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Human Security in the Arctic: A Review of the Russian Literature

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This primer examines two aspects of contemporary security research and policy in the Russian Federation. Given that Russian literature does not research human security in the Arctic, this primer will cover the concepts of human security and Arctic security—from the Russian perspective—separately. First, it examines how the concept of human security has been interpreted in Russia. Second, it explores the dominant approach to security in the Russian Arctic. While Arctic security issues are often characterized in human security terms in Western Arctic states, this is almost entirely absent in Russia. Despite a modest adoption of the human security concept in other areas of Russian research and policy, security in the Arctic is conceived and evaluated almost entirely in traditional, military, and state-centric terms.

In the first section, the primer reviews the concept of human security and Russian scholars' views on it. This provides additional insights on the subject as well as some critique. It shows the Russian perspective on various issues relating to the concept and Russian views on how the West uses the term. This review includes the various definitions used by Russian scholars, their skepticism of the concept, national interests and sovereignty, as well as citations of foreign intervention and spiritual security. This primer also reveals the dichotomy between human security and national security and interests for Russian scholars, as well as revealing gaps in Russian literature on human security.

In the second section, the primer turns to Russian literature on Arctic security, and provides a breakdown of the traditional security outlook on the region. The primer also outlines the main schools of Russian research on contemporary Arctic security and its leading scholars. Similar to the previous section, a review of Russia's dichotomy between collaboration and competition reveals a consistent focus on geostrategy and diplomacy in the Arctic. The lack of focus on human security is instead replaced with research on military and non-military forces in the Arctic, delineation, and analysis of Western posturing in the Arctic. The primer also reviews Russian government policy documents and policy papers in relation to Arctic security, and presents a gap analysis of Russia's policy and scholar work on Arctic security.

This research used both English and Russian search engines, such as Google scholar and Yandex. Canvassing leading Russian experts on human security and Arctic security provided helpful insights. The evaluation of Russian language literature as well as the Russian-English translations and transliterations provided in this document are my own. As a note on transliteration, given that there are several ways to transform Cyrillic writing into the Latin alphabet, I ask for forbearance from the reader who demands accuracy and consistency.

1. Introduction to the Russian Concept of Human Security

Human security examines security issues with a human or person-centric focus and a multi-disciplinary approach. This perspective looks beyond borders, viewing security issues on a local, sub-national, or international level, challenging the *traditional security* perspective of national security and defence. It looks towards including human rights, poverty, climate change, development, discrimination, and many other factors that are often overlooked by traditional security perspectives, with the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report* on "New Dimensions on Human Security" being its foundational document.

Roland Paris has described human security as:

> The latest in a long line of neologisms—including common security, global security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security—that encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military defence of state interests and territory. Although definitions of human security vary, most formulations emphasize the welfare of ordinary people.[1]

Indeed, the human security concept and its definitions in general have been extensive and vague, and given the paradigm's relatively recent origins, the literature has been varied in focus and frameworks. Further, the extensiveness and diversity of this paradigm is even more convoluted when considering that literature in different parts of the world often times view it from contrasting perspectives, such as focusing on particular elements when examining human security.

Besides this, human security naturally confronts traditional security perspectives. Traditional security elements, given their direct application, could be more persuasive for national governments to apply as part of their policy or strategy. On the other hand, given that human security is not derived from 'national interests' it is far more difficult to implement. Due to the current structure of international affairs, inter-governmental organizations (IGO) or international institutions do not lead or push policies, as their mandates and budgets are usually set by the governments participating in international fora. From a global perspective, human security often can put forth a more effective and efficient policy or strategy, but it may not be the strongest case for a national government to implement. Nevertheless, human security has the potential to become more persuasive for policymakers as the world becomes ever more globalized and inter-dependent—syncing national interests to global interests and forcing national governments to work together on certain global challenges.

While research on human security has largely focused on Western states, this primer examines human security in the context of the Russian Federation, particularly whether it has been applied in the context of Russian Arctic

policy. The Russian literature does evaluate human security as a concept and shares the concept's goals — building a people-centric, sometimes person-centric, approach to common security challenges not precluded by national borders. However, it does not focus on human security in the Arctic directly, which Russia prefers to view from a traditional security perspective. In addition to standard human security approaches, the Russian literature also attempts to include other elements to evaluate human security. In this primer, I examine how Russian scholarship and policy documents evaluate human security as a concept, and the Russian perception of security in the Arctic.

Russian literature outlines human security in a similar way to Western literature, but also looks at some particular areas that other literature does not, such as religious or spiritual security and technological or information security. When looking at the Arctic, in particular, Western human security research tends to examine issues related to climate change, identity of native peoples and Indigenous human rights, supply of traditional foods, community health, socio-economic areas, ecological fields, and political stability.[2] Russian literature takes a different approach, and consistently observes Arctic security through a traditional, national interest, nation-centric perspective. In terms of the last point, Russian literature does evaluate the issues listed above—such as climate change, infrastructure, and natural resources—but it does not directly link them to the human security paradigm.

Due to its novelty and ambiguity, scholars and policymakers have been very cautious with the human security concept.[3] The new paradigm has many limitations and unanswered questions relating to its implementation, who should and can successfully implement human security policies (i.e., governments, non-governmental organizations [NGOs], IGOs), and other areas. Russian literature has been acute in bringing these limitations to light, specifically highlighting the debate over human security's legitimacy in light of international law, and how it can encourage interventionism and intrude on nation sovereignty. There is broad skepticism in Russia as to how the human security concept could be used as a 'tool' to 'manipulate' states and legitimize 'interventions' in others' 'domestic affairs' as part of state's long-term strategy. Therefore, opening a new debate: who is really the driver of the human security concept, national governments, or transnational actors (such as IGOs and NGOs)? Are independent scholars and civil society the ones attempting to influence policymakers and governments to include human security concepts, or are governments using human security and civil society actors for their own long-term strategy?

2. Definitions of Human Security

As a concept that originates in English, human security has required translation into the Russian linguistic and cultural context. This is challenging because the human security paradigm is extensive, broad, and relatively ambiguous already; even some English language sources use distinct or related terms to refer to human security-related themes. The Russian translation makes researching human security even more complicated, as it utilizes three differing translations, listed below from most to least commonly used:

Figure 1: English-Russian Translations of Human Security

English	Russian
Human Security	Безопасность человека
Personal Security	Личностной безопасности
Life Security	Безопасность жизнедеятельности

There is no stark diversion in the literature with respect to how the different definitions are used, since they are at times utilized interchangeably. However, these definitions do uncover some small, specific variations in the Russian literature, which exemplify three perspectives. The first translation, *безопасность человека*, is the most direct translation of the English version of human security, and by far the most used. This is how the United Nations (UN) also translates it. It uses the word *человек* to resemble human/person is widely used in international resolutions, such as *права человека* or human rights—therefore, this definition has a more humankind-oriented connotation that would include both a person and a people-centric approach.

Diverging from this mainstream method, the second translation takes a slightly different approach with the core word *личность* meaning person, individual, or identity. This creates the connotation of a more person-centric approach, rather than a people-centric approach, and the association of a particular identity or individual uniqueness. What is particularly interesting in this case, is that Russian scholarly literature prefers to use the first definition, referring to "human"—as used by the UN—while the Russian government usually uses the second, referring to "person." Understanding why the Russian government prefers to use this definition—in national documents including the national Constitution and National Security Strategy papers—is an interesting aspect to explore further in future research. It could be an indicator that the Russian government does not prefer the universality of the "human" terminology, which could be seen as sovereignty-infringing, while the definition using "person" is able to harness the Russian national identity.

