Human Security, Europe, and the Arctic

Gabriella Gricius
NAADSN Graduate Fellow

Introduction

The concept of human security has been prevalent in European policy for over a decade, since Europe began to understand the changing nature of security threats and demanded a review of traditional security policies. The concept of human security emerged in the UN’s 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP), where it first referred to moving away from traditional state-centric conceptions of security and towards a comprehensive, context-specific, and multi-sectoral security that focused on individuals. From this original human security idea, two approaches emerged: a broad approach and a narrow approach. While a broad approach to human security is based on a ‘freedom from want’ concept, a narrow approach is based on ‘freedom from fear.’ The broad approach draws from the work of the UNDP and the Japanese government, arguing that human security should encompass freedom from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, repression, and disasters. This can include health security, environmental security, food security, societal security, political security, and personal security. A narrow approach to human security, the so-called Canadian approach, takes a much more focused definition, primarily seeing human security as freedom from violent threats (Liotta and Owen 2006). The European approach to human security has evolved since its emergence in 2003. Today, it is not as prevalent in policy documents as it once was. However, while the language itself is not used as often, the core principles of human security are present in all but name.

I. The Development of Human Security in Europe

In 2002, the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, proposed the formation of a Study Group on European Security Capabilities to help redefine a pragmatic way of implementing human security (Christou 2014, 368). This Study Group became human security’s main advocacy group and epistemic community for the next decade. Although it did not mention human security by name, the European Security Strategy (ESS) – ratified a year later in 2003 – was the first policy document that began to see security as beyond states, referencing human security throughout the strategy. The ESS (2003) discussed five key threats facing the European Union: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. What is notable about these threats is that they are transnational in nature and require a people-first civilian-military approach,
as opposed to traditional military power in regional conflicts. Furthermore, the ESS linked the EU’s defense to threats against human welfare outside its own borders.

The Study Group’s first formal report is known as the Barcelona Report, and better known as *The Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (2004). The Barcelona Report constituted the first real appearance of human security in European policy:

> Europeans cannot be secure while millions of people live in intolerable insecurity... where people live in lawlessness, poverty, exclusivist ideologies and daily violence, there is fertile ground for criminal networks and terrorism. Conflict regions export or transport hard drugs and guns, to the European Union. That is why a contribution to human security is now the most realistic security policy for Europe. (Barcelona Report 2004, 7)

While the Barcelona Report helped to institutionalize the concept of human security in the European Union, it took a narrow definition of human security, focusing on freedom from fear rather than freedom from want (Christou 2014, 369). However, even with this narrower definition, the Barcelona Report recognized the value of freedom from want conceptualizations, focusing on seven guiding principles: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force (Daouk 2017, 30-31). Alongside these seven principles, the Barcelona Report proposed a 15,000-person Human Security Response Force, incorporating both military and civilian dimensions. However, the Barcelona Report’s principles were neither communicated nor disseminated well.

When Finland rose to the EU presidency in 2006, it used its power to request that the Study Group be reconvened, leading to the Madrid Report, also known as *A European Way of Security* (2007). This report was used to both embrace human security as a new strategic narrative and address critiques of the Barcelona Report’s soft approach to security, as well as to refute the claim that human security was just a cloak for European militarism. While the principles of the Madrid Report were not that different from those of the Barcelona Report, the background was that of the negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon (Daouk 2017, 31). This political variable influenced the Madrid Report so that it mainly argued that the European Union should develop its own security strategy based on human security principles. Rather than the narrower interpretation used by the Barcelona Report, the Madrid Report took a broad interpretation of human security. This broad interpretation resulted in three main proposals. The first was a Public Declaration of Human Security Principles, meant to act as guidelines for future interventions. The second was a new Strategic Framework for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions to restore a host country’s normal politics in the wake of any intervention. The third proposal was a Human Security section of the European Security and Defence Policy mandate that was meant to translate these theoretical human security commitments into actual mission priorities.

Both the Barcelona and Madrid Reports represent early conceptualizations of human security in European policy. In terms of actual policy implementation, many have argued that the 2008 *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* was a turning point in the wide acceptance and diffusion of human security (Christou 2014, 373). However, while the Report brought human security into official European Union security policy, there was no evolution of human security as a concept (Thompson 2016, 162).
The principles of the Report, for example, mirrored closely those of the Barcelona and Madrid Reports. Even with this supposed step into broad acceptance, many European states attacked human security as being too fuzzy a concept. Others, like Finland, however, pushed for the ESDP to adopt normative human security commitments (Daouk 2017, 34).

