Reflections on Arctic Arms Control and Proposals for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (ANWFZ)

Alexander MacDonald
NAADSN Graduate Fellow

Introduction

The Arctic region has, and will continue to hold, intrinsic strategic value to the superpower states. The region has nonetheless been largely characterized by cooperation. Or, at a minimum, has not been subject to intra-Arctic conflict. The end of the Cold War and the leveling off of some of the hard security concerns between the superpowers allowed for the institutionalization of Arctic cooperation through the Arctic Council and the resulting agreements, treaties, and understandings that it, or its member states, have produced. But only institutionalization of a certain nature and cooperation of a particular genre, since security issues were explicitly left out of the Council’s mandate.

Despite Arctic specific governance structures largely avoiding hard security questions there has been a wealth of academic discussion and non-governmental advocacy work related to Arctic hard security. Proposals for Arctic disarmament, demilitarization, and denuclearization make up a discrete strain of these dialogues. Within this strain, proposals for the establishment of an Arctic nuclear-weapon-free zone (ANWFZ) have been made on numerous occasions between 1964 and 2012. As dialogues on Arctic hard security intensify, both within and outside of governments, an opportunity presents itself to reanalyze, and perhaps even to re-envision, proposals for the establishment of an ANWFZ.
This article draws on six interviews conducted in January and February 2021. Thomas Axworthy, Adele Buckley, Ernie Regehr, Franklyn Griffiths, Ronald Purver, and Michael Hamel-Green were interviewed by the author. These individuals were chosen based on their contributions to the academic and advocacy discussion on the creation of an ANWFZ and Arctic specific arms control measures. The article will proceed as follows: first a brief historic overview of Arctic specific arms control and confidence building measures will be provided. Then a review of proposals for the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ will be provided, followed by proposals for an ANWFZ. This is done to contextualize the succeeding expose of interviews which will be grouped together by topical area. The goal of this expose is to showcase the ongoing consideration of an ANWFZ, how specific ideas related to the ANWFZ concept have evolved and changed over time, and to share evaluations for the future of ANWFZ proposals.

Arctic Specific Confidence Building Measures

Within the context of the Cold War, the Arctic region developed a unique strategic significance for two interrelated reasons. Namely, the geographical proximity of the United States and the USSR/Russia, and the advantage of staging weapon systems in the region because of this proximity. Thus, the Arctic became one of the most militarized regions in the world during the Cold War. Such militarization prompted immense attention from non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament advocates who, through various proposals, sought to prevent the Arctic region from becoming a theatre for superpower conflict.

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* Dr. Thomas Axworthy is the current Secretary-General of the InterAction Council and a Senior Fellow with the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. He served as the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau from 1981 to 1984. From 2009 to 2015, he was president and CEO of The Gordon Foundation, an institution known for its partnership with Northern Indigenous leaders in helping to create the Arctic Council. In 2012, he published “A Proposal for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,” The Yearbook of Polar Law IV (2012): 87-139.

† Dr. Adele Buckley is a physicist, engineer, and environmental scientist. She is the past Chair of the Canadian national group of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. In 1998, she published “An Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Circumpolar Non-Nuclear Weapon States Must Originate Negotiations,” Michigan State International Law Review, vol. 22, no. 1: 167-194. She has made presentations of the Arctic NWFZ proposal in nine countries, sometimes on several occasions.

‡ Ernie Regehr is Senior Fellow in Defence Policy and Arctic Security at The Simons Foundation of Vancouver, and Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace Advancement, Conrad Grebel University College, the University of Waterloo, and is a co-founder of Project Ploughshares. He has served as an NGO representative and advisor on numerous Government of Canada delegations to multilateral disarmament forums, including Review Conferences of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and UN Conferences on Small Arms. In 2019, he published “Cooperative Security and Denuclearizing the Arctic,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, vol. 2, no. 1, (2019): 274-296.

§ Dr. Franklyn Griffiths is a professor emeritus of international politics and the George Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, from which he retired in 2001. In 1979, he published “A Northern Foreign Policy,” Wellesley Papers 7 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979) which contains one of the most cited Arctic arms control proposals.

** Ronald Purver is a former Research Associate with the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa, former Research Fellow with Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, former member of the Queen’s Center for International Relations, and formerly with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax. In 1998, he published: Purver, Ronald, 1988, “Arms Control Proposals for the Arctic: a Survey and Critique” in Mottola, Kari (ed.), The Arctic Challenge, Westview, Boulder, pp.183–219.

Proposals for Arctic specific arms control measures began in the late 1950s. In 1957, the topic of ‘Arctic Disarmament’ appeared for the first time on the United Nations (UN) Disarmament Committee Agenda. In the following year, 1958, the UN Security Council convened at the request of the USSR to address “Urgent measures to put an end to flights by United States military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union.” The 817th meeting of the Security Council on 2 May 1958 addressed this topic and considered a draft resolution put forward by the United States. Draft resolution S/3995 noted the USSR and US’s growing capabilities for a massive surprise attack and the growing importance of the Arctic region and recommended that “there be promptly established the Northern zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle with certain exceptions and additions.” The draft resolution failed to pass due to a USSR veto, in which it noted its suspicion that such an arrangement would be used by the US for intelligence collection purposes and thus did not represent an honest and good faith arms control proposal. The American proposal for an inspection system should be understood as a consequence of the Eisenhower administration’s pursuit of the Open Skies plan, which evolved over several decades into the Treaty on Open Skies which permits Treaty members to conduct short notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over each other’s territory to collect data on military forces and activities.

While the inspection system proposal failed to garner consensus in the UN Security Council, the idea itself lived on. In 1960, Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker spoke in the UN General Assembly declaring that “Canada is prepared to make available for international inspection and control any part of the Canadian Arctic territory in exchange for a comparable concession on the part of the Soviet Union.” The Danish Foreign Minister made a similar pledge in offering “the vast territory of Greenland as part of a mutual balance inspection arrangement.” These proposals also failed to produce any formal arms control measures, as both the US and USSR raised concerns regarding geographical asymmetries in the proposed zonal boundaries which would engender strategic imbalances unacceptable to one or the other side – a consideration which has historically plagued Arctic arms control measures.

Nordic NWFZ Proposals

Following these Arctic specific proposals were Nordic specific arms control measures, including proposals for a Nordic NWFZ. In January of 1958, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin presented the idea of a Nordic NWFZ in a letter to his counterpart in Norway. The proposed plan was made public by Krushchev in his 1959 Riga Speech, in which he spoke of an “atom-and-rocket-free zone.” This plan was subsequently formulated and campaigned for by the Finish President, Urho Kekkonen, beginning in 1963. Kekkonen proposed a NWFZ in the Nordic region which would prohibit the possession and stationing of nuclear weapons. While at that time the Nordic region did not have any nuclear weapons, possessed or stationed, Kekkonen’s argument was that the status quo based on national decisions would benefit from being confirmed in some sort of binding multilateral arrangement. The Kekkonen Plan, as it became known, failed to be realized despite its lingering in government circles until 1978.