The last translation uses *жизнедеятельность,* which could be directly translated as livelihoods, vital activity, or functions vital to life. It is, again, a word consisting of several parts including "life" and "activity." By itself, the word is best described as the biological process—a set of processes occurring in a living organism, serving to maintain life in it, and are manifestations of life. This translation has a strong focus on the security of maintaining and preserving human life. This is an interesting formulation as it deals with biological life, as opposed to the individual or people, and looks at this from a more scientific perspective—like an organism's interaction with the environment.

Observing the common ground, all three definitions utilize the word *безопасность* to designate security, and the literature does not go further to include *защита* (protection), *обеспечение* (secure, provision, procuring), or *охрана* (defence). To break it down further, *безопасность* is actually a combination of two parts ("без"-"опасность"), directly translated as "without danger" or "the absence of danger." Concepts such as *safety* and *security* also play an interesting and separate role in definition and translation. Often used interchangeably,

there is actually an important difference between the study of safety and security. Safety relates to harm done by accident, mistake, or flaw, while security refers to harm done by intentional actions undertaken by human actors.[4] However, the Russian language does not accommodate this difference, and only uses one word, *безопасность,* to describe both. Often articles written in Russian originally and then translated into English use "personal safety" to allude to human security elements.

3. Russian Literature on Human Security

3.1 The Rise of Human Security

Russian literature describes human security as a paradigm brought in by the West—predominantly underlining the significant actions of Canada and Japan, but also including the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK)—and internationalized through the UN. The foundation of human security is not disputed in Russian literature, and the foundational characteristics of the concept are outlined in a similar fashion to other literatures. The literature generally dates the concept back to the 1990s, and particularly to the 1994 UNDP report, but there are some sources that counter this point and argue that human security existed as a concept long before but was not internationalized until that time. Disagreeing with this perspective are scholars suggesting that new security challenges have risen, and the increasing complexity of the process of globalization and interdependence has created a need for this new paradigm.

Although agreeing that human security requires further study, one half of Russian scholars is critical of the concept and the other is optimistic. The first half sees human security as either misguided, a tool used by governments, too ambiguous, or too encompassing, while the other half contends the discipline of international relations requires new interpretations of security as issues—and the word—evolve. The latter perspective sees the novel human security paradigm as the evolution of security studies, challenging the dominance of traditional security perspectives. Here, the literature diverges, with some arguing the human security paradigm is the next step in security studies and ought to replace the traditional perspective, while others see human security as an additional concept which could be viewed in parallel to traditional perspectives.[5]

Those seeing human security as part of an evolutionary process claim that security issues go past political and conflict-related issues, and therefore, it is necessary to include socio-economic issues and human rights abuses. At the same time, it is also necessary to not only work with national governments on solving security issues, but to also work with sub-national, transnational, and intergovernmental organizations—making the link to the fact that the current and potentially future international order is less national and more global. These and other factors encourage the literature to justify intervention as a positive effect in certain contexts. This conclusion is largely criticized by critics of human security, and remains a major point of contention elaborated upon below.

Reviewing the two security perspectives, Russian scholars agree that human security is a type of soft power, while traditional security is hard power.[6] Borisov goes further by arguing that the world relies more on soft power and persuasion, which increases the significance of human security.[7] Some scholars also indicate that

traditional security approaches are more likely to invest in the military, while human security approaches are more likely to invest in a diversity of development and humanitarian initiatives. Kochetkov and other scholars claim that traditional security seeks more confrontation, while human security seeks more cooperation among states.[8] While most Russian scholars agree that human security is largely a Western concept, Kochetkov and others also argue that developing countries and nations with authoritative regimes, inversely, use traditional security concepts to maintain power.[9] Likewise, many scholars determine that Russia is not a leader or even supporter of the concept.

The literature categorizes the evolution of human security at the UN in five phases:

1) 1994–1999 development and promotion,
2) 2000–2004 defining and establishing it as part of the international agenda,
3) 2005–2008 activating the promotion of human security by the UN and to include freedom to live in dignity, and the debate of how to approach human security,
4) 2009–2012 interpretation of various causes and the multi-disciplinary nature of human security, the attempt to figure out the framework and limitations of the paradigm, and the debate of interventionism, and
5) 2013–2017 activation of NGOs and UN specialization agencies to tackle human security.[10]

3.2 Approaches to Human Security

The Russian literature incorporates many transnational issues that other human security literature examines. However, it dedicates particular attention to certain issues such as terrorism, organized crime, climate change, religion, information, and technology. As well, there is minimal mention of sub-national issues in the Russian human security literature. The literature broadly agrees there is not one particular element of human security, but consistently notes that there is a lack of a clear framework for what elements should be included – and not if a narrow or a broad human security approach is better, for instance.

When describing approaches to human security, the literature outlines Canada's narrow approach—"freedom from fear" focusing on conflictual and weaponized situations such as gender-based violence, conflict prevention, political instability, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding—and Japan's broader approach—"freedom from want," which also includes poverty, hunger, human rights abuses, widespread diseases, ecological catastrophes, and economic instability, believing that these elements cause as much harm to human security as terrorism, war, and genocide. Although omnipresent in the literature, scholars do not go further to debate between the two approaches and their merits. It is only suggested that Japan's broader approach alludes to the fact that human security may require multidisciplinary explanations due to the various elements involved, and that security challenges, such as terrorism and genocide, seen through the traditional security perspective, may actually be linked with other issues including climate change, poverty, hunger, or a variety of socio-economic issues. At the same time, this more encompassing nature is criticized for drawing indirect or weak links between causes and effects, and thus not providing concrete answers for researchers or policymakers. Critics of human security who are skeptical of intervention would, by assumption, not prefer Japan's wider approach given that it could be

more encompassing and pose a larger threat to state sovereignty. However, this preference is not available because the skeptics outright do not accept the entire human security concept as justifying interference.

The Russian literature accepts both external *and* internal threats as human security issues, emphasizing both quantitative and qualitative aspects, such as measuring material possessions (e.g., food, water, wealth) and social possessions (e.g., social cohesion and access to education). The literature includes threats relating to terrorism, emerging weapons, technological warfare, CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear weapons), religious war and extremism, ecology, and demography (i.e., ethnic conflict). Combining two of the most examined elements, terrorism and technology, postmodernist terrorism features as a key human security issue. This is not to say that the literature does not go further than this—there are studies examining threats related to radiation, infrasonic, and genetic weapons. With respect to the two approaches, it seems that the literature focuses more on Canada's narrow human security approach by focusing on these elements.

There seems to be a major discrepancy between what is and what is not examined in the literature. On the one hand, there is a clear contrast with the amount of literature that places a strong focus on religious or spiritual security, which is largely missing in Western literature. Some scholars even suggest that individuals and society must be protected from "a world slowly and purposefully heading towards increased religious fanaticism."[11] A substantial amount of attention has been devoted to religious fanaticism, which includes "non-traditional religions, cults, Christianity in the West and some political-religious movements in the East, fundamental Islam, terrorism and ethnic conflicts."[12] No attention has been devoted to Russian Orthodox Christianity in similar examinations.