Shortly after the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The Treaty of Lisbon was a key point in Europe’s history, but importantly for the story of human security – it also changed how EU security policy was created. It did so by joining together the posts of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, to create the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This position also laid the groundwork to create the European External Action Service, a part of the EU that specifically promotes civil and military actor cooperation (Daouk 2017, 27). In the wake of the Treaty of Lisbon, then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called for a European-Russian security treaty, leading the Human Security Study Group to create a report governing relations between Europe and Russia with a human security architecture, titled Helsinki Plus: Towards a Human Security Architecture for Europe. That same year, human security made it into the EU’s Military and Civilian Headline Goals (Thompson 2016, 165).

While the above expressions of human security are thought of as Europe’s first-generation approach (2003-2008), A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) and the Berlin Report are widely considered its second generation. As the Berlin Report described: “A second-generation human security approach uses methods of addressing global challenges that involve politics, law, and economics, and that are both individual and collective, both top down and bottom up, and both global and regional and locally driven. It is a practical strategy for ending wars rather than pursuing ever-elusive victory in war” (Berlin Report 2016, 4).

In short, the Berlin Report looked at wars and security situations prevalent in 2016 and came to the conclusion that more people-oriented policies were needed and that there needed to be a significant shift from praxis to lexis (Daouk 2017, 39). This shift originated from Europe’s experience with the Libyan crisis of 2011 and the Syrian Civil War, leading the EUGS Report to take an approach grounded in ‘principled pragmatism.’ While the Report framed security in terms of human security, it focused more on resilience language. This is similar to the Towards a New European Security Strategy? report of 2015, which looked at human security in regards to cyber and nuclear infrastructure threats, climate change, and maritime security (Thompson 2016, 165). The diffusion of human security language also reached EU Arctic Policy in 2016, where the policy suggested that human security is also applicable in the Arctic when looking at economic, social, and environmental security risks (EU Arctic Policy in Regional Context 2016).

Over the last 15 years, human security has become broadly disseminated across European institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), policy think tanks, and academia. However, what many have concluded is that there is a need for conceptual reform. There has been little to no development of human security since its adoption in 2008. For many, human security is perceived as too ambiguous and impractical for a strategic narrative (Kotsopoulos 2006). For others, the problem is that human security has been co-opted into a traditional security narrative and exists to reproduce a Westphalian structure of states (Thompson 2016, 173).
State Adoption

On an individual state level, the adoption of human security has varied across the European continent, with some states integrating human security into their foreign policies while others have used it in specific policies. States like Switzerland have taken to the concept, creating an explicit human security agenda within its Department of Foreign Affairs as well as founding the Human Security Network (HSN), of which Austria, Greece, and Ireland are members (Kotsopoulos 2006, 10). Recently, a member of the Swiss Parliament proposed that the Federal Council should increase funding for Switzerland’s Human Security Division, showing that human security remains relevant in Swiss foreign affairs (Pierre-Andre 2019).

Human security is also popular in Germany and was mentioned in policy debate as recently as spring 2020, when the Vice President of the German Bundestag, Claudia Roth, discussed making human security the focus of all security policy considerations (Roth: In Zeiten von Grundrechte-Einschränkungen Sind Parlamente Gefragt, 2020). Human security was also a large part of the discussion on the deployment of the German Armed Forces in Mali, where the German Green Party advocated for human security to be the focus of solving conflicts (Bundeswehreinsätze in Mali, 2020). In 2012, the Bundestag also came out with a report focusing on the security aspects of migration to Europe. The report highlighted that potential risks of migration can only be identified if human security is the framework through which they come to investigate migration (Verteidigungspolitische Aspekte Zum Thema Migration: Ausarbeitung, 2012). In Germany, however, human security is nothing novel. In 2006, the Bundestag published a comprehensive report looking at the concept and proposing ways of putting human security into practice, such as preventing conflicts, civilian-led programs, and by looking at Afghanistan as one case study (Das Konzept Der Menschlichen Sicherheit 2006).

The Netherlands also has a robust human security approach to its foreign policy. In its Integrated International Security Strategy 2018-2022, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserts that ensuring Dutch security requires a human security-centered approach that looks beyond the military defense of its territory. Dutch civil society also highlights human security, with the Human Security Collective – a foundation working on issues of development and security – based in The Hague. Hirsch Ballin et al. (2020, 59) also highlight the turn to human security within Dutch foreign policy, specifically as it relates to a focus on stabilizing fragile states, adopting an integrated approach to security and development in missions outside Dutch territory, as well as the growth of ‘flow security.’ In a Dutch context, flow security refers to securing the streams of people, capital, information, technology, and goods and services that flow into (and through) the country, through both physical (air, sea, land, and increasingly also space) and digital (cyber) supply lines (Sweijs et al. 2018, 7). However, Dutch policy on fragile states has not really changed since 2008. Similarly, flow security is a fairly new concept in Dutch foreign policy and is not fully integrated, although cybersecurity, climate security, and economic security are growing in importance.