Commentators have isolated a host of reasons for the Kekkonen Plan’s failure. Foremost among them are: (1) the refusal of Norway and Denmark to change their policy of foreign military bases on their territory and the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on their territory in non-peace times; (2) the failure to withdraw ballistic
missiles and tactical nuclear weapons from territories bordering the proposed Nordic zone; and (3) the inclusion of the US and USSR in the negotiations and balance of power considerations in continental Europe. These variables act as sign-posts in analyzing ANWFZ proposals, for they highlight key security considerations that ought to be kept in mind. Namely, that regional states must predict a net security benefit to denuclearizing to consider it as a desirable policy option. Moreover, that threats to each state’s security must be considered and efforts to reduce or mitigate those threats must be sufficiently made. And finally, that the superpowers have a disproportionate influence in security arrangements which should be given due regard, for ensuring their strategic stability is a key to success.

Despite the failure of the Kekkonen plan, the Nordic NWFZ proposal was revived in 1987 by Mikhail Gorbachev in his famous Murmansk speech of October 1987. Gorbachev proclaimed that the USSR:

is in favor of a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region. Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace. We suggest that all interested states start talks on the limitation and scaling down of military activity in the North as a whole, in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres.

Gorbachev’s call for an “Arctic zone of peace” was not a call for a pan-Arctic NWFZ, but rather a reiteration of previous Nordic NWFZ proposals with a host of complimentary international cooperation initiatives attached to it. These complimentary initiatives included: (1) limiting naval activity in seas adjacent to the Nordic region; (2) peaceful cooperation in exploiting the resources of the North and Arctic; (3) scientific research in the Arctic; (4) cooperation between Northern countries in environmental protection; and (5) the opening up of the Northern Sea Route to foreign vessels. It is crucial to flag that within the context of attempting to negotiate military cooperation in the Nordic region, that a state actor – Mikhail Gorbachev – presented not just an aspirational end goal, but also a series of complimentary intermediary measures meant to build confidence, transparency, and ultimately cooperation.

While the Murmansk speech is often hailed as an extraordinary disarmament offer on the USSR’s part its real novelty was that it was “an authoritative exposition of a unified approach to Arctic policy by the Soviet Union,” for it “reflected a broadening of the concept of international security, a close connection between its civil and military elements, and an understanding that economic development and environmental protection are both, in considerable measure, contingent upon controlling the arms race.” Several Western observers, nonetheless dismissed the USSR’s new Arctic initiative as a public relations ploy, or as a sly attempt by Gorbachev to attain uneven advantages in the Arctic through arms control measures. Ronald Purver, while analyzing the Murmansk initiative, argued that the Soviets were proposing such security measures because of their own perceived vulnerability and insecurity, and thus sought to stave off the US and NATO’s encirclement of the USSR via a ‘peace offering.’ This vulnerability was heightened by the announcement of the US Navy’s Forward Maritime Strategy, increasing US submarine activity in the Arctic, NATO build up on the Northern Flank, and the conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Forces Treaty (INF), which the USSR feared could lead NATO “to compensate for the loss of its land-based intermediate-range missiles by increasing the deployment of nuclear armed air- and sea-launched, long-range cruise missiles in and over Northern Waters.”


Other scholars, however, point to the subsequent Soviet Arctic policy in the wake of the Murmansk speech as proof that the Soviets were seriously pursuing genuine international cooperation in the Arctic, for “more has been done by the Soviet Union to develop Arctic cooperation since the Murmansk speech than during the previous seventy years.” Some countered this line of argument by highlighting that the subsequent Arctic policy of the USSR was primarily focused on scientific, resource, and social sectors. That is, the militarily strategic nature of the Arctic was not addressed head on, which seems to substantiate the claim that the renewed Nordic NWFZ proposal by Gorbachev was simply a self-serving repackaging, or elaboration, that was tacked on to the broader social reform he was pursuing. As Charles Emmerson has observed: “[t]he Murmansk initiative was less generous than first appeared. Given that the Northern Fleet carried the bulk of the Soviet Union’s submarine-launched nuclear weapons, Gorbachev’s offer to remove SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines) from the Baltic Fleet was a political gesture, intended to draw Scandinavian states closer to the Soviet Union without making any real dent in Soviet strategic nuclear capability.”

These efforts, spanning several decades and across different national governments, revealed that Nordic countries have preferred to negotiate such a security framework within a wider European framework and that any NWFZ must be the consequence of pan-Nordic collaboration. Such collaboration has proved to be difficult, if not elusive. The creation of a NWFZ in each region establishes a security regime, which can prove problematic when zonal states already belong to a collective security regime, like NATO. The theory of NWFZs fundamentally questions the validity and purpose of nuclear weapons, which essentially contrasts NATO’s enduring commitment to nuclear weapons as “the ultimate deterrent.” Thus, NATO members joining a NWFZ would inherently question the very rationale of NATO’s strategic concept, and perhaps its entire justification. Therefore, it is not only a security gamble to switch from nuclear umbrella to NWFZ, but also a political act which carries consequences. All of which ought to be accounted for in analyzes of proposed NWFZs in the northern hemisphere, including the Arctic region.

The ANWFZ Concept

The first pan-Arctic NWFZ proposal was made in 1964 by Alexander Rich and Aleksandr Vinogradov, who were American and Soviet chemists respectively. The proposed agreement stipulated that the region “would contain no nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles, long-range bombers or missiles.” This approach did not include the supporting infrastructure for such systems like “military installations per se, airfields and bases” or “defensive installations such as radar.” They proposed a zone covering, at a minimum, Alaska and Eastern Siberia, with the possibility of Greenland and the remainder of the Arctic being included at a later date. Their proposal was based on a number of key assumptions: (1) the Arctic did not yet have an obvious or developed military value; (2) there were only two main negotiating powers (the US and the USSR); (3) a zonal approach could be taken to ensure strategic balances were respected and maintained; (4) such an arrangement leaves the vast majority of each nation’s military establishment intact, and; (5) it could provide a testing ground for inspection systems. The authors explicitly noted that the agreement was aimed at providing opportunities for confidence building and transparency measures so as to enhance the possibility for more general nuclear disarmament agreements to take shape. While novel, the proposal proved to be exceedingly short-sighted in misdiagnosing the strategic importance that the Arctic region would take on in the years following the
publication of the proposal. Therefore, it is not surprising that the proposal gained little to no traction within the governments concerned, allowing the proposal to essentially fade out of focus for some time. The proposal, nonetheless, marks a clear starting point in efforts focused on an ANWFZ.