Rarely, some studies investigate broader approaches to human security, which include disease, pandemics, and mental illness.[13] Some look at the development and quality of life and link it to human security. A few observe regional human security, but rarely inclusive of Russia. Only two studies were found with a gender focus.[14] Going forward, there is definitely a gap in the analysis of sub-national and regional levels, Arctic, disease, wellness, and gender. Moreover, the literature is severely limited in case studies and in the application of human security elements, and rather focuses on examining the broad spectrum of human security, its implications, and shortcomings.

3.3 Russian Critiques of Human Security

This research uncovered that much of the Russian literature is skeptical of human security, with the main complaint being the conflict between *right to protect* and *interventionism*—with many references to interference in domestic affairs and arguing for the sovereignty of states. Some scholars reject human security as a concept completely. There are many questions as to how interventionism could ever be reasoned or justified within the current framework of international law, but there is no analysis of how international law should be updated to fit the concept of human security. For much of the Russian literature, there is concern that the 'Western-created' human security paradigm is really a concept used to interfere with the domestic affairs of other countries, and that efforts to ensure or at least increase human security would harm or decrease Russia's national security.

With this perspective, the literature predominantly references examples such as Kosovo (referred to as the former Yugoslavia), Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Syria. These cases allude to 'interventions led by Western governments' that were justified using similar elements to human security concepts, and consistently question the legitimacy of such justifications and the effectiveness of interventions. These cases particularly focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US operations in Afghanistan, NATO's bombing in Yugoslavia in 1999, US invasion of Iraq in 2003, NATO-led Libya intervention in 2011, and Western-led airstrikes in Syria dating from 2014.

It is telling that, in illustrating these cases, the Russian literature makes no mention or examination of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea, Russo-Georgian war, Russian deployment of troops in Transnistria, or Russia's intervention in Syria—where similar critiques could be made. For instance, to contrast these 'Western-intervention' cases, it would be interesting to investigate, in a similar light, the Soviet Union's attempt to justify its invasion of Afghanistan with the Brezhnev Doctrine and the result of that invasion. The Brezhnev Doctrine justified intervention because a threat to socialist rule in any state constituted a threat to all socialist states—a pretext used to also justify the invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Conversely, the Russian government tried to justify the occupation and annexation of Crimea as a way of ensuring security for Russian citizens and their rights.[15]

Returning to the Russian literature's criticism of human security's potential for interventionism, the discourse ensues a debate over *ex injuria jus non oritur* (illegal acts do not create law) and *ex factis jus oritur* (the law arises from the facts) within the frame of international law. Observing the former, Russian literature implies that interventionists relying on human security to rationalize unjust or illegal acts cannot create law, while others, such as those who believe that sovereignty prevails, believe that the international law is based on the way the world is drawn out and the facts on the ground. The former is largely used by humanitarian interventionists to argue that international law is limited and contains imperfections, and that leading with a human-centric approach will help create international law and new state practices which will be more positive for the actual population.

The right to protect and interventionism places a major stake in Russian literature and for Russian policymakers, given Russia's growing resentment for any "interference in domestic affairs." The current Russian government and its policymakers consistently reject the idea of interventionism and the involvement of foreign actors in other states' domestic affairs.[16] Libya and Syria are used as popular examples of Western interventionism, and some scholars go as far as to suggest that interventionism justified by human security elements actually backfires on human security elements elsewhere. In this instance, scholars suggest that Syrian refugees place an overwhelming burden on states like Libya, where human security elements are further harmed, like the right to citizenship, education, health, employment, and various factors leading to—or exacerbating—socio-economic circumstances that persuade individuals to pursue organized crime and terrorism. In simple terms, the argument is made that intervening in one situation, justified by certain human security elements, can harm human security elsewhere. This argument is repeated throughout the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Some scholars go as far as suggesting that human security attempts to create an illusion of security threats. Because human security is an unresolved framework, and could include various elements, some issues could be

constituted as security threats—but are they actually security threats? In answering this question, a different question arises: who gets to decide what is constituted to be a threat to human security and not?[17] These scholars point to the recently mentioned examples—connecting it to Western intervention—to claim that certain threats were exaggerated or false but were accepted at the time to justify them as real threats.

Furthermore, the literature is quite skeptical of the UN's ability to protect human security. Some of the criticism revolves around the inability of UN members to come together quickly enough to establish proper actions. Moreover, there is a potential issue of governments not being able to come to agreement on the definition of human security and the approach required to ensure it. Even in the event of the UN establishing a mandate and operation, the literature alleges that there are 'severe limitations' of the UN in addressing human rights concerns on the ground. Scholars claim that there is potential to arbitrarily establish the concept of human security and an effective mandate to ensure protection, but the UN is not always able to practically apply it or achieve an effective result on the ground. However, these points lack substantial evidence to effectively demonstrate this thesis as they do not observe all UN cases and usually select certain cases. Further, the literature does not discuss the inefficiencies or the question of legitimacy of the current UN system, such as the UN Security Council permanent member states that have the overwhelming influence in deciding on UN mandates and action, as well as the definitions used by the Security Council. Coincidently, Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council.

3.4 Dichotomies

The Russian literature outlines the human security concept at three levels: individual, government, and international. Between these levels, the literature discusses several dichotomies, including one of individual freedoms and security against government priorities and national security, and one of national security and interests against international security and global interests. The overwhelming majority of security scholars in Russia believe that Russia prioritizes, and should prioritize, its national security and geopolitical interests first and foremost in both realms. This means that individual interests such as health, welfare, and hunger—not a national scale—will likely not be prioritized by the Russian government in comparison to national interests and national security. Also, this means that the Russian government is more willing to ensure its national security and interests before global security—as affirmed in the most recent Constitutional amendment that authorized Russian law to overrule international rulings, such as those by the European Court of Human Rights.[18]

In addressing the dichotomy between global human security and national security, there is potential to investigate the Nash equilibrium. Some of the generic human security literature contends that if governments pursued human security they would also, as a by-product, ensure national security—to which the Russian literature is skeptical. In observing this dichotomy, one could argue the traditional paradigm of national security encourages individualistic rationalization by states to seek their own security without acknowledging the security interests of other states. However, these solitary actions, motivated by national security priorities, might not necessarily ensure security as a whole. In this case, the Nash equilibrium could aid in promoting human security as a concept and requires additional examination. Primarily used in economics and game theory, the Nash equilibrium encourages actors to choose a middle option that is of greatest benefit to all rather than the greatest benefit for themselves. In certain cases, the Nash equilibrium dictates that actors seeking the best

option for themselves could actually bring more harm to one another. With respect to human security, it would be interesting to observe this concept with game theory as it could help elaborate on the paradigm further.

Another dichotomy in the literature discusses the limitations of ensuring human security while protecting individual freedom. Scholars deliberate on the spectrum that may exist between unlimited freedom and guaranteed security, with some suggesting that while "freedom permits, security prohibits."[19] If freedom and security cannot both be accomplished in a particular situation, which has priority? Although there are arguments made to separate the two, there are others who claim that there are more commonalities between individual freedom and human security. Following this point of view, some arguments suggest that human security can ensure individual freedoms. For Yelagin, in particular, human security and individual freedom are not only interlinked but also interdependent. His research suggests that freedom and human security is protected by the Russian constitution and encouraged by the government. Using this example, he believes there is a need to balance the two since absolute freedom and security are not possible. Secondly, he believes that absolute freedom has the potential to harm the freedom of others—similar to the harm principle first proposed by John Stuart Mill—and that this balance is achieved through national law.