Norway was one of the first adopters of human security, as one of the founders of the Human Security Network with Canada and Austria. While the concept is not widely featured in its policy documents, it has been more recently discussed as a driver of its new humanitarian strategy that focuses on access to quality education in emergencies (Juul 2019). Further, former Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk in May 2020 wrote in an editorial for Vårt Land that although human security has been less prevalent as of late, it has never been more important. Finland and Sweden were also early adopters and advocates of human security (Middleton...

In other states, it seems that human security was prevalent in the early 2010s but has declined in prominence. For example, Austria described ‘comprehensive human security’ as the overall goal in all of their development policies in their 2011 Security and Development Policy. When these developments involved conflict, human security was seen as the long-term goal. In another Austrian Human Rights Guidelines document in 2009, human security was mentioned as fundamental for cooperation. While human security is mentioned as one of the overarching goals in the 2019-2021 Programme on Austrian Development Policy, it is only mentioned a few times and generally in connection to the broader goal of peace.

**II. Critical and Policy Scholarship on Human Security**

Immigration strategies, development plans, industrialization, defense, counter-terrorism, urban development, crime prevention, and food and health security are all areas that deserve to be scrutinized from this people-centred perspective. (Tadjbakhsh 2014, 5)

While human security certainly has grown more institutionally accepted in the EU, critical scholars across Europe have voiced doubts about its lack of gender perspective, its potential usage as a legitimization tool of dubious interventions, its paradoxical difference in broad and narrow conceptualizations, its characterization as an empty signifier, and the consequences that could arise from implementing human security (Ulbert and Werthes 2008). Policy critiques have also played a role in both suggesting arenas where human security is best suited, such as climate change, as well as furthering some critiques previously put forth by critical scholars. Beyond critiques, human security has been applied in various areas of policy across Europe, including sanctions, climate change, and European missions abroad. The question presented to policymakers everywhere is not whether human security should be applied everywhere, but rather where it can do the most good.

For policy formulation, human security presents further issues. First, human security covers such a broad breadth that it cannot serve as a suitable guideline for setting priorities (Trachsler 2003, 77). Further, undermining state sovereignty may have consequences. Human security could easily be misused as an instrument to encourage and legitimize interventions in the internal affairs of states. Taking that one step further, states could become morally obligated to intervene in situations that have nothing to do with their national interests and thus, in fact, undermine them.

**Human Security – A Lack of Gender Perspective?**

Human security, some scholars argue, does not take into account the different living conditions of men and women and the specific threats and dangers that women face (Human Security = Women’s Security 2003, 54, Ulbert 2005, Hoogensen and Rottem 2004, Hoogensen and Stuveå 2006, Stuveå 2010, Hoogensen Gjørv 2014). In other words, there is no understanding that there are fundamental inequalities between women’s and men’s security. One key example of this is that today’s states and security systems are inherently gendered, meaning that women’s experiences are often not considered in the dominant discourse. In order to remain
relevant, human security would have to deconstruct these systems before truly being able to take a nuanced gender perspective. Further, this line of critique claims that the human security agenda is defined by masculine state constructs, and that these constructs ignore women-led policies and practices (Human Security = Women’s Security 2003, 149). How, then, can human security gain a gender perspective? Some scholars argue that solutions already exist, such as gender-sensitivity programs and other training. However, these same scholars note that it is important to move beyond such easy solutions. Some scholars have questioned if, after these trainings, there is any kind of follow-up or if institutions can really expect a meaningful change of behavior.

As human security exists today, these scholars claim, it is not sufficient as an overall framework. This is not to say that human security could not be improved. To make a more gender-democratic human security, reforms could focus on protection from military force (specifically reforming the UN), the establishment of international regulations for reducing the arms trade, peace dividends for female peace entrepreneurs, cultural dialogues, protection against domestic and civil violence, policies against sexist and racist ideologies, and local anti-violence networks (Human Security = Women’s Security 2003, 38). Ulbert also argues that a narrower concept of human security from a gender perspective is possible, but that restricting the concept in such a way may risk losing an empowerment and rights dimension. By reorienting traditional development and legal issues to a security approach, human security risks automatically painting any threat as an enemy and securitizing everything. Humanitarian interventions, for example, now clearly illustrate that security has expanded to covering human rights by military means (Ulbert 2005).