Following Rich and Vinogradov, three notable ANWFZ proposals have been made: Hannah Newcombe (1981); Owen Wilkes (1984); and Thomas Axworthy (2012). Newcombe, a Canadian peace researcher, developed her proposal off the knowledge gained from the Nordic NWFZ initiatives and also drew on relevant international treaties (the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Seabed Treaty). Newcombe did not shy away from clearly stating that “we are looking for real, though small at first, strategic sacrifices on the part of the superpowers, or the Arctic Treaty will be of little value.” Newcombe suggested the denuclearization of all land, water, and air space North of 60° North. Such a demarcation would specifically mean that the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) of the Treaty (the US and Russia) would undertake the obligation not to place nuclear weapons in their Arctic territories, and to remove any auxiliary systems (storage sites, launching equipment, port facilities for nuclear capable submarines) from their Arctic areas. Newcombe noted that it would be desirable to allow the geographic boundaries of the Treaty to be reasonably flexible, “so as to balance the concessions by the superpowers taking into account their sensitivities from the point of view of global strategy.” This approach is what Newcombe called a ‘flexible North of 60° N plan.’ This particular approach appeared realistic and advantageous since the negotiations on borders would only include three of the eight prospective members – Canada, the US, and Russia, conveniently those who have the most to lose and the greatest sensitivities to how the borders will be drawn – seeing that the entire territory of Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden would be covered by the Treaty.

Owen Wilkes, an NGO peace advocate from New Zealand, published “A proposal for a demilitarized Zone in the Arctic” in 1984. The geographic scope of Wilkes proposal is rather unique compared to other ANWFZ proposals as it does not include what he refers to as the “Central Polar Basin,” nor does it include any of Russia’s continental territory. Rather, in terms of land mass, it includes Russia’s Franz Josef Land, the US’s Bering Strait Islands and the North Coast of Alaska, Denmark’s Greenland and Faroes, Iceland, Norway’s Svalbard, and Canadian territory North of 60° North. Wilkes does propose that the zone “would include the sea areas in-between the above mentioned lands,” which it is important to note would fall within the EEZ limits of the state's involved (Russia, US, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland). Wilkes also notes that “it might also be seen as necessary or feasible to include the Aleutians, Labrador, New Foundland, parts of Norway and the Soviet Northern islands east of Franz Josef Land.” Thus, the geographic scope of Wilkes proposal is unique in comparison to the other zonal proposals in that it takes a peripheral approach, rather the all-encompassing approach of Newcombe, Rich and Vinogradov, or Axworthy, as will be seen.

Wilkes’s proposal nonetheless aims to achieve the same substantive outcome as other proposals, namely “a total ban on transit or presence of nuclear weapons.” Wilkes builds on this, asserting that “flights of bombers, strategic reconnaissance aircraft, cruise missiles, and maybe seacraft would be banned. In principle, ballistic missile overflight would be banned.” Thus, Wilkes’s proposal for the denuclearization and demilitarization of the circum-Arctic region, and his assumption that the central Arctic Ocean surface waters would not become militarized because of ice cover, was essentially aimed at employing denuclearization to create “a barrier
between the two superpowers, a barrier which must be violated by either superpower if it wishes to launch a nuclear attack.”

The most recent and most comprehensive proposal for an ANWFZ was presented by Thomas Axworthy at a conference of the Interaction Council in 2010. In comparison to Newcombe’s proposal, Axworthy’s ANWFZ proposal represents a significantly more robust and articulate proposal, one which reflects the changes in geopolitics that have occurred since 1980. The proposed zone would cover the eight Arctic states’ territory as Newcombe laid out, while also including all adjacent seas, seabeds, continental shelves, disputed territories, international waters, and airspace, of those territories. Axworthy specified that, “Nuclear Weapon Free’ should mean all nuclear weapons and armaments, as well as the targeting of nuclear facilities and nuclear testing.”

In connection to this, Axworthy makes the argument that an Arctic NWFZ should not only prohibit the use of nuclear weapons but should also “prohibit conventional weapons attacks on nuclear installations. This is because the environmental and health fallouts from the latter would resemble the former.” Axworthy also makes the interesting point that an Arctic NWFZ treaty should prohibit the conducting of nuclear weapons related research, noting that while all other NWFZ treaties have been quite silent on this point, the Arctic has a rich history of nuclear weapon testing and research which makes such a provision more applicable. Axworthy, moreover, particularly calls for the Treaty to include a provision affirming that all zonal states support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

While agreeing that the eight Arctic states are the most essential actors to negotiating an Arctic NWFZ, Axworthy does not discount the possible contributions of other states. He notes that “relevant actors” and “Arctic stakeholders” – China, Japan, South Korea, France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union – have vested interests in the Arctic and should thus be consulted during the treaty making process. This being said, Axworthy also concludes that “[i]f it is not possible to get all Arctic states to ratify the NWFZ Treaty then those states which support the initiative should sign on to the treaty and continue to lobby non-signatories to sign on.”

Axworthy’s proposal is comprehensive and articulate representing some of the most up-to-date considerations on the topic. The comprehensive nature, however, has the drawback of highlighting the daunting task of negotiating an Arctic NWFZ, making quite stark the numerous delicate issues and possible stumbling blocks. Axworthy, like Newcombe, but to a much greater degree, works from the position that nuclear weapons are catastrophic in nature, and thus seeks to provide a framework for minimization followed by elimination. To buttress this ambitious plan, he includes a system of confidence building measures designed to lay the foundation for intensified cooperation among the Arctic states in order to construct the environment in which an Arctic NWFZ is conceivable and achievable.

While not amounting to a comprehensive proposal, it is important to note the local Indigenous support for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Arctic. At its first conference in 1977, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) passed Resolution 77-11 entitled “A Resolution on Arctic Policy: Peaceful and safe uses of the Arctic Circumpolar Zone.” The resolution resolved that “the Arctic shall be used for peaceful and environmentally safe purposes only,” that “there shall be prohibited any measure of military nature,” and that “a moratorium be called on emplacement of nuclear weapons.” The ICC followed the 1977 resolution with another one in 1983, more
explicitly addressing the prospect of a NWFZ, the resolution was entitled: “Resolution on a Nuclear Free Zone in the Arctic.” This resolution further confirmed that the Arctic and sub-Arctic should be used for peaceful purposes, that “there shall be no nuclear testing or nuclear devices in the Arctic or sub-Arctic,” and resolved that the “executive Council of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference lobby the United Nations and various international organizations to encourage members of the United Nations to adopt a policy for a nuclear free zone in the Arctic.” These two resolutions also seem to highlight a normative understanding of the Arctic as a ‘region of peace’ on behalf of the ICC, and probably among the Indigenous peoples of the region more broadly. These perspectives have not been lost in the intervening decades. In April 2009, the ICC issued a declaration on Arctic sovereignty, which states that “Inuit had been living in the Arctic from time immemorial” and therefore “Inuit consent, expertise, and perspectives are critical to progress on international issues involving the Arctic.” This should be properly understood as the ICC’s rejection of approaching an Arctic NWFZ from a purely “southern perspective,” that is, without the input or collaboration of local populations.