In exploring these ideas, criticism of the US government and its laws is inevitable, as many scholars put forward examples of how the US prioritizes national security above individual rights and security. This reveals several additional gaps in the literature. First, there is little to no examination or criticism of Russia's dichotomy between national security and individual freedoms as part of the human security concept. Second, there is a need to investigate the comparative dynamic of individual freedom and human security and, on the other hand, individual freedom and national security. This type of examination may help to illustrate the difference between human security and national security on individual freedom and help understand which might be more effective in ensuring individual freedoms.

3.5 The Lure of National Security and National Interests

The dichotomy of human security and national security goes further into the discussions of the security discipline's evolution, with many scholars arguing that the origin of human security arose from the fact that national security does not always represent the security of the individual or region. Governments do not always provide security, and they can actually *create* security risks for individuals, a given region, or even the world.[20] This reignites the debate over interventionism and the right to protect, as scholars interrogate the right values and wrong values that could help define what are and are not security risks. Some arguments suggest that there are no right or wrong values, only different values created by certain peoples or states, and many such values would not constitute universal values. Others note that the human security concept encourages "wide-open interventionism," the "washing-out of state sovereignty," and the emergence of a "new paradigm of peculiar values."[21]

In observing values, Selezneva's survey indicates that the Russian population believes that the most important value for them is peace (74.6%), with security (73.4%) and legitimacy (67.4%) as runner-ups. The study also notes that the majority of Russians believe that "human security can be provided only by the state, and not by an external force."[22] Selezneva alleges that the overwhelming majority of the Russian populace believes that

"no protection of human rights, no value of freedom is worth a human life, because 'military intervention' leads to victims in any case, and this violates the most important natural human right to life."[23] Selezneva and other scholars assert that by defending an individual, "human security ideologists" have forgotten about humanity.[24] Among the various arguments that could be challenged, in the survey that Selezneva points to it is clear that Russians also highly value human rights (64.9%) and justice (63.2%). Even with these figures, Selezneva and other scholars insist that the national government is responsible for these aspects, and there should not be any interference.

Therefore, many Russian scholars disagree with the argument that one of the primary reasons for the existence of human security is due to the failure of national governments in not ensuring security, especially when it comes to Russia as a case study. One of them, Tsygankov, believes that the 2008 global financial crisis exemplifies a situation where the global community not only failed to ensure individuals' security but was the cause of the economic security threat. Due to that global threat, individuals had to be protected by their national government—arguing that the Russian government was able to ensure security for its citizens in the form of socio-economic policies.[25] The few commentators countering this perspective claim that, because of Russia's recent "social transformation and political modernization," the most unprotected national security aspect is the individual.[26] These scholars shine a light on the idea that if the Russian government, or any other government, continues to only pursue its national interests and protection of national security, then human security will suffer. Radikov claims that, in Russia particular, the states devotes no attention to human security due to the lack of political and legal framework for these initiatives.

In the face of the new human security paradigm, Russian scholars continue to advocate for national security and national interests through a moral approach. Pushkarev and others assert that there is a gap in educating the Russian's *moral education*, and that it is imperative for the national government to educate Russian society with a moral education.[27] This is more essential than ever before, these scholars claim, because it is "necessary to guide citizens to enjoy their rights and freedoms with deep regard for moral standards," and this should be handled by "public institutions of moral education including traditional religious communities of the country."[28] These scholars argue that "moral standards are the most important in the security of the Russian people," including both individuals and the nation as a whole, and prioritize "the continuation of the Russian people and way of life, rather than the individual."[29]

This leads to the discussion of how Russian scholars attempt to combine national interests and national security with human security. Besides the previous example, scholars also argue that national interests in economic development will help with employment, for instance, and individuals would be more secure in this case. It could also be argued (but is usually not within Russian literature) that the opposite is true: that betterment of individual human security, such as improved employment opportunities, could bolster national interests and security. From another perspective, some Russian commentators also argue that human security is created through global stability, but they never explore whether global security could be created by human security.

3.6 The Russian Government's Stance on Human Security

Human security is not usually mentioned by the Russian government and is not a particular priority. As previously observed, the Russian government prefers to use *personal* security instead of *human* security in its official documents and statements. The *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation* (2000), approved by Presidential decree No. 24, is an early concept outlining Russia's "views on how to secure the individual, society and the state against external and internal threats in every sphere of national life."[30] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs identifies this concept as "articulat[ing] the major thrusts of the Russian Federation's foreign policy."[31] In it, the Russian government pays special attention to terrorism and organized crime as threats to both individual security and society. However, it also acknowledges other elements that constitute as a threat to individual security such as economic, political, social, international, informational, military, border, natural disasters, and environmental security. It is interesting to note, as early as 2000, the Russian government placed a special emphasis on information security, suggesting that "other countries are trying to dominate the global information space and oust Russia."[32]

Furthermore, the *National Security Concept* lists the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms as part of personal security. The document lists: i) improved quality and standard of living, ii) physical, spiritual, and intellectual development as a person and citizen, iii) protection against growing wealth inequality and the rise of poverty, iv) growing unemployment, and v) public health, specifically the rise in alcohol and drug consumption. The government also attempts to place the concept within the national constitutional framework, with the aim of ensuring the personal security of citizens while protecting their constitutional rights and freedoms. It states that "Russia's national interests are a totality of balanced interests of the individual, society and the state."[33] These instances, once again, place human security, or *personal* security, in a potential confrontation with national security and national interests—as outlined in the Russian scholarly literature. Section 23 of the *National Security Concept* clearly indicates the government's rejection of intervention by declaring its policy of "non-interference in domestic affairs of States, so as to ensure solid and equal security for each and every member of the global community."[34]

The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015) updated the previous concept, with some notable changes.[35] Terrorism and violent extremism remained a top priority, and the strategy kept threats relating to criminal organizations, health, decent quality of life, environment, epidemics and disease, human rights and freedoms, food scarcity and water shortages, income inequality and poverty, employment and labour rights, and social support.[36] This concept also pays more attention to information and communication technologies as a source of an emerging security threat to personal and national security. As Section 43 outlines, this type of security threat can "disseminate propaganda" that can undermine personal and public security.

It is also interesting to see the number of times that the concept draws on *social stability* and *spiritual* and *moral traditions* of the "Russian identity" as part of personal and national security. Section 43 dictates that "activities of foreign and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)" constitute a threat if they aim to "violate the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, destabilize the internal political and social situation."[37] This definition is vague and legally encompassing, which may be an indicator of the government's relations with its NGOs who are foreign-funded or international NGOs. This is important because NGOs in Russia

could be prevented from "interfering in domestic affairs"— as the Russian government sees it. From Russia's perspective, entities like international NGOs and foreign-funded NGOs could be vehicles attempting to interfere in Russian domestic affairs under the guise of "human security."

The overwhelming mentions of Russian identity, culture, spirituality, and moral values as part of personal and national security were new additions to the revised 2015 concept. More specifically, the national security concept states that there is a need to "preserve and develop the Russian culture, traditional spiritual, and moral values […and to] preserve and develop the all-Russian identity."[38] The document claims that many threats, both internal and external, are attempting to dismantle these 'essential' values to personal and national security. Several sections of the concept consistently cite this aspect claiming that "propaganda of permissiveness and violence" threaten these values, and that there is a need to "revive traditional Russian spiritual and moral values," which includes "respect for family and confessional traditions and patriotism."[39] Therefore, in addressing this 'security issue,' the concept identifies the need to "create a system of spiritual, moral and patriotic education of citizens, by introducing the principles of spiritual and moral development into the education system"— following the aforementioned ideas of Pushkarev and other like-minded Russian scholars.[40]

The 2015 concept consistently alluded to both national security and personal security, but never drew the limitations of either or prioritized these aspects. For instance, Section 42 goes on to state that "fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms, [and] the preservation of civil peace, political and social stability in society" are a part of personal security, but only after "constitutional order, sovereignty, state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation."[41] Once again, it is unclear whether the government would prioritize national security, public order, and social stability, or fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms. It may also be that the government intends on saying that these aspects all play hand in hand.

