on military affairs in general \(^2\) and the geo-strategic environment in particular. \(^2\) Specifically, U.S. political and military leaders are increasingly concerned about Russian testing and possible deployment of hypersonic missiles in the Arctic. \(^2\) The main concern is the accelerated flight times of these weapons, against which there is no effective defence. Deployed in the Arctic, therefore, decision-makers may have little to no warning time to react if these weapons were fired. U.S. observers stress that, as a result, Russia (or China) may be able to use or threaten to use these weapons as a form of ‘horizontal escalation’, having a conventional strike capability to hit the continental
U.S. in order to disrupt any mobilization or response to local acts of aggression against allies (such as Norway) in Europe or Asia.

This reality has amplified calls for greater surveillance capabilities, data collection, and data feed integration to build a centralized and comprehensive real-time COP, as outlined above, over greater areas throughout the Arctic in order to detect, monitor and track these weapons. In blunting their influence, specifically by deterring their use or threat of use, there is a debate about whether the focus should be on defeating these weapons and/or developing similar hypersonic weapons which can be used in an offence-retaliatory capacity. There is, however, no clear division in practice between offensive and defensive capacities and postures, with the U.S. currently investigating ways to defeat hypersonic weaponry by engaging them as soon as they are fired, including from within Russia territory. Such line of thinking may result in developing more comprehensive strike options in and around Russia (or China) in a forward deployed manner, creating a sort of ‘offence for defence’ posture. Such positions most likely will generate countermoves by Russia, seeing them as preventative in nature with the goal of completely neutralizing Moscow’s strategic force capabilities. While it is early stages in the development and deployment of hypersonic weapons in general and in the Arctic in particular, there is a potential that the U.S. moves towards a strategy in which ‘defence’ is seen as synonymous with ‘inviulnerability’, attempting, simultaneously, to become immune to such weapons while also ensuring their ability to use them against others, rather than accepting mutual vulnerability. Russian (and Chinese) development of hypersonic weapons, and the strategic rationale and operational plans governing their use, must continue to be studied by the U.S. and her allies, but there must be self-appreciation that moves seen as ‘defensive’ in reacting to these – including forward deployment of certain forces in proximity to Russia and China – may in fact be contributing to destabilizing the strategic environment.

The Need for Regional Military-to-Military Contacts, Forums and Protocols

The increasing scope and frequency of military activity in the Arctic raises the spectre of escalation stemming from misunderstanding and misperception. Although governments and militaries have been at pains to publicise certain actions as defensive in nature and a stabilizing force in the region, this does not automatically translate to the basis of such actions being understood. Consequently, developing a stronger network of communication regarding defence activity and planning, including enhancing military-to-military contacts, may help lead to greater stability.

Land-based military activities in Europe occur under the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe’s (OSCE) regime of ‘Confidence- and Security-Building Measures’ that has sought to enhance transparency and predictability, lowering the potential for miscalculation. Although this attempt to formalise openness has not satiated all defence concerns, the increasing level of military activity and the accompanying suspicion suggests that there is room for a similar regime in the Arctic. While it is not a foregone conclusion that rules are followed, assessments of regime adherence can also act as a further indicator of attitudes towards the rules-based order and help to shape understanding of others’ perception of the status quo. The regime may extend to incorporating visits to sites of infrastructure development, particularly where
there are concerns about the latter’s potential dual-use nature.\textsuperscript{24}

A better understanding of the rationale of Arctic activities is an important step to limiting the potential for escalation. For example, Russian long-range bomber flights in the Arctic, even when they do not enter North American airspace, can be threatening given extant missile technology. Consequently, creating norms pertaining to openness and transparency around even seemingly low-level Arctic activities, particularly in the context of the U.S. concept of intercepting “archers” (specific military platforms) rather than “arrows” (missiles launched by these platforms), would be beneficial. This would not be too dramatic a shift – prior notification of such flights and an indication of plans to intercept used to be commonplace. Similarly, a high level of military activity increases the risk of accidents. In the Arctic such an event may have significant consequences given the difficulty of mounting rescue operations and the delicacy of the environment. The imperative of ensuring that activities are predictable in order to ensure adequate deconfliction is therefore even more stark.

Questions have also been raised around Chinese activities in the Arctic, and U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo indicated disquiet with the Chinese assertion that it is a “near Arctic” state.\textsuperscript{25} As such, opening actions in the Arctic to greater scrutiny through a formal reporting process, particularly if they have the potential to influence defence postures, may also be beneficial in building a picture of the contours of action, and facilitate further discussion of acceptable parameters of behaviour. Formal consideration of Chinese, or any other state’s, activities in the Arctic by the more generally acknowledged Arctic states would, however, further expose a political seam and questions about the ability, desire, and desirability of the members of the Arctic Council having collective decision-making and enforcement capability in the region become of greater significance. By following a path of engagement rather than ostracization, and rewarding transparency and openness, a clearer picture of the military and political situation may emerge. From this can stem a robust series of protocols and norms that limit the likelihood of escalation and reduce the potential for an aggressive actor to develop dangerous military dominance.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Arctic remains peaceful and there is a high level of coordination of collaboration between Arctic States at various levels. The augmented development, deployment, and stationing of military forces in the Arctic, furthermore, does not represent, nor is primarily motivated by, a contest over re-defining territorial and maritime ownership in the region. Rather, the trends outlined here speak to how the Arctic, or parts of it, are increasingly becoming tethered to larger, extra-regional strategic systems, interests and rivalries, particularly between the U.S. and Russia, and increasingly China, with local and allied states reacting and adjusting to these developments. Nevertheless, while a conflict ‘for’ the Arctic is unlikely, the uptick in the possibility of conflict ‘in’ or ‘over’ the Arctic\textsuperscript{26} – either due to accidents, misunderstandings, or spill-over effects from tensions in other regions – should be a major concern and impetus for all regional states to work together to create pathways and channels to address these developments.

It will also be important for the U.S., Canada, and their allies, both within and outside NATO, to fully explore the nature of their alliance structure in relation to the Arctic. While there is an accepted foundation of values and a general confluence of interests for the Arctic, each state’s actions are
influenced by their capabilities, world-views, and socio-political structures. Thus, it cannot be expected that there will be total agreement about actions in the Arctic, and non-U.S. militaries should not be seen as a mere augmentation of U.S. military capability. As such, it is of critical ongoing significance that there is consistent discussion about states’ respective perceptions, constraints, and goals in order to ensure that all feel valued and that contributions are understood to be made on the basis of genuinely collective action, rather than being a function of a vertical hierarchy. The incoming Biden Administration has made clear they will mend their alliance relationships, which have been strained during the Trump presidency. Based on great power competition – both with Russia and especially China – being an entrenched and central anchor in U.S. national security, and the Arctic an increasing arena of importance in this regard, the U.S. military will remain an engaged and active regional actor for the foreseeable future. The extent of interaction with allies and the ways in which the U.S. works with its partners to achieve common strategic objectives in the region – political and economic as well as military – remains to be seen.

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11 Several historic and contemporary examples exist, including the dumping of radioactive materials in Russian waters and mid-decade cleanup projects of defunct military sites in the U.S., Canada and Greenland.