Reflecting with the Experts

As noted, the individuals were invited to be interviewed because of their contributions to the academic discussion on Arctic security, specifically proposals for an Arctic NWFZ and to Arctic specific arms control measures. The interviews were framed as discussions about the enduring obstacles faced by ANWFZ proposals, future prospects for an ANWFZ, and strategies for establishing an ANWFZ in the current global security environment. The following is a topical grouping and analysis of the comments made during those discussions.

NATO

The specific concern of NATO vis-à-vis a prospective ANWFZ is whether membership within a collective security arrangement with a nuclear posture is compatible with membership in a NWFZ. Wallace and Staples have argued that “it might well be possible to draft an Arctic NWFZ Treaty that does not conflict with the letter of NATO members commitments to the Alliances Strategic Concept,” but also recognized that “membership in a NWFZ would be incompatible with its spirit.” Other scholars, however, claim that “[t]here is general agreement that the introduction of a NWFZ would require a change in NATO nuclear strategy. At present, this is unlikely to happen since any change in the strategy concerning the Northern Flank would have serious implications for NATO strategy in central Europe,” and this is why, historically, “there has been opposition from the US and Britain to the proposals for a Nordic NWFZ.” For context, it should be noted that there are indeed precedents for states under a nuclear alliance joining an NWFZ. Australia is a member of the Raratonga Treaty (the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone) despite being in a nuclear security alliance with the US through The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Three Central Asian states – Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – are similarly allied to Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization and yet members of the Central Asia NWFZ.

Adele Buckley remarked that while NATO, a nuclear alliance, apparently poses a problem to forming an ANWFZ, “... regardless of United States political pressure to conform, a country belonging to NATO can exercise its foreign policy in whatever way it wishes. There is no reason why Canada or any one of the Nordic countries, all free of nuclear weapons, could not host a meeting to begin discussions on a partial ANWFZ.” Furthermore, Buckley said that “I feel certain that the underlying lack of interest of the non-NWS of the Arctic in the ANWFZ concept is membership in NATO,” implying that it is NATO’s strategic nuclear posture that has stymied the potential of opening discussions on excluding nuclear weapons from the Arctic.

Hamel-Green noted that “to overcome that particular issue of NATO, the problem is the pressure from Russia. It is not helping matters at all. But the counter to that is also the instability of any deterrence-based systems, given all the new evidence and thinking about the risk of accidental nuclear war, to rely on nuclear weapons in any way.” Along these lines, he further noted that there are ways in which non-nuclear members of NATO can distance themselves from NATO’s nuclear posture. For example, Arctic littoral states that do not host NATO nuclear weapons could consider withdrawing from the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) as a way of further distancing themselves from NATO’s nuclear posture. Buttressing this, Ernie Regehr particularly noted his belief that “a country like Canada could descent from the basic nuclear strategy of NATO and declare itself not to be part of a nuclear planning group.” While NATO may pose certain political obstacles to the establishment of an ANWFZ, there are legal precedents which could be made recourse to should a NATO member wish to join a NWFZ zone, as would be the case in an ANWFZ.

A Canada-Nordic NWFZ

An ideal ANWFZ would include US and Russian territory in order to be truly pan-Arctic in character. However, what if the US and Russia show continued reticence to the idea of an ANWFZ, does that mean that Arctic denuclearization is impossible? Commentators, think-tanks, and advocacy groups have proposed the creation of a Canada-Nordic NWFZ, which would essentially entail the non-nuclear weapon states of the Arctic region entrenching their non-nuclear status via a formal agreement. Such a zone, while geographically smaller than desired, would advance the cause of the ANWFZ by formalizing what is already existing in practice – the non-nuclear status of Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland. Should such a regional zone be unfeasible it has also been proposed that Canada declare its Northwest Passage as nuclear weapons free. Dr. Buckley noted, in addition to the US position that the Northwest Passage (NWP) is an international waterway, the NWP is known to be narrow in places and sometimes shallow, and thus unfavourable for submarine passage. Thus, declaring the NWP as nuclear free would not necessarily advance the ANWFZ cause.

Dr. Hamel-Green remarked that “all of the nuclear weapon free zones have been established first by the regional states themselves, with no initial agreement by the United States, which has not been enthusiastic about any zone, and was vigorously opposed to the one in the South Pacific.” Such an approach would be phased and “reassure people about their security at each stage of that phase, while allowing countries to gradually improve the reach of provisions against nuclear weapons.” Similarly, Dr. Buckley suggested that the greatest benefit of
pursuing a Canada-Nordic NWFZ is that “it doesn’t require the agreement of the US or Russia to start negotiating. And because of that, I think it’s the best way forward.”

Hamel-Green further elaborated that the Canada-Nordic NWFZ is attractive as an intermediate step since “the best can sometimes be the enemy of the good. If initially you can’t get anywhere, what you can do is have a framework agreement where you agree on denuclearizing within your own territories, but also seek together some sort of framework agreement whereby in a later phase, the wider region can be denuclearized. You can have a stepping-stones approach.”

Such a phased approach would not be novel, for as Hamel-Green observed: “the Latin American NWFZ Treaty only eventually came into full force in 1994 for the two largest regional states, Brazil and Argentina, even though almost all the other regional states had brought it into force for their own territories not long after it was signed in 1967.”

How would such a zone be geographically demarcated? Hamel-Green suggested a specific demarcation for a Canada-Nordic NWFZ. Namely, that “you could draw a line from the Northwest corner of Alaska to the Kola Peninsula that would roughly bisect the Arctic, encompassing all of Canada and the other littoral states... and you could leave the other half of the zone for a later stage” of pan-Arctic denuclearization.

Ernie Regehr, while agreeing on the merit of the idea, and the possible efficacy of a Canada-Nordic NWFZ as an intermediate step, cautioned that “the biggest impact would be on NATO. It would be a major signal to NATO, and an attempt to isolate the Americans... It does strike me as a very similar kind of debate to whether or not a NATO non-nuclear weapon state could join the [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons] TPNW, while still being part of a nuclear alliance.” In this way, any discussion of a possible Canada-Nordic NWFZ must remain cognizant of the key obstacle that NATO, and its strategic concept, may pose in addition to the historic challenges faced by the Nordic NWFZ proponent, as previously elaborated.

Transit Rights

The intention of any NWFZ is to totally remove nuclear weapons from the zone. Thus far, the established NWFZs have successfully prohibited the stationing of nuclear weapons by states within the zones. The transit of nuclear weapons through NWFZs remains a key issue however, with none of the current NWFZs containing a blanket prohibition on the transit of nuclear weapons through their zones. It is nonetheless still recognized by non-proliferation advocates that NWFZs ought to prohibit the transit, in addition to the stationing, of nuclear weapons. Thus, the issue of transit has featured prominently in commentaries on ANWFZ proposals.