Finally, the 2015 concept places a peculiar emphasis on other new security dilemmas. It confirms that the government, alongside half of the Russian literature, is suspicious of "US and its Western allies of trying to maintain their dominance."[42] Observing this along with public statements of Russian officials, the view of the Russian government and the half of Russian literature is that Western states continuously attempt to influence Russian domestic affairs in order to 'contain' Russia and to maintain Western global dominance. More interesting is Russia's rejection of interventionism on the basis of ensuring human rights, but then stating that the Russian government reserves the right to "protect the rights of compatriots abroad."[43] In fact, the Russian government deems it justifiable to intervene in other states and their domestic affairs to protect the rights of Russian compatriots—and this definition is as ambiguous and all-encompassing as the wider approach to human security that includes human rights as part of human security. This type of justification was used to justify the annexation of Crimea, as part of a 'Russian rescue' of Russian compatriots from 'far-right nationalists' threatening their lives and language rights.[44] It is also clear that the Russian government, alongside many Russian scholars, believes that the government should be the guarantor of public and personal security, as per Section 44.

The 2016 *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* confirms these aspects.[45] Terrorism and transnational crime are again atop the list, and the government is more willing to articulate these issues and other security challenges as cross-border challenges that are rapidly becoming more pronounced and far-reaching. However,

this concept addresses the threat of terrorism as a result of systematic development problems and external interference—once again referring back to Russia's strong rejection of interventionism.[46] Furthermore, the Russian government takes a stronger approach in this concept than in previous ones by clearly indicating that "Russia conducts an assertive and independent foreign policy guided by its national interests."[47] This may serve as an affirmation that the government will continue its own conduct in foreign policy, presumably combating the alleged influence of Western states, and will once again prioritize its own national interests rather than those of its citizens, regional neighbours, or global actors.

4. Russian Perspective on Security in the Arctic

It was difficult to find any Russian research evaluating Arctic security through a human security lens. Although there is some literature that evaluates aspects of human security, Russian scholars do not explicitly recognize themselves as researching the human security paradigm. Therefore, most Russian research merely focuses on concepts relevant to human security in the Arctic, but do not connect them to the human security paradigm. On the other hand, when evaluating security in the Arctic, Russian literature mostly focuses on the Arctic through a traditional security lens. This research perspective could reflect the Russian policy and research preoccupation with "national" or "sovereign" lenses—overwhelmingly channelling state-centric realism.

My research identified three leading contemporary Russian experts focusing on Arctic security: Andrei Zagorskii, Valery Konyshev, and Alexander Sergunin. Zagorskii is the Head of Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a professor at the Department of International Relations History of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) University, and a member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).[48] Konyshev is a professor of international relations at the St. Petersburg State University, on the BRICS Steering Committee at the Polar Connection, and a member of the Valdai Club as well as the RIAC.[49] Sergunin is a professor of international relations at the St. Petersburg State University and Higher School of Economics, a part-time professor of the Department of World Politics at MGIMO, a part-time professor of political science at the Department of Applied Political Analysis and Modelling within Nizhny Novgorod State University, and a member of the Valdai Club.[50]

4.1 Zagorskii's Scholarship

Zagorskii's Russian-language publications suggest a slight evolution in the Arctic perspective. At first, Zagorskii viewed the Arctic primarily as a zone of cooperation. Over time, he gradually moved to viewing the Arctic as a zone of confrontation, primarily between the West and Russia. The book *Arctic: Zone of Peace and Cooperation* (2011) illustrates a broad view of Arctic security, including other scholars such as Sergunin and Konyshev.[51] This publication outlined many areas where cooperation is possible for Arctic states, due to shared issues and goals, including climate change, exploration of natural resources, fishing, shipping, and economic security. There is never a direct link to human security, even though there are linkages to the broad conception of human security in the Arctic.

The preface articulates a "combined approach" to construct a new security architecture involving Western and Russian experts. Zagorskii et al. claim that the experts did not see Arctic security issues through the prism of West-Russian relations but in the context of common security threats, and allegedly promote a pan-European security approach for Russia.[52] Although this is a fair self-assessment of the scholars investigating common challenges and areas of potential cooperation, there is a consistent mention of potential confrontation, competition, securitization on a national level, and the acknowledgement of the US and Russia's—as well as European countries—strategic outlooks toward each other.

This shows that, even pre-2014, Russian experts anticipated competition between the West and Russia in the Arctic zone—and largely viewed Arctic security issues through this lens. For instance, when focusing on fishing and trade routes, Russian scholars investigated situations that would endanger national security and how other nations would attempt to promote their interests. An investigation of Arctic energy resources and their potential for exploration lead to a discussion of delineation, lack of clarity of borders and enforcement, and overlap with other nations, creating areas of contention.

Although some scholars link "Arctic security alarmism" fuelled by the media, there is significant mention of US-Russia security confrontation, particularly through a nuclear strategic perspective. Rather than focusing on how a nuclear confrontation could affect the Arctic, which could be viewed as a human security approach, the scholars instead focus on US and Russian missile defence capabilities and mutual deterrence on a nation-to-nation "strategic stability" level. The scholars themselves admit that "despite the end of the Cold War, this state of affairs largely persists to this day, albeit reduced levels of confrontation […] facilitated by unchanging geostrategic factors."[53] Overall, it is important to acknowledge that these Arctic security issues are investigated through a national interest and "geostrategic" lens, and not through a person-centric, regional, or global security approach.

Moving to Zagorskii's post-2014 work, similar security challenges remain apparent, but there is heightened focus on Russian-West relations, Arctic military capacity, and confrontation in the Arctic. In 2016, Zagorskii's *International political conditions for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation* reveals this evolution.[54] This work, led by Zagorskii, again highlights areas of overlap in the Arctic, such as the continental shelf, fishing, and trade routes, and how these areas could lead to confrontation between Arctic nations. This time, however, the research looks more deliberately at regional cooperation and the effect of international law, regulations, and institutions (i.e., Arctic Council) to help prevent confrontation and encourage securitization of the region.

The book shifts to examining more non-strategic and strategic military activity, as well as geostrategy of Arctic states. The authors look at regional cooperation and regional structures, but pay even stronger attention to bilateral relations and security blocs (i.e. NATO) when investigating regional security dynamics and scrutinize the US, NATO, and the European Union (EU) more closely than before. Consequently, these scholars conclude that security is becoming even more difficult to assess between non-strategic and strategic aims. For instance, Zagorskii et al. claim that the Russian Northern Fleet is responsible for both maritime strategic nuclear forces for mutual nuclear containment as well as for "the protection of the economic zone and production areas activities, suppression of illegal production war activity; ensuring the safety of navigation [… and] completing

foreign policy actions of the government in the economic important maritime areas."[55] This blurring is an interesting concept, which may allude to how Arctic security issues create hybrid issues between traditional and human security concepts. The book concludes that regional cooperation and regional institutions (including international law and regulations) ought to be the main pillar to secure the Arctic region from politico-military confrontations and restrain from development of military capacity, as well as transparency in the military sphere among states.[56]

In 2017, Zagorskii again focused on climate change, economic activity, and safety of navigation as primary security concerns, as well as search and rescue. He does not raise militarization of the Arctic as an acute concern, given his assessment that most Arctic states do not possess sustained Arctic military deployment capacity and that all Arctic states, including the US and Russia, do not hold Arctic military development as a key priority, instead looking to develop other military capacities.[57] Accordingly, he builds on his previous thesis of non-strategic and strategic forces in the Arctic, in combination with Russia-West confrontation due to the 2014 events in Ukraine.