Dubious Interventionism

Critics of human security also point to its potential role in dubious interventionism (Krause 2005, Boer and de Wilde 2008, Fukuda-Parr and Messineo 2012, Debiel and Werthes 2013). On one hand, human security encourages a focus on citizens, which in some cases pits citizens against their states in a bid for more rights. On the other hand, human security can also lead to a strengthened state, as it is a method of securitization and states that implement human security policies may take a more active role in governing. In this sense, human security may empower and legitimate the state to do more, which can include infringing on the rights of groups. However, states that take on human security may also have more state capacity, making it possible to pursue human security. Human security, in this case, would have good governance as a prerequisite.

This securitization has also played out in how Western states are utilizing human security to justify interventions abroad. When European and international institutions adopted human security, countries in the Global South grew concerned that this term would be used in service of interventions. They were correct. The implementation of human security soon led to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) mandate in the UN (Tadjbakhsh 2014, 3). The R2P mandate was arguably made with good intentions to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity. However, in practice, it has been used to justify war behind a moral rationale. Some scholars have argued, for example, that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in Ukraine was done to protect the rights of Russian speakers in the region. Russia has suggested that its actions were taken to protect the human security of people who live in that region.
In short, it matters who conceptualizes human security: civil society or states (Krause 2005, Boer and de Wilde 2008, 243). Others argue that human security could also encourage military solutions or the illegitimate use of force in response to political, economic, and social problems. For example, Europe’s response to the migration crisis has been characterized by tight border controls and Southern European countries refusing, in some cases, to accept asylum seekers – solutions which have led migrants to both seek out more dangerous routes across the Mediterranean and rely on human smugglers. Further, human security could be used for military-supported power politics (Debiel and Werthes 2013, 328). While the narrative and concept behind human security focuses on emancipatory discourse and citizens, it can easily be co-opted for other means.

**Internal and External Security – A Fusion?**

Other scholars also critique human security due to the fusing of internal and external security (Boer and de Wilde 2008, Johns 2014). Human security’s broad, all-encompassing definition implies a redefinition of roles such as those of the military, police, and intelligence services. These changes of responsibility between defense and security on one side, and law and order on the other, point to a further blurring of the traditional distinction between normal and extraordinary politics (Boer and de Wilde 2008, 13). In other words, extraordinary politics becomes normal politics, which can encourage extraordinary measures to be taken for ordinary problems. Further, scholars argue, this blurring results in new tensions around how policing is governed. How should intelligence agencies and local police offices work together to investigate, for example, an organized crime network that spans different states? Reorganizing these divisions of labor ultimately results in fewer distinctions between national and international violence. Take, for example, a terrorist attack that happens in France. A terrorist attack would naturally need to be addressed by EU-level police and Interpol, but also the French national security services, local police, and potentially neighboring European states. But who, then, is in charge and what rules apply? Arguably, this presents a problem because universalizing human security raises the distinctions between both external and internal security, as well as political and criminal violence (Boer and de Wilde 2008, 225).

One specific example of how human security may prove problematic in practice comes in addressing human security and international law. By adopting an individual-first approach to law, nothing changes in how international law is conceived of or applied. If this is the case, then what purpose does human security serve for this policy area? Moreover, by categorizing all potential harms as security threats, the prioritization of political action is impossible. For example, human rights law is often charged with addressing all human rights violations. Rather than human security providing a useful lens through which to create a holistic human rights policy, European courts are instead witnessing a securitization of human rights law (Kettemann 2006).

Some authors claim that a consistent human security state policy, that uses both military means to tackle wars (human security from above) as well as community efforts to protect (human security from below), does not exist today (Boer and de Wilde 2008, 172). This is not to say that human security policies from below do not exist. Alternatively, human security initiatives from below may contribute to fragmentation. Human security policies from above also suffer from conceptual problems, namely that these policies are dependent on the structure of the international system. That is to say that as it stands, human security currently acts as an add-on for traditional security policies, only allowing for a shift of the referent object to the individual when the state is not possible. Boer and de Wilde (2008) also claim that hegemonic interests and narratives co-opt
human security and that middle powers, such as Norway, Japan, and Canada, have used human security to promote an image on the international stage rather than genuinely wanting to change their policies. Human security, then, Johns argues, is not acting as it claims to be, and instead is reinforcing the dichotomy of weak and strong states by making stronger states stronger and disempowering weak states (Johns 2014).