All six experts rightly noted that current NWFZs have not restricted the transit of nuclear weapons through their respective zone, at best they have left the decision of transit up to individual states, presumably to decide whether to permit such transit through their coastal waters or EEZs. Likewise, all experts highlighted Russian stationing of SSBNs on its Kola Peninsula as the largest impediment to restricting the transit of nuclear weapons through a prospective ANWFZ in any meaningful way. It was noted that the stationing of Russian SSBNs on the Kola Peninsula is a strategic choice motivated more by global strategic interests – access to the Atlantic and Pacific theatres – than by Arctic specific interests. In recognition of this, Dr. Buckley suggested that one solution to the Russian SSBN impediment is to not include the Kola Peninsula within the ANWFZ so that they may transit their SSBNs while otherwise respecting the integrity of the zone.
Dr. Buckley stressed that any agreement that seeks to regulate international waters – like the Central Arctic Ocean – must be international in its nature. That is, it is not enough for just the Circumpolar state’s along with states who have Arctic naval capabilities to negotiate such a treaty that would curtail transit rights, or any rights guaranteed to a state on the high seas via UNCLOS. Rather, seeing that such a treaty could constrain both regional and non-regional state’s, it ought to be pursued in an international fashion.

There are various perspectives on the issue of whether some states could be asked to relinquish legal rights in the relevant domains. Dr. Hamel-Green, for example, argues that "there are precedents for nuclear powers to relinquish such rights in the case of the Antarctic Treaty, which demilitarizes and denuclearizes from the South Pole through to latitude 60 degrees South. That includes the land territory, the territorial waters, and the international waters...it’s been perfectly possible legally and politically for the US, Russia, France, the UK, and China to do that. And there’s no difference with the Arctic.” Moreover, Dr. Hamel-Green believes that there is a growing international consensus that the transit of nuclear weapons is inherently not innocent, and thus not guaranteed under UNCLOS’ right of innocent passage. Specifically he noted that with “the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons [TPNW], you’ve got additional reason to invoke the Law of the Sea provisions saying that any transit of ships carrying nuclear weapons is not innocent.” And further, that “nuclear weapon states can forego their transit rights under protocols, it is perfectly feasible to do that. And the South Pacific nuclear free zone does offer some precedence in this area. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone [Protocol] is now signed and ratified by all but America...This prevents any nuclear weapon state from testing nuclear weapons anywhere in the South Pacific, including international waters, including Exclusive Economic Zones.”

It is therefore obvious that any prospective ANWFZ will have to contend with the transit issue, as have all preceding NWFZs. It is possible, however, that the framers of a prospective ANWFZ attempt to curtail nuclear-weapon transit more boldly, and that they may benefit from more enhanced interpretations of UNCLOS and related customary law.

**Preconditions for Success**

ANWFZ proposals have thus far failed to make the crucial transition from NGO advocacy circles to government policy circles. That is, proposals have yet to be considered viable policy options. The experts generally agreed that the problem lies not so much in the proposals themselves, but in conditions that must be present for such a proposal to be considered. Specifically, states in the region must have a certain degree of mutual confidence which can be produced through confidence building measures followed by intermediary arms control measures.

In this regard, Dr. Franklyn Griffiths remarked that “part of the problem with the nuclear weapons free zone is that it's an ends rather than a process. The process is really what should be worked out. How do you get from here to there? There is not too much talk about the analysis of preconditions. Instead, it’s people going to directly for the Holy Grail [the NWFZ], and others are not ready to go there and the whole thing is held up.”

In the context of creating the necessary preconditions for Arctic denuclearization, Griffiths stressed the importance of “creating a kind of civil society in the Arctic, where you have vested interests in non-military
cooperation that slowly offsets and provides a context in which hard edged, or pointed, military matters are discussed... so you get to arms control discussions indirectly.”

Through this “indirect approach” there is both the recognition of the need to insulate the soft-security cooperation mechanisms of the Arctic, while at the same time recognizing the need to address hard-security issues as well, but in a way which does not threaten the hard-won successes of Arctic soft-security thus far.

Dr. Thomas Axworthy likewise stressed the importance of building “constituencies” within the context of promoting an ANWFZ policy, especially when the government of a given country is not yet enticed by the idea.

Ernie Regehr emphasized the need to insulate the work of the Arctic Council from hard-security questions to safeguard its efficacy as a venue of cooperation for soft-security and governance cooperation. Regehr nonetheless stressed the necessity of a forum which could produce “a better understanding of day-to-day [military] operations to avoid mishaps, close encounters, and misinterpretation of military events.”

Dr. Buckley echoed this idea, suggesting the creation of an “Arctic Security Forum” since hard security “doesn’t fit and would be detrimental” to the work of the Arctic Council.

Regehr highlighted that an additional benefit of such a forum would be that it “helps to set the context for larger strategic relations and strategic studies, that is, discussions that then go beyond the immediate military operations issues, and towards arms control, and broader strategic relations.”

This is essentially a call for Arctic states to free themselves from their self-imposed moratorium on addressing hard security issues. A dual track approach to cooperation is needed. The two tracks are soft security cooperation on the one hand, and defence diplomacy on the other. In this conceptualization, the two tracks run in parallel to each other, to the benefit of each other, while remaining mutually insulated from each other to preserve one another’s efficacy. The realm of soft-security cooperation (i.e., fisheries, search and rescue, environment, shipping, etc.) has been intensely guarded by the Arctic regional states in an effort to prevent extra-Arctic politics and tensions from disrupting regional soft-security cooperation. In this way, hard security issues can be addressed with the same earnest that soft security issues have been addressed.

Taking the comments of the experts together, they agree that the Arctic Council would not be the right forum to address hard security issues, but that for the ANWFZ to have any future hard security issues need to be addressed in some sort of formal way. Moreover, this dialogue on hard security issues is the first step to building confidence in the region on hard security matters which in turn enhances the prospects for intermediary arms control measures leading to possible denuclearization. Dialogue, confidence building, and intermediary arms control measures are thus the necessary preconditions for consideration of an ANWFZ proposal.

Building Confidence

If confidence building measures are a necessary step along the pathway to Arctic denuclearization, what are they and what would they address? Ernie Regehr emphasized the importance of developing confidence building measures to strengthen and enhance the cooperative governance environment of the Arctic region. Regehr particularly made reference to the 2012 proposal of Dr. Axworthy which includes a whole section on confidence building measures, the first of which is to specifically avoid actions which do not build confidence.

Regehr also highlighted the importance of non-binding political declarations like the Ilulissat Declaration of 2018, since they
can act as foundation stones or reference points for the further building of confidence and predictable relations. Regehr emphasized that such agreements, while not binding, do help to create a “kind of milieu in which you want to preserve a sense of internal stability within the region.”