Zagorskii now claimed, however, that the events in Ukraine fundamentally altered relationships and pit Russia and the West against each other. Post-2014, he believes this encouraged Western states to become more concerned about Russia's military build-up in the Arctic. To avoid an unintended arms race, he argues, all Arctic states should show military restraint, abandon provocative scenarios of major military exercises, and ensure a high level of mutual transparency of military activities. He observes that "Russia is the only state that has permanently deployed non-strategic forces in the Arctic and is implementing a large-scale program for building them up," and that at the beginning of the 2010s, Russia's "regional military superiority" was perceived not as a threat but rather as a contribution to solving common security problems in the region.[58] Whether this assessment is true, it confirms the evolving view of Zagorskii and many other Russian scholars that 2014 was a pivotal moment which shifted away from the potential for Arctic states to address common security issues to addressing concerns from a traditional 'national security and strategies' perspective.

In addition to confrontation, Zagorskii states that the combination of strategic and non-strategic forces—or military and non-military capacities—in the Arctic can send the wrong signal to international neighbours. Even the deployment of mostly non-military, non-strategic forces can be overshadowed by minor deployments of military capacities. Therefore, strategic forces can undermine non-strategic forces and activities. Zagorskii notes that:

> Arctic coastal states have opted for different options for combining military and non-military forces and means. At the same time, they were aware that unilateral deployment in the Arctic, even insignificant military forces and assets can be misinterpreted and provoke an arms race. For this reason, they gave great importance of strengthening bilateral and regional cooperation. At the beginning of [the 2010s], this contributed to the strengthening of the Arctic Council and other formats of cooperation, the formation of a common understanding of the fact that in the foreseeable future the military presence in the Arctic will expand, but not due to the aggravation of interstate relations, but due to the need to respond to new risks.[59]

Therefore, some Russian scholars (including Zagorskii) affirm that some degree of militarization will occur in the Arctic to address common security challenges, but they also encourage both Russia and the West to seek de-securitization of the Arctic by restraining military construction in the region and avoiding the excessive build-up of non-strategic forces in the region, large-scale military exercises, and high-level of transparency. However, Zagorskii and like-minded scholars continue to claim the existence of competition and confrontation between Russia and the West. On the other hand, these same scholars suggest that the Arctic has always been a place of occasional cooperation due to common regional security challenges—and has always been relied upon as one of the last places of international cooperation between Russia and the West.

Finally, Zagorskii's most recent work, "Arctic defence postures in the context of Russia-West confrontation" (2018)*,* amplifies the theme of confrontation between the West and Russia.[60] It no longer discusses common security issues, and he instead turns to assessing the national defence postures of each Arctic nation pre-2014 and post-2014. He argues that the events in Ukraine—more accurately depicted as annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the conflict in Donbas with the involvement of the Russian Federation—coincided with more aggravated relations between the West and Russia.

This latest assessment concludes that the politico-security in the Arctic region will remain "stable and predictable."[61] However, if relations do not change, the long-term situation may worsen. Given that this article was written in 2018, Zagorskii could not have included additional confrontation between the West and Russia over the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Alexei Navalny, the attempted hack of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the Russian government's continued disregard for human rights and the rule of law.[62] With additional sanctions and repercussions—including expelling each other's diplomats—relations have indeed worsened.

Zagorskii notes that NATO, which includes five Arctic states, has focused more heavily on the Baltic and North Atlantic than on the Arctic region. At the same time, Zagorskii claims that Western literature has been overtly focused on the militarization of the Arctic, although it is important to note that most Russian literature also emphasizes the study of militarization of the Arctic and the military capacities of neighbouring Arctic states. His evaluation also examines Canada's political and defence posture towards the Arctic before and after 2014. He notes that although Canada planned to modernize its Arctic military capacity, its actual development is insignificant. In comparison to other Arctic states, Canada has not modernized its Arctic arsenal (as it has touted since 2006) because this is not a priority for Canadian political leaders. On the other hand, Zagorskii points out that the Canadian government—citing the Canadian Senate in particular—closely monitors Russia's military development in the Arctic and finds it important to be able to respond to a military challenge.[63]

Overall, from his examination of Arctic states' defence postures in the face of post-2014 Russian confrontation, Zagorskii argues that NATO Arctic countries are less opposed to the policy of militarizing the Arctic themselves—albeit, leaving out that these countries are justifying this military development as a response to Russian militarization. He concludes that Canada, the US, and other NATO members modernizing their Arctic military capabilities is a display similar to "the picture of the Cold War era" and suggests that this leaves little to no space for widespread security cooperation.

4.2 Konyshev and Sergunin's Literature

Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin represent a different side of the Russian literature on Arctic security. Most of their major publications appeared around 2013 and 2015. Regardless of the events in Ukraine in 2014, they continuously focused on militarization of the Arctic and Russia-West confrontations, and how security issues and dilemmas relate to geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics between the Arctic states.

In the "Remilitarization of the Arctic and Security in Russia" (2013), which appeared before the transformative events in Ukraine, Konyshev and Sergunin wrote that Arctic geopolitics portended a dangerous tendency towards militarization.[64] They argued that NATO was strengthening its presence and activities in the Arctic, modernizing armed forces stationed in the region and related military infrastructure, and actively employed naval force to defend its member countries' economic interests. Consequently, Konyshev and Sergunin focus less on broader security questions such as climate change and more on direct security threats that other Arctic states pose to Russia. Accordingly, their 2013 evaluation recommends that the Russian Federation pursue a "balanced position" towards remilitarization of the Arctic, which first ensures that the government protects national security and interests and then pursues "mutually acceptable solutions" to avoid "further development of negative tendencies."[65] Such a "balanced" approach is an apparent paradox, however, given that the authors suggest the Russian government ensure defensive capabilities in the Arctic in order to prevent further escalation of negative trends, as a build-up of military capabilities might further escalate militarization in the Arctic.

Pursuing "mutually acceptable solutions" is prevalent in Russian literature, emphasizing that Russia should seek international cooperation and mediation but only through solutions that benefit Russia—setting up a framework of little to no compromise in creating such outcomes. Moreover, while Zagorskii and other authors look to Arctic cooperation as a means of Russia working with other states to address common security challenges, Konyshev and Sergunin believe that Arctic cooperation is predominantly necessary to reduce security risks arising from Arctic confrontation.

Konyshev and Sergunin's 2014 article "US Military Strategy in the Arctic and National Security of Russia" reinforces their belief that the US is bent on utilizing military power in the Arctic with the goal of containing Russia, suggesting that US military manoeuvres may constitute a national security threat to Russia.[66] Their assessment points to American military exercises with allies, information sharing among NATO allies, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and air defence systems located in the north, and reconnaissance and surveillance. Their evaluation concludes that the US Arctic strategy is "a rather contradictory combination of various vectors and components," given that the Obama Administration declared its desire to cooperate with all Arctic states, including Russia, while ensuring its "national interests" by any means.