A Narrow vs. Broad Conception of Human Security

Other scholars such as Debiel have argued that the concept places a clear bias on the Western model of the state (Menschliche Sicherheit, Good Governance Und Strukturelle Stabilität, 3). Human security, in other words, aims towards structural stability, but this structural stability exists only in an idealized Western industrialized nation-state. Boer and de Wilde (2008, 236) also argue that human security is primarily focused on interventions in the Third World and is a Western concept to be applied to developing countries. In all likelihood, this is because human security emerged from Western states, and naturally reinforces their monopoly on violence and force.

Perhaps the most common critique of human security is its vagueness and ambiguity. Broad conceptions of human security, scholars argue, do little more than create lists that relabel phenomena (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo 2012, 12). Creating these lists and concepts that attempt to cover everything can obscure the causes and mechanisms of threats. Further, conceptually, human security also does not have sufficient explanatory power and has conflicting conceptual strengths, according to some scholars (Bonn 2003). It often overlaps with similar terms like ‘human development’ or ‘human rights.’ Some organizations and states have defined the term more narrowly, but this then leads to differences in the ways that human security is explored and implemented. This unclear normative status has led to security policy being indistinguishable, in some cases, from development policy (Debiel and Werthes 2013, 327). Debiel and Werthes (2005) argue that while a narrow understanding of human security offers more analytical value, a broad conception serves as a political leitmotif for foreign policy projects, for better or for worse. For example, a practical value of human security is that it provides a frame of reference for evaluating politics that can bring states together on universal goals (Debiel and Werthes 2005, 11). Key examples of this are the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction in 1997, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998. However, these goals are not always good in nature. For example, some scholars have argued that bringing human security into the mainstream has exaggerated post-Cold War security threats, placed these threats in the developing world, and encouraged short-term policymaking (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo 2012, 14).

Boer and de Wilde (2008, 243) argue that one of the main problems with human security is that one cannot be against it. In other words, it applies to so much that it effectively means nothing at all (Johns 2014). This critique places human security as an empty signifier. Scholars and policymakers have claimed that human security covers everything and, therefore, effectively has no real explanatory power.

Where Human Security Can Do Good

All the critiques above notwithstanding, human security has the potential to be effective in specific policy arenas. The current issues facing the world include pandemics, financial crises, natural disasters, and many other issues that often do not comply completely with a state-based version of security. Beyond these larger
multidimensional issues, human security is also already in use in more state-based questions of security, namely sanctions. Giumelli (2016) argues that EU sanctions have been adapted to meet human security concerns by adopting a more targeted approach and including exemptions. While he claims that there is more work to do in incorporating local voices and ensuring that targeted societies do not experience knock-on consequences, sanctions present a key example of how human security is already being incorporated into policies. Currently, the EU has taken steps to ensure that their sanctions are not hurting unwilling civilians, by including exemptions within sanctions texts (Giumelli 2016, 8). The EU has also implemented a bottom-up approach that includes local voices in the targeted society, to make sure that sanctions are being appropriately addressed. This bottom-up approach reduces any rally-around-the-flag effect, increasing the legitimacy of the EU as a foreign actor.

Although the EU already has implemented some human security principles – namely a bottom-up approach and avoiding harm to innocent civilians – in its sanctions policies, there is more that could be done. Giumelli (2016, 14) proposes that the EU should utilize pre-impact assessments to foresee economic consequences of sanctions from a human security perspective. Alongside these assessments, sanctions regimes should constantly be monitored to adjust to changes, making sanctions flexible. More fundamentally, EU institutions should also be relying on expertise from civil society rather than the state for better information, implementation, and organization. Through this lens, sanctions can move beyond being purely an instrument of state power, and rather become an instrument of governance (Giumelli 2016, 17).