The experts also made the link between Arctic arms control and the global non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament regime (NACD). All seem to agree that while the global NACD regime affects strategic postures and decisions in the Arctic, that it is not wholly determinate of the situation in the Arctic. This, it seems, is not a position grounded in Arctic Exceptionalism – that the Arctic is inherently unique – but rather the consequence of a conviction of the need and desirability for non-proliferation and disarmament. For if we wait for the situation to improve elsewhere to address the situation in the Arctic, we may never actually address the Arctic situation. Ronald Purver, admitted that the status of global non-proliferation is “not that great at the moment, so that might argue against the practicality of certain Arctic proposals, on the other hand, it may enforce the argument that you’ve got to start somewhere, and the Arctic might be the place.” In a similar vein, Dr. Hamel-Green noted that “you have to have regional initiatives side by side with global initiatives... regional initiatives can lay the way for global initiatives as well, and vice versa.”

The prospects for NACD progress under the new Biden Administration were particularly noted, especially the possibility of a no-first-use pledge. Such a change in US strategic posture would have direct ramifications on military activity in the Arctic region, for as Regehr remarked, it “would remove the rationale for US submarine patrols that threaten Russian SSBNs in what are international waters, but often considered as Russian home waters,” because of their bastion defence posture. A no-first-use pledge is a key confidence building measure within Axworthy’s proposed framework for an ANWFZ.

Dr. Hamel-Green, while strongly emphasizing the necessity of confidence building measures, noted that “confidence building measures are one of the interesting things that helped defuse things between the Trump administration and North Korea. It was American willingness to cancel its military exercises using nuclear bombers close to the North Korean border.” Applying this rationale to the Arctic, Dr. Hamel-Green proposed that “there could be right away an initial agreement not to have any military exercises in the Arctic Ocean, which is quite a feasible thing that could be bilaterally attractive to Russia and America.”

**Intermediary Arms Control Measures for the Arctic**

Dr. Griffiths thus emphasized that “intermediary steps are what it’s all about.” This should be no surprise, since Dr. Griffiths pioneered what has become a legacy intermediary arms control proposal for the Arctic region. In 1979, Dr. Griffiths proposed a “regime of limited demilitarization” for the Central Arctic Ocean, which consists of the “Arctic Ocean lying to the seaward of the line demarcating the offshore Exclusive Economic Zone of the littoral states.” Specifically, Dr. Griffiths proposed that Canada pursue the demilitarization of the surface waters and ice of the Polar Basin. The objective of this proposal was two-fold: to lay the foundations for a community of Northern states aware that the Arctic is best managed in a cooperative fashion; and freezing the level of military activity, or if possible, to reduce it.

Reflecting on his 1979 proposal, Dr. Griffiths noted that in hindsight it was not actually accurate at the time to refer to the Central Arctic Ocean as “tacitly demilitarized” since we now know that “it was full of Soviet subs,
American ASW, NORAD was there, and all the rest.” With today’s knowledge, Dr. Griffiths admitted that it would have been more accurate to refer to the area as “not an active zone of conflict.” These distinctions matter since the thrust of the 1979 proposal relied on the assumption that there was little military activity occurring on the surface waters and ice of the Central Arctic Ocean, and thus the logic was to formally demilitarize part of an area which was already ‘tacitly demilitarized.’ This, perhaps, is an interesting insight into why the proposal was never seriously considered by governments of the day and whose life was largely constrained to academic and NGO peace circles.

Ernie Regehr, however, cautioned against questioning the validity or accuracy of the 1979 proposal, for it specifically addressed Central Arctic surface waters, which ought to be distinguished from sub-surface waters which may have been used extensively by submarines. Regehr particularly mentioned that the use of Central Arctic surface waters for military and defence purposes has essentially remained constant since 1979, which is to say that it has seen minimal use. Regehr credited this to the fact that “none of the Arctic states need [the Central Arctic surface waters] for their own coastal protection. And the defence systems that they have, including the Russian string of bases and radars and air defense system, don’t need access to the international waters of the Arctic beyond their EEZ waters. And so, it is hard to see why any of them would need to station strategic systems there.”

Regehr further noted that the window of opportunity for this measure may still be open as “the central Arctic Ocean isn’t going to become a theater of routine military operation for a long time to come.” There may, however “be symbolic military uses or transit,” but “it’s going to be a long time before the Central Arctic Ocean becomes a sort of freewheeling waterway.” Several analysts have warned, however, that such an agreement would be unrealistic because of its negative implications on internationally recognized rights for freedom of navigation. Regehr, cognizant of these challenges, argued that while such an agreement would infringe upon states freedom of navigation, it is still conceivable that “Arctic states, via treaty or some sort of cooperative arrangement, commit not to undertake military operations on the surface waters of the Central Arctic Ocean,” and further that they “could acknowledge that this is not precedent setting or in contradiction to freedom of navigation principles of international law by saying that it is a regional agreement and arrangement which the parties do not take to affect their rights on the High Seas generally.” Regehr referenced the 2018 Fisheries agreement which established constraints on the established right to fish in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean until adequate scientific information is available on the implications of such activities. Of interest in this agreement is the inclusion of two ‘non-prejudicial clauses’ which parties to these agreements made use of to try and establish stark boundaries on the precedent setting power or contribution which these agreements could make to establishing customary international law. Drawing on the precedent of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, Regehr further noted that efforts to establish the Central Arctic Ocean as demilitarized could begin by the US and Russia making unilateral declarations not to place certain weapon platforms in the Central Arctic Ocean and from there begin more formal negotiations.

Dr. Buckley, while weighing in on the idea of demilitarizing the surface waters of the Central Arctic Ocean, noted the desirability of such a measure but argued that “the idea seems to be even more difficult than negotiating a NWFZ. It would require all the circumpolar states to participate, and all other states with navies that might go there at present or in the future.” Moreover, icebreakers with weapon platforms, as China has already has,
would pose a significant obstacle to this specific intermediary arms control measure. She is not alone in her skepticism, as evidenced by Ronald Purver when he remarked that “the likelihood of the Arctic opening up and surface naval activity increasing, partial demilitarization of the Central Arctic Ocean is probably needed now more than ever, especially once the ice melts, but I’m still very pessimistic about partial demilitarization.”

Ronald Purver, who supported Dr. Griffiths 1979 proposal, observed that the proposal had merit in the 1980s since there was prospective military uses of the surface waters and ice like “anti-submarine helicopter teams or the landing on the ice and drilling though to lower detection devices and so forth as part of the ASW program against Soviet submarines and surface vehicles and other ways of using the ice for military purposes. I suggested that if this is what was coming up, that it might be a good time to prevent that by demilitarizing the surface waters.”

In our current context, Purver argued that “of course, that would be even truer with the current melting of the sea ice and the greater commercial use of open waters in the Arctic. But, of course, that also suggests that it would be more difficult than ever to get countries to agree... once greater commercial activity commences than surface naval activities will more or less inevitably follow.” Purver nonetheless emphasized the need to consider preventative measures, just as the Seabed or Outerspace treaties acted as preventative measures to curtail the arming of specific regions/geographic areas.