The authors believe that US strategy intends to "dominate the Arctic" in political, military, and economic-strategic areas. Konyshev and Sergunin assert that this strategy is a continuation of Cold War competition and strategic confrontation. The only difference in the new Arctic confrontation between the US and Russia, they claim, is the increased competition for natural resources and transport routes, "ambiguous consequences" of global climate change in the Arctic, and the dynamic changes in functions and status of IGOs and NGOs. They also claim a need for joint action to address regional and global problems, with Russia ready to commit to do so – but the US is allegedly far from ready to do the same.

In "Canada's Military Strategy in the Arctic" (2015), Konyshev, Sergunin, and Subbotin evaluate Canada's geostrategic and military strategy for the Arctic region from a Russian national security perspective.[67] The authors believe that, although Canada is allegedly pursuing a policy of Arctic military and paramilitary modernization, it does not "cause legitimate concern" for Russia. However, these experts claim that Canadian policy in the High North has certain contradictions and inconsistencies that create "political and military-strategic problems and challenges" for Russia.[68] This contradiction is reportedly underpinned by Canada acting as a beneficial partner for Russia—adhering to similar legal principles when dividing the Arctic shelf and the organization of control over sea straits in the region, and advocating for increasing the authority of the Arctic Council. On the other hand, Canada allegedly pursues an "anti-Russian" policy with "militant rhetoric" due to anti-Russian lobbying from the Ukrainian diaspora and pressure from the US.[69] For these authors, this was particularly evident when Canada was one of the first countries to impose sanctions against Russia in connection to the "Ukraine crisis."[70] These "anti-Russian" policies and Ukrainian/US pressure are widely alleged in Russian literature to define the main influences on Canada's policies towards Russia, particularly after 2014.[71]

Although the authors do not see Canada's capacities as a threat for Russia, they see Canada's overall policy towards Russia as a potential cause for concern stemming from the alleged internal (Ukrainian diaspora) and external (US and NATO) pressures.[72] The authors believe that, due to these pressures, Canada "undertakes anti-Russian actions in the field of Arctic policy."[73] Their evaluation indicates that Canada's Arctic defence policy aims to "protect economic interests and respond to 'non-traditional' (non-military) challenges in the region rather than preparing for a large-scale military conflict."[74] Konyshev et al. argue that Canada has neither the desire nor the material and technical capabilities for the latter, and relies heavily on the US—which, they suggest, profits Canada both financially and functionally. Therefore, these Russian analysts conclude that Canada "is incapable of creating a real threat to Russian national interests."[75]

Interestingly, the authors believe that Canada's "anti-Russian rhetoric" is not intended for any particular Arctic state but rather "for its own internal audience."[76] As a result, these experts recommend that Russia continue to pursue its current policy and to react calmly to "periodic repeated anti-Russian attacks by Canadian politicians" until "the emotions around the Ukrainian events […] settle down."[77] Konyshev et al. also suggest that Russia use soft power approaches to convey to the Canadian society that Russia is not an enemy of Canada and is actually a potential ally. These experts, however, do not provide details about how this approach could be shaped.

Similarly, Konyshev and Sergunin turned to "Norway's Modern Military Strategy in the Arctic and Russian Security" in a 2017 article that once again investigates other Arctic states' military strategy and capacities. In this evaluation, they believe that alongside an allegedly "anti-Russian" rhetoric and "anti-Russian" military strategy, Norway will occasionally pursue military cooperation with Russia. Similar to their evaluation of Canada's Arctic policy, Konyshev and Sergunin assess that Norway's military capabilities to conduct operations in the Arctic are "not yet threatening to the interests of the national security of Russia."[78] In parallel to their conclusions on Canada, the authors also believe that Norway's "anti-Russian/containment" policy stems from continuous pressure from the US and NATO. They further suggest that Norway is pressuring Sweden and Finland to join NATO, which would be a cause for Russian security concern. Furthermore, the authors reiterate that the "Ukrainian crisis" has "intensified the trend towards tense relations between Norway and Russia."[79]

Finally, Konyshev and Sergunin turn to the US in their 2018 evaluation "Russian-American Relations in the Arctic: Cooperation or Rivalry?," again mobilizing a state-level geostrategic security perspective as it relates to Russia's national security and interests in the Arctic region.[80] The authors mention natural resources, economic security challenges, climate change, terrorism, trafficking, and other broad security concerns that would apply to human security concepts, but instead choose to apply these security concerns to traditional security perspectives. Consequently, they believe that the US-Russia confrontation emanates from the Americans' hunt for natural resources, economic development, northern trading routes, and securitization of the region for their own interests. The authors assert that this "trend towards rivalry in the Arctic is driven by the desire of the United States to maintain its global hegemony"—reasoning that shifts accountability away from Russia's policies or actions.[81]

For actions that demonstrate this need to dominate, the authors point to the United States' self-determined right to unilateral action and achieving freedom of movement for their commercial and military ships in the Arctic and globally.[82] Konyshev and Sergunin are also cautious of NATO enlarging its military presence in the Arctic, and of the US using the Alliance to secure strategic interests while attempting to expand the alliance to new members.[83] As in their critiques of Norway and Canada, the authors find US Arctic policy contradictory—citing geostrategic confrontation with Russia, but with elements of cooperation.

In assessing this confrontation, the authors conclude that "the deterioration of relations is largely due to internal political contradictions in the United States, when Russian-American relations often become hostages in the struggle elites for power."[84] Along with other Russian scholars, they assign blame for the Americans' "anti-Russian" position on the Democratic Party in the US—even suggesting that Democrats are pursuing this policy because they have "not come to terms with Trump's victory" and continue to seek political power at the cost of solving common security issues.[85] This "anti-Russian" policy touches on Ukraine, Syria, and the Arctic, the authors claim, and American politicians and experts extrapolate crisis events to paint Russia as a state with a propensity for aggression, including in the Arctic region.

4.3 Reviewing Russian Literature on Arctic Security

Obviously, the two camps in Russian security literature share many similarities, conclusions, and analytical perspectives. Zagorskii tends to focus more on the various aspects of security in the Arctic with greater breadth and depth, including economic, trade, natural resources, and climate change issues. Although Zagorskii looks at strategic military forces and defence postures, Konyshev and Sergunin devote most of their investigations in examining how Arctic states may confront or contain Russia, and conduct threat assessments of "anti-Russian" Arctic states by looking at their foreign and defence policy towards Russia in the Arctic sphere.

In general, there is a consensus in the Russian literature that Russia-West confrontation has always existed in the Arctic. The period between the end of the Cold War and 2014 only brought reduced confrontation. Geostrategy and geopolitics persisted, and it was only a matter of time before other events, such as Ukraine and Syria, made relations more difficult and potentially dangerous. This is particularly interesting because an overwhelming number of Russian scholars claim that it is the reaction of the West to Russia that is the cause of deteriorating relations. Russian scholars have not addressed how Russia's own foreign policy has eroded

relations with Western countries and may hamper Russia's ability to conduct effective regional diplomacy. On the contrary, many Russian experts believe that Russia has actually been handling the West's "anti-Russian" policy and actions with restraint, and should continue to do so while developing its strategic and non-strategic Arctic capabilities.[86] This reflects how Russian scholars understand Russia's policy and actions—including the annexation of Crimea, involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, illegally conscripting residents of Crimea, Azov Sea incident, poisoning of critics and opposition leaders, targeting of LGBTQ+ individuals in Chechnya, violently suppressing national protests, and dissolving civil society—as unchanging or uncompromisable policy actions. [87] These particular evaluations might also reflect studies funded and supported by the Russian government, including the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and initiatives funded by the Russian President.