Multidimensional issues, however, are where human security can best shine. Climate change is perhaps the best example. Climate change is arguably the most pressing problem facing not only Europe, but the world today. What makes it so difficult to address is its multi-faceted nature. Climate change is not only causing rising sea levels, but also rising temperatures, changing migration patterns, and rising food prices, alongside many other interrelated problems. Climate change is also not a problem faced by one state. Instead, it is a global problem that requires cooperation. Human security thinking is helpful here. Rather than looking at states, human security emphasizes humanity’s interdependence, cross-sector interactions, and dangers, and may help address the ethical questions of climate change that a state-based traditional notion of security would ignore (Gasper 2010, 25). Furthermore, human security prioritizes access to basic goods on an individual level rather than in aggregate. This focus on ethics and on the individual in particular importantly adds to how policymakers can understand climate change and preserving public goods (Gasper 2010, 22). Most of the second-generation human security reports, such as the Berlin Report, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, and Helsinki Plus: Towards a Human Security Architecture for Europe, mentioned climate change as one area that a human security approach would focus on. In general, human security discourse actively promotes the idea of human worth and human membership in one ecosystem, providing a more nuanced and progressive narrative than a state-based security narrative could propose.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are another area where human security could play a critical role. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy placed a high importance on creating a consistent message with the UN’s 2030 Agenda, which includes implementing the SDGs. While the SDGs tend to exist side-by-side, a human security approach would bring many of these problems closer together in a more interconnected and systematic fashion. Issue areas such as the right to decent work and income,
political security, cultural security, and environmental security encompass a variety of different goals. However, they all play a role in influencing each other (Koehler et al. 2012, 19). Thus, human security with a more holistic lens better addresses some of these broad issue areas. This is because human security brings together questions of the political and personal. In other words, human security integrates many different policy areas that may seem diverse at first into one coherent narrative. Further, it emphasizes that “economic poverty, political and personal insecurity and violence, environmental degradation, and social exclusion are decisive for all levels of human development” (Koehler et al. 2012, 22). An individual-centered approach can thus better handle questions of the SDGs and promote a more structured discussion on how to address these concerns.

Migration is yet another area where human security would help to better inform the policy narratives taken by the EU. Sørensen et al. (2017, 6) argue that the European response to increased migration has actually undermined the human security of those migrants. By closing borders, Europe has encouraged refugees to seek out risky routes to Europe, including through Libya and Turkey, promoting higher levels of human trafficking and smuggling and further boosting the relevance of criminal networks that facilitate illegal immigration. Moreover, the EU’s mass expulsion policies, which send refugees back to countries like Afghanistan, may pose significant threats to the individual human security of refugees (Sørensen et al. 2017, 18). In particular, these expulsion policies illustrate a tension between the EU’s desired aims of deterring migration as well as addressing its root causes. However, in keeping with Europe’s current state-centric security policies, the EU tends to focus on deterring migration, presenting real human security problems in certain states like Greece. With states like Greece and Turkey generally taking on the majority of migrants, further human security problems arise, such as the mass detention of new arrivals and the proliferation of refugee camps (Sørensen et al. 2017, 25). Adopting a human security network could potentially help address these problems. Firstly, rather than closing borders to refugees, the EU should maintain and intensify its humanitarian efforts, establishing safe routes and opening up additional routes of legal migration (Sørensen et al. 2017, 52). Restricting migration does not resolve the security issues of state borders; rather, it opens up further possibilities for illegal immigration, which then presents human security problems for migrants. The EU must be aware of the consequences of their migration policies. Europe must also work to find a political solution in Libya. If Libya were more stable, many African migrants would not feel as though Europe was the only option. Moreover, it would take pressure off of the dangerous sea route across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe (Sørensen et al. 2017, 52).

As discussed above, human security also has the potential to play a large role in justifying interventions. While generally that potential is negative, human security also has the potential to change how states create humanitarian intervention strategies for the better. One example of where this could be implemented is with the EU’s policies and actions in the Horn of Africa. The EU already has a regional strategy of engagement, but that strategy is driven by state-based security policies rather than a human security approach. By reframing that intervention through a human security framework, the EU could better understand and achieve its goals. A human security framework could include, for example, 1) promoting human rights; 2) addressing humanitarian crises and economic development; 3) seeking peace and security; 4) promoting good governance; 5) adhering to multilateral principles with a focus on local engagement; and 6) designing peace missions with a human rights focus (Waal and Ibreck 2016, 5). This kind of framework would build on what
already was in place, but shift the focus to a commitment to economic development, regional infrastructure, and multilateralism.

III. Europe, the Arctic, and Human Security

While European Arctic policy documents do not generally mention human security explicitly, much of the underlying language and ideas currently in existence come from a human security approach that prioritizes individual security and a broader notion of what security can mean (Hossain et al. 2018). For example, in the 2008 *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council*, the European Commission argued that climate change is a threat multiplier in the Arctic. Because of this, the EU needs to focus on the environment, climate change, energy, research, transport, Indigenous peoples, and multilateral governance as part of a broad security strategy. Eight years later, in an additional EU policy document from the Directorate General for External Policies, the EU outright stated that “human security challenges also exist in the Arctic.” These challenges could be encompassed in a broad agenda including economic security, societal security, and environmental security. The policy also noted that Arctic policies of the EU and eight Arctic states already discuss human security themes, defined here as economic, social, and environmental security. Therefore, a shift towards explicit human security rhetoric may do little more than “reframe the language of existing efforts” (EU Arctic Policy in Regional Context 2016, 20).