Similarly, Dr. Griffiths noted that the growing accessibility of Arctic waters will enhance economic and development interests in the region while also providing new opportunities for military advantage, like the ballistic missile defence options in the region. Dr. Griffiths also noted that “the change in sea ice in the Arctic cuts both ways. Increased interest and involvement in the non-military development of the region, but also sharpened attention to the military potential of the changing region.”

Proposals have also been made for the establishment of SSBN sanctuary zones in the Arctic region. Proposals for such a zone date back to the 1980s but have received relatively little attention or updating until recently, and even then in a very small way. Ronald Purver, writing in 1983, suggested that a “type of strategic ASW control measure would be the creation of SSBN sanctuaries or ASW-free zones, from which adversary ASW forces and installations would be barred (and which would also, incidentally, make initial acquisition of trail more difficult.) Verification would appear to be quite feasible by the use of the defending party’s own sonar detection systems.” Specifically, sanctuary zones were proposed on the Russian side in the Barents Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, and on the American side in the Gulf of Alaska.

On this topic, Ernie Regehr remarked that “it just seems like a complete no brainer, an obvious contribution to strategic stability.” This is especially so, he argued, because “one of the most disturbing developments has been the American and NATO patrols deep into the Barents Sea and to the approaches of the of the Kola Peninsula...those visits deep into those areas are an immensely destabilizing thing” since it demonstrates pre-emptive strike capabilities and severely threatens the potency of Russian second-strike capabilities. Regehr expressed further surprise that the arms control community has not picked up on these destabilizing activities and revived the SSBN sanctuary idea as a means to reduce destabilizing military activities in the region. Regehr thinks that agreement “could be reached on a sort of agreement on exclusion of patrols in that area, even if it was just to the bear cut off between Svalbard and Norway [from the North Cape of Norway, to Bear Island, to
South Svalbard], to pledge not to patrol with anti-submarine warfare capabilities beyond that point, that would be a significant stabilizing development.”

Reflecting on his previous academic commentaries on the idea of SSBN sanctuaries, Ronald Purver noted that “the idea of an SSBN sanctuary was largely rejected because the whole [US] maritime strategy was dependent on threatening the Soviet submarine deterrent in the Arctic,” since “the last thing the US Navy, with all of its political influence, wanted was any kind of restriction on its activities, and any kind of restriction that might impose on its maritime strategy.” This was compounded by governments general opinion that such zones could not be verified. At the time, Purver disagreed however, noting that “they could in fact, be verified largely because they were already being verified, the systems were already in place and in practice, and depending on the area of the world, they had been more or less successful. Afterall, the American’s boasted of their ability to track and monitor Soviet submarines.”

Conclusions and Takeaways

A key takeaway from these discussions is that any further elaboration of the ANWFZ concept ought to include robust consideration of the pre-conditions for denuclearization negotiations in the Arctic region. In this context, Arctic specific confidence building measures and arms control measures should be of particular interest for they are key elements to a strategic environment more conducive to serious nuclear arms reductions. For example, Axworthy remains convinced that an ANWFZ is a potential policy option and that “developing a realistic arms control agenda for the Arctic would be a great contribution” to positively developing the ANWFZ concept. The enduring interest of these experts in Dr. Griffiths 1979 demilitarization proposal and the idea of SSBN sanctuaries is telling in this regard.

Intermediary steps are meant to pave the way towards more substantial arms control and reduction measures – in this case a NWFZ –therefore, they must be sensitive to strategic balances, ideally enhancing the strategic balance of the region. For this reason, the best intermediary arms control measures will be those that fit within the deterrence logic of the states involved. Further, it is ideal for a suite of intermediary steps to work together in unison, or sequentially. Thinking of intermediary measures in such a way evokes the sense of a ‘security architecture’ or ‘security community.’

Those involved, despite honorable work within the non-governmental world over decades, have not been able to break into government circles in any meaningful way to advocate for their proposals. As Ronald Purver candidly noted, “these were fairly popular ideas in academic circles, the idea of controlling strategic and submarine warfare, including SSBN sanctuaries, was also academically popular, but it was total anathema to the US Navy and most other Navies.” This perhaps remains one of the largest hurdles for the ANWFZ concept – since its conception it has not been seriously dealt with by governments as a policy option. For example, in 1986, a special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations recommended that “that Canada, in co-operation with other Arctic nations, seek the demilitarization of the Arctic,” specifically noting the possibility of a NWFZ in the region. The government of Canada formally responded noting that “The government will strive to limit excessive militarization of the Arctic in the interest of strategic stability and in the context of our associated arms control and disarmament effort, and will seek out new ways of building trust in the circumpolar North,”
but “singling out the Arctic for demilitarization does not seem practicable.” Militarization of the Arctic was recognized as a potential issue, and one worth addressing, yet denuclearization proposals were seen as unlikely and impractical because of the strategic use of Arctic waters for nuclear force deployment and a perceived lack of confidence and trust between the two nuclear states operating there – US and Russia. The problem – excessive militarization, including nuclear arms – was admitted, but the proposed policy solution – an ANWFZ – was declined as non-feasible. This response by a government buttresses the experts’ growing concern for preconditions, including confidence building and intermediary arms control measures.

There is hope, for in 2011 Denmark endorsed the idea of an Arctic NWFZ in UN proceedings and then included it in its foreign policy statement. In 2009, the Icelandic government released a manifesto in which it declared that “Iceland will be declared a nuclear weapon free zone and the Icelandic government will support nuclear disarmament internationally.” In 2011, a private members bill was presented in the Canadian House of Commons by Larry Bagnell, MP, Liberal member from Yukon, entitled “An Act respecting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Canadian Arctic” but it was not adopted. These individual instances mark progress, albeit relatively small, in the movement of the ANWFZ concept from NGO circles to government policy circles. In this regard, Dr. Hamel-Green stressed that “finding a way to put together leadership of a party or key people in the government to see the importance of this [ANWFZ], and to actually promote it and argue for it, that’s a crucial thing, even in the absence of a broader general movement.”

Dr. Axworthy optimistically remarked that “as a policy advocate, you keep advocating, you keep working and polishing your proposals because at some point, the windows open, they don’t stay closed forever, but when it opens, you got to jump through it.” This attitude has been evident amongst all these experts’ work over the past several decades. Despite little progress on establishing an ANWFZ, these experts have remained committed to the idea in principle and remain hopeful for its eventual establishment.