Outside these two camps, a minority of Russian commentators looks at aspects of security that relate closer to the human security paradigm, such as northern Indigenous communities, climate change, natural resources, international law and multilateral structures, and socio-economic dynamics in the Arctic. For instance, Ryzhova's 2020 article "Looking at Canada's Arctic policy via the Liberal government" examines Canadian policy in relation to health and resilience of Indigenous people, protecting Aboriginal rights, and mitigating the effects of climate change.[88] In 2015, Skulakov and Fadeev wrote "On Separate Aspects of Determining the International Legal Status of the Arctic as a Basis for ensuring the Security of the Russian Federation in the Region" which, while acknowledging the importance of international law and institutions, recommends that Russia should strengthen and modernize its Arctic military capacity because of competition created by other Arctic states and their desires to expand their regional influence.[89] Yang's "Future of the Arctic: The role of Ideas" (2011) is a rare example of Russian scholarship that tries to counter traditional and "neo-realist" perspectives by arguing that global and regional security issues far outweigh the geopolitical and geostrategic security issues, and that Russia should focus on these issues instead.[90] Yang proposes a socio-ecological lens to understand the most serious security issues, and points out that journalists usually gravitate towards the "neo-realist" or traditional security paradigm rather than exploring other drivers to promote a "zone of peace."

The gaps in Russian literature on the Arctic from a human security paradigm are wide-ranging. The literature does not have any perspectives on gender, LGBTQ+, or marginalized communities. There is little to no investigation of Indigenous communities, livelihoods, traditions, through a security lens, and there is a clear lack of focus on Arctic inhabitants—including people, wildlife, and the environment. In fact, there is no direct link to human security whatsoever when evaluating security in the Arctic, because most Russian literature on Arctic security adopts a traditional security lens. Consequently, the literature focuses less on common security interests, issues, and solutions, and instead centres on national interests, geostrategy, geopolitics, and state-centred perspectives—predominantly as they relate to Russia's national interests and security.

5. Conclusions: Overview of Russian Literature of Human Security and Arctic Security

This primer examined two aspects of contemporary security research and policy in the Russian Federation. Given that Russian scholars do not research human security in the Arctic, this primer covered the concept of human

security and Arctic security from the Russian perspective separately. First, the primer examined how the concept of human security has been interpreted in Russia. Second, it explored the dominant approach to security in the Russian Arctic. While Arctic security issues are often characterized in human security terms in the Western Arctic states, this is almost entirely absent in Russia. Despite a modest adoption of the human security concept in other areas of Russian research and policy, security in the Arctic is conceived and evaluated almost entirely in traditional, military, and state-centric terms.

In the first section, the primer reviewed the concept of human security and Russian scholars' views on the concept, which ranged from caution to out-right skepticism. Russian literature does evaluate various human security issues, such as climate change and infrastructure, but it never directly links those issues to the human security concept. Further, Russian scholars point to religious or spiritual security and information-technological issues as relevant to human security, which is seldom covered in Western literature. Looking at this ambiguous paradigm, Russian literature is fractured among several key groupings on the conclusions of human security. The literature adopts three definitions for human security which frame how the concept is viewed. The first definition relates it to the human or person; the second relates it closer to an individual or identity; and the third relates it closer to life or living being. However, Russians only use one definition for security, which may create issues given distinction in English between safety and security.

Russian literature places human security into a soft power category. Although Russian scholars acknowledge that Russia is not a leader in this area, the country focuses on relevant issues such as terrorism, organized crime, climate change, religion, information, and technology. The Russian government does not outright oppose the concept, and a reviewing of its major security policy papers from 2000 to present reveals how the Russian government includes economic, political, social, international, and various other types of security questions. However, the government harkens back to spiritual and moral traditions, as well as the supremacy of national security and national interests, with no mention of sub-national issues, gender, LGBTQ+, or minority issues.

From Russia's perspective, human security invites uncertain questions, such as: Who decides on the framework or definition? When does it justify intervention? And who would be intervening to ensure human security? Many Russian scholars focus on the importance of international law, sovereignty, and national interests and security, while cautioning against foreign interventionism in the name of human security. Thought to be a Western concept, human security in Russia is consistently examined against so-called "Western interventionism," with many pointing to Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Syria. At the same time, these analyses do not investigate Soviet or Russian foreign interventionism. Scholars go so far as to suggest that the human security concept is an illusion of threats, sometimes called in to justify actions by certain Western nations and lacks enforcement due to a lack of global enforcement capacity.

In the second section, the primer turned to Russian literature on Arctic security. Although Russian scholars look at Arctic security through a traditional security lens, some research does look into threats and issues relating to human security, but without mentioning the concept—such as research on climate change security in the Arctic. Most Russian literature focuses on Russian relations and geostrategic postures in the Arctic region, with Andrei Zagorskii, Valery Konyshev, and Alexander Sergunin leading this contemporary field of research in two camps. In the first camp, Zagorskii leads the discourse by looking at shared goals and security issues affecting Arctic

states, including climate change, exploration of natural resources, fishing, shipping, and economic security. All Russian scholars concur that competition between the West and Russia in the Arctic has always existed—but the level of confrontation wavered during certain eras, such as the decade following the fall of the Soviet Union. Zagorskii suggests that Russian-Western relations in the Arctic are worsening, particularly after the 2014 events in Ukraine. Like all Russian scholars in this area, there is no mention of Russia's annexation of Crimea or any other Russian actions that have brought sanctions regimes and other reactions from Western governments. Instead, Russian scholars focus on how Western nations are increasing their Arctic posture and articulating non-friendly policies. In this difficult time, Zagorskii looks to the Arctic Council and international law to solve disputes and reduce tensions. Russian scholars also focus intensely on US, NATO, and EU as major actors—with the US being the most important actor in any analysis. Like most other scholars, Zagorskii argues that the West is moving *towards* Arctic militarization. He also insists on the need to assess strategic and non-strategic goals and capabilities, as they can send mixed signals in the Arctic as elsewhere.

On the other hand, Konyshev and Sergunin look at the Arctic through a geopolitical and strategy lens, where tensions are high and the situation is highly confrontational. Their analysis focuses on NATO presence, Arctic military modernization, and armed forces, rather than climate change or other broader shared issues. They believe that the US is bent on military power and domination, that the West's economic interests could impede Russia's national security, and that the West is set on global hegemony and in "containing" Russia. They identify the West's "anti-Russian" policies and activities as a major security threat to Russia. As a result, they call on Russia to react strongly to Western posturing and to pursue "mutually acceptable solutions"—solutions that must benefit Russia first and foremost, and that invite little room for compromise. From their perspective, Canada—owing to its little capacity—does not itself pose a threat to Russia. However, these authors allege that Canada has moved towards "anti-Russian" policies, not because of Russia's actions but other domestic and international drivers, such as the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada or US Democrats deeply dissatisfied with Donald Trump's election victory in 2016. Given these preoccupations with state-level considerations, the Russian literature on Arctic security offers no perspectives on gender, LGBTQ+, or marginalized communities. Furthermore, there is little to no investigation of Indigenous issues vis-à-vis security, leaving the literature in that country out of sync with evolving scholarly currents in countries such as Canada.

Notes

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