Why Human Security Is a Useful Tool for the Arctic

One of the original founders of the Human Security Network, Norway, appears to be acting just as the *EU Arctic Policy in Regional Context Report* described. In other words, rather than using the language of human security, Norway is applying many of the ideas of human security in all but name. In the first White Paper concerning the Arctic since 2011, released in 2020, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not mention human security at all. Instead, the report highlights rising issues of great power politics and focuses on regional development, addressing matters such as population decline and the fishing industry (*People, Opportunities and Norwegian Interests in the North 2020*). However, an entire chapter focuses on social security, defining it as a “society’s ability to protect itself against and deal with incidents that threaten fundamental values and functions and endanger life and health” (*People, Opportunities and Norwegian Interests in the North 2020*). Some of these threats, according to the report, include climate change, food security, health security, maritime activity, and emergency response capabilities. In short, it refers to the broader sense of human security without using the language as such.

Finland was another early adopter of human security. Its Arctic Strategy does not mention human security by name, although its Internal Security Strategy does. While its most recent Arctic Policy was published in 2013, it uses the term ‘comprehensive concept of security,’ referring to securing citizens’ access to services “provided by safety and security authorities within a reasonable period of time” (*Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013, 40*). Again, this refers to a broader sense of security, but does not seem to take the more emancipatory notion of a ‘freedom from want’ conception of human security. Rather, the middle ground of ‘services’ could mean a number of things including access to food, water, health, or simply security services.
Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region follows the pattern of Finland and Norway in that it does not mention human security by name but appears to frame its security around the notion of a broad concept of security. The strategy is based on principles including respect for international law, human rights, democracy, the principles of the rule of law, and gender equality (Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2020, 6). Notably, Sweden’s foreign policy is explicitly feminist, meaning that it is based on the idea that sustainable peace cannot be achieved if women and girls are excluded. However, Sweden’s Strategy is not nearly as explicit in connecting food and health issues to questions of a broader security concept.

Other European countries’ Arctic policies seem to give human security the same treatment as the Nordic states. Germany’s 2019 Arctic Policy Guidelines, for example, mention that the Arctic buildup of tensions impacts economic and environmental security, but otherwise do not engage with broader notions of security (Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines 2019, 23). Even though many of these policies do not use human security language, they still carry with them the same benefits and drawbacks that human security has. Thus, human security remains a relevant concept because it underlies decision making even though it remains rhetorically hidden.

European scholars agree, seeing human security as a useful tool for the Arctic. Hoogensen et al. claim that a state-based security discourse cannot appropriately handle questions of insecurity and security at non-state levels (Hoogensen et al. 2009, 5). In the Arctic, the authors argue, a state-based approach not only influences government policy towards a focus on resource exploitation, territorial protection, and power, but also leaves out important questions of climate change, supply of traditional foods, political stability, and community health. Hossain and Petrétei (2016b) agree, noting that human security in the Arctic helps to capture the “complex interaction of international, regional, and local actors” (Hossain and Petrétei 2016b, 10).

Hossain et al. (2017) take the argument a step further by claiming that, in fact, non-traditional and non-military threats are the main security concerns of Arctic inhabitants as opposed to traditional state-based security. Western understandings of security helped to promulgate state-based ideas of security as opposed to an Arctic-based security. These older Western-based approaches are ill-suited to dealing with the challenges and threats of today. In the Barents Region, security threats tend instead to include socio-economic insecurities, poverty, climate change, education, health, and the cultural pressure to modernize (Hossain et al. 2017, 54). The authors focus on climate change and cultural pressures as the two greatest security threats to Northern populations as opposed to great power competition or other state-based security threats. However, notably, these non-traditional security threats tend to be interconnected and constitutive. In other words, a human security framework demands an interdisciplinary and broad understanding of security. Hossain and Cambou (2018) explain that interconnectedness in the Barents Region by showing how environmental changes can easily cause economic distress in a region that in turn may have consequences for community health (Hossain and Cambou 2018).

The Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) II (2011) also addressed ‘soft securities.’ While human development as a whole tends to focus on preventative strategies rather than the risks, the Report still addressed how so-called soft securities, such as food, water, and energy, play an important role in the Arctic. Here, similar to European Arctic policy, the AHDR II did not mention human security by name, but it had all of the hallmarks, such as a focus on Arctic residents rather than states, and a broader notion of security. The EU’s
Institute for Security Studies report, ‘Arctic Security Matters,’ expanded on the AHDR, arguing that human security should be featured on the agendas of Arctic stakeholders, even including more localized issues such as alcoholism, substance abuse, venereal disease, person-on-person violence, and suicide (EUISS 2015, 73). These transnational threats amongst many others demand, according to the EUISS, more robust cooperation on local, regional, and international levels.