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1 Agreements through the Arctic Council include: the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic; the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic; and the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation
6 This meeting was requested via a letter to the President of the Security Council, dated 18 April 1958. United Nations, Security Council, S/3900. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/629416
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 16-26.
20 Ibid. 71.
22 Ronald Purver “Arctic Security: the Murmansk Initiative and Its Impact,” 147
23 Ibid. Purver offered a clear example of the self-serving nature of the Murmansk arms control proposals by outlining that “proposals for restricting military activity in the vicinity of international straits and shipping lanes is viewed in western capitals as particularly self-serving for the Soviets,” for all parties are “acutely aware of NATO Europe’s dependence on the Atlantic sea lanes for supply and reinforcement in time of war.” 152-155.
26 For a comparison of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with the Nordic Zone proposals see: Broadhurst, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: A Comparative Analysis of Theory and Practice.
27 It should nonetheless be noted that NATO maintains a formal commitment to nuclear disarmament, see: NATO Strategic Concept 2010, Preface, Para. 26: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf
31 Ibid., 22.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
Ibid., 256.
38 Ibid., 257.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 8.
43 Ibid., 9.
44 Ibid., 8.
45 Thomas Axworthy, “A proposal for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone.”
46 Ibid., 138.
47 Ibid., 103.
48 Ibid. This would be a particularly important confidence building measure on the part of the US.
49 Ibid., 105
50 Ibid., 139
51 Ibid. These include: joint Search and Rescue patrols, increasing diplomatic resources, harmonizing regulations, multilateral efforts to deal with nuclear waste, scientific cooperation, and economic integration.
53 ICC, *Resolution 77-11*.
54 Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) 1983, *Resolution on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Arctic*.
55 Ibid.
59 Interview with Dr. Adele Buckley, former Chair of the Canadian national group of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, (February 16, 2021) (transcript on file with author).
60 Interview with Dr. Adele Buckley.
61 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green, professor emeritus, College of Arts & Education, Victoria University Melbourne, (February 25, 2021) (transcript on file with author).
62 France, a nuclear weapon possessing NATO state, does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.
63 Interview with Ernie Regehr, Senior Fellow in Defence Policy and Arctic Security at The Simons Foundation of Vancouver, (February 4, 2021) (transcript on file with author).
64 Ernie Regehr “Cooperative Security and Denuclearizing the Arctic,” 274-296.
66 Canadian Pugwash Call for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,” Canadian Pugwash, (24 August 2007): [https://pugwash.org/2007/08/24/statement-on-an-arctic-nuclear-weapon-free-zone/](https://pugwash.org/2007/08/24/statement-on-an-arctic-nuclear-weapon-free-zone/). Politically this would be a very disruptive action by the Canadian government since it would up-end the now longstanding US-Canada ‘agree-to-disagree’ policy on the NWP.
67 Interview with Dr. Adele Buckley.
68 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green.
69 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green. Also see his article on the deployment of this approach in North East Asia: Michael Hamel-Green, “Nuclear Deadlock, Stalled Diplomacy: The Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Alternative – Proposals, Pathways, Prospects,” *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, (2021).
70 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green
The Union of Concerned Scientists defines a non-nuclear weapon as one that is not designed for or intended to be used in a nuclear conflict. "A no-first-use nuclear policy means that the United States would commit to never use nuclear weapons first, either as a first strike (that is, an unprompted surprise attack), as an escalatory move in a conventional conflict, or in response to a non-nuclear attack. The only situation in which the US would use nuclear weapons would be in response to a confirmed nuclear attack on itself or its allies."

Ibid.

72 Interview with Ernie Regehr. Regarding this, Ernie Regehr referenced a report from the Canadian Parliament Standing Committee on National Defense which recommended that: “the Government of Canada take a leadership role within NATO in beginning the work necessary for achieving the NATO goal of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons. That this initiative be undertaken on an urgent basis in view of the increasing threat of nuclear conflict.” Canada and NATO: An Alliance Forged in Strength and Reliability, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, June 2018, 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, pg. 105: https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/NDDN/Reports/RP9972815/nddnrp10/nddnrp10-e.pdf


75 For example, the 1985 Treaty of Raratonga states in Article 5 (2) that “Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.” Treaty of Raratonga (1985), Article 5 (2).

76 Owen Wilkes made essentially the same proposal in 1984, see: Wilkes, Owen, A Proposal for a Demilitarized Zone in the Arctic.

77 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green.

78 Ibid.


80 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green

81 Ibid.

82 Interview with Dr. Franklyn Griffiths, professor emeritus of international politics and the George Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, (January, 28 2021) (transcript on file with author).

83 Ibid.


85 Interview with Ernie Regehr, Senior Fellow in Defence Policy and Arctic Security at The Simons Foundation of Vancouver, (February 4, 2021) (transcript on file with author).

86 Interview with Dr. Adele Buckley.

87 Interview with Ernie Regehr.


91 Interview with Ernie Regehr.

92 Interview with Ronald Purver, former Research Associate with the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, (February 19, 2021) (transcript on file with author).

93 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green, professor emeritus, College of Arts & Education, Victoria University Melbourne, (February 25, 2021) (transcript on file with author).

94 The Union of Concerned Scientists defines a non-first-use policy in the US context as: “A no-first-use nuclear policy means that the United States would commit to never use nuclear weapons first, either as a first strike (that is, an unprompted surprise attack), as an escalatory move in a conventional conflict, or in response to a non-nuclear attack. The only situation in which the US would use nuclear weapons would be in response to a confirmed nuclear attack on itself or its allies.” Union of Concerned Scientists, “No-First-Use Policy Explained,” May 7, 2020: https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/no-first-use-explained


Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green.

Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green. For further thoughts on similar proposals see: Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing hard power in a ‘low tension’ environment” Chatam House, 2019.

Griffiths, Franklyn “A Northern Foreign Policy.”

Interview with Dr. Franklyn Griffiths.

Ibid.

Interview with Ernie Regehr.

Ibid.

Ibid.

UNCLOS, Pt. III, Articles 37, 38, 39.

Interview with Ernie Regehr.

Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,” May 15, 2019. [https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/arctic-arctique-eng.htm](https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/arctic-arctique-eng.htm). In the Arctic context, such non-prejudicial clauses were also used in the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation (1988), clause (4).

Interview with Dr. Adele Buckley.

Interview with Ronald Purver.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Dr. Griffiths outlined that: “if the Russians want to launch ICBMs or SLBMs from Arctic locations, the United States is up there with surface ballistic missile defenses, they will be able to track and shoot down Russian missiles in their early launch phase. This is something the Russians will not like, since it will degrade their second-strike capability, of course. So therefore, they were going to have to do something about these capabilities that the US may, and is starting to deploy I believe, into the Arctic.” Interview with Dr. Franklyn Griffiths.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Interview with Ernie Regehr.


Interview with Ernie Regehr.

Interview with Ronald Purver.

Ibid.

Interview with Dr. Thomas Axworthy.


Interview with Ronald Purver.
126 Independence and Internationalism, report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada’s International Relations, June (1986).
128 For a historical overview of the little interest shown by the Canadian government in substantively addressing arms control and disarmament in the Arctic region in this time period see: John English, Ice and Water: politics, peoples and the Arctic Council, (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013):153-163.
131 Bill C-629, “An Act respecting the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Canadian Arctic,” February 15, 2011.
132 Interview with Dr. Michael Hamel-Green.
133 Interview with Dr. Thomas Axworthy.