However, there are still aspects of security that some scholars believe need to be integrated into a human security framework. Cassotta et al. argue that human security needs to also include cyber threats against critical infrastructures in the Arctic (Cassotta et al. 2019, 327). This inclusion of other fields comes back to Hoogensen et al.’s claim that human security as a framework demands interdisciplinarity.

The Sami and Other Indigenous Peoples

European scholars also focus heavily on Indigenous peoples in the Arctic when addressing human security. Although the Sami people are the only European Indigenous people, European policy documents as well as scholarly articles more broadly discuss human security as relevant for Indigenous people in the Arctic as a whole, rather than purely looking at the Sami people. Hossain and Petrétei (2016b, 4), for example, claim that human security can act as a tool of empowerment for Indigenous people in the Arctic. Because Indigenous people face so many threats that do not fall within a state-centric understanding of security, human security can act as a framework to address these different threats. The authors note that a human security framework can also help empower Indigenous people to establish policy and legal tools to protect their traditional occupations, languages, and identities (Hossain and Petrétei 2016b, 5). Given that some of the most serious threats to Indigenous peoples are societal in nature, this approach may be more useful than reverting to a state-centric security, which would ignore these security threats. Hossain and Petrétei (2016a) further focus on the Sami people and acknowledge the serious threat that they face when their cultural heritage is appropriated for touristic purposes. Szpak also discusses the Sami people, arguing that the main threats to the Sami consist of climate change, and the actual and potential economic exploitation of both natural resources and traditional livelihoods (Szpak 2017, 77). Economic exploitation in the Arctic can easily lead to accidents such as the risk of oil spills in the Barents or Kara Seas, which in turn can threaten the food security of Indigenous peoples. In other words, human security is inherently multifaceted and many, if not all, of its parts are interconnected. In an ecosystem as fragile as the Arctic, that means that interconnecting the human security of Indigenous people is essential to understanding threats to their security.

Within studies on Indigenous people and European policy, it is clear that human security could be used as a tool for better creating Arctic policy and studying the Arctic. Because human security is at its heart inclusive, its adoption can assist in the creation of more inclusive policies in the Arctic. As the Arctic is moving to a more relevant area in geopolitics, it will become more interesting to see the extent of human security as enacted by European policy, as well as how scholars respond. The Arctic is in a unique position where military activities – the domain of state-centric understandings of security – are on par with human security threats (Klein 2018). Therefore, it presents an interesting case for the implementation of human security policy.

IV. Conclusion
Human security is a radical approach for any state to propose, whether specifically in the Arctic or generally throughout their policies. This paradigm shift implies that states would focus on transnational threats first, as opposed to national ones (Glasius 2008, 36). In places like the Arctic where threats are more often transnational than not, this is not immediately radical in nature. However, human security also connects traditional security policies to non-traditional ones including disease, environmental disasters, raw material mining (Guesnet 2016), trafficking, and organized crime, alongside economic and social security. This connection can lead to policy proposals that can change the nature and aim of national policies. Migration, for example, is one such area of tension. State-centric security would argue that illegal migration should be countered with the strengthening of borders. Instead, a human security approach would increase humanitarian efforts to save refugees and establish secure routes for migrants to reach safety (Sørensen et al. 2017, 52). Further, this type of approach would focus on the reasons for migration and create policies to address those issues, such as the security situations in other countries (Fröhlich 2020). Migration is, however, just one such transnational issue that human security can approach – it is certainly not the only one.

The COVID-19 pandemic, increasing hunger crises, fragile states, and violent conflicts are all issues that can best be solved with a more holistic human security approach rather than a state-centric understanding of security (Fischer 2020). Europe’s second-generation approach takes a more pragmatic attitude to human security, through a narrower approach that focuses on addressing global challenges through both bottom-up and top-down approaches that are locally and regionally driven. Today, however, the language of human security is very seldom used, and is often present in stealth rather than being named as such. Regardless, Europe has certainly institutionalized parts of human security in its policies for almost two decades. Even if the language of human security is not as present in documentation as it once was, its ramifications imply that the policy remains important to understand because it underlies the nature of decision making within Europe, regarding policies towards both the Arctic and the rest of the world.
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