



The Arctic Council and Regional Governance: Canadian and Norwegian Reflections

A report on activities held in Ottawa on 18-19 September 2024

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The last two years have made the intersections between geopolitics and Arctic governance unmistakable. Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF), released in 2019, stated that "while Canada sees no immediate threat in the Arctic and the North, as the region's physical environment changes, the circumpolar North is becoming an area of strategic international importance, with both Arctic and non-Arctic states expressing a variety of economic and military interests in the region," thus necessitating "effective safety and security frameworks, national defence, and deterrence."¹ Then Russia's brutal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 rocked the international order, with heightened geopolitical competition spilling over into Arctic regional affairs. What some commentators called the age of "Arctic exceptionalism," marked by peaceful regional relations since the end of the Cold War, abruptly ended – if it ever existed at all.² Consequently, much of the expert debate about the Arctic geopolitical environment has shifted from a conflict-or-cooperation binary to analyzing a continuum of competition involving the seven like-minded Arctic states (all of which are now NATO members), Russia, China, and other non-Arctic state and non-state actors.

Commentators have typically held up the Arctic Council as the centerpiece of circumpolar governance in the northern polar region. Established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council has been the primary intergovernmental forum among the eight Arctic states and six Permanent Participant organizations representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples. The Council also has a variety of "Observers" including 13 non-Arctic states, 13 intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, and 12 NGOs that contribute to the Council's various initiatives. The Council's six working groups have been deeply engaged in issues related to sustainability, emergency preparedness, scientific knowledge, and ecosystem conditions since its founding, making the Arctic Council a distinctive regional body in international affairs. The Council's work has produced major reports including the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (2004) and the *Arctic Human Development Reports* (2004 & 2015), which have had an influence on broader international scientific initiatives including the IPCC.³ The eight Arctic states have also negotiated legally-binding agreements under the auspices of the Arctic Council that aim to enhance international cooperation on maritime search and rescue, marine oil pollution, and scientific cooperation in the Arctic.⁴

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 dramatically shifted the geopolitical context of the Arctic. The other seven like-minded Arctic states' decision to "pause" their involvement in the Arctic Council on 3 March 2022, announced in a statement condemning Russia's war, left Russia's Chairship in limbo and the future of the Arctic Council in question.

As [Fridtjof Nansen Institute \(FNI\)](#) researcher Serafima Andreeva noted in a panel discussion highlighted in this report, the Arctic Council has survived thus far through a series of tenuous steps. By 10 May 2022, Norway had indicated that it intended to proceed with its Chairship. On 28 June 2022, the seven "other" Arctic states (all except Russia) issued a statement that they would resume Arctic Council work that did not involve Russia. On 11 May 2023, following extensive negotiations and a common desire to preserve the Council, Norway accepted the Chairship of the Arctic Council through a virtual meeting. Since then, the cautious resumption of Arctic Council work has proceeded in various stages. First, limited scientific work was resumed on 26 June through written procedures only, making working group meetings impossible. On 28 February 2024, however, "the eight Arctic States, in consultation with the Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations, reached consensus to gradually resume official Working Group meetings in a virtual format."⁵

While some Arctic Council work has resumed, it is *not* business as usual. Diplomatic meetings with Russia on the Senior Arctic Official level remain on pause and, as this activity report explains, the seven like-minded Arctic states are participating in working-group-level activities while being "clear-eyed" about Russia's destructive war in Ukraine. This fact was made abundantly clear by key participants in a series of events convened in Ottawa from 18-19 September 2024, which enabled a diverse group of experts from Norway and Canada to discuss and debate the past, present, and future of the Arctic Council in evolving geopolitical contexts.

"Not interested in Arctic Geopolitics? Arctic Geopolitics is Interested in You!"

This Arctic Geopolitics Pubinar, organized by the Macdonald Laurier Institute, FNI, and NAADSN, was held in Ottawa on 18 September. Moderated by Alex Dalziel, the panel – in which various participants "tagged in and out" at various points – featured Andreas Østhagen, Andreas Raspotnik, Serafima Andreeva, Svein Vigeland Rottem, Whitney Lackenbauer, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Jennifer Spence.

The free-flowing discussion did not follow a formal agenda, and participants were encouraged to raise controversial points and frank ideas to ignite and invite vigorous (but respectful) debate. Most commentators insist that "Arctic exceptionalism" – the idea that the region can be insulated from global dynamics owing to its special characteristics – is dead. Should the Arctic Council still exist?

Defenders of the Arctic Council emphasized the importance of scientific diplomacy, the unique place of Indigenous voices in circumpolar affairs, and the value of maintaining a forum from which Russia derives benefit (a carrot to reward good behaviour). Critics or skeptics highlighted how Russia seeks to use the Arctic Council as part of its "return to normalcy" narrative that would sequester the Arctic from dynamics elsewhere but then would highlight it as an example of how the West lacks strategic patience. Other participants also observed that, for Russia, territorial aggrandizement and violent revisionist behaviour has proven more important than upholding circumpolar relationships with the other Arctic states. While everyone agreed that the Arctic Council

working groups facilitate and produce important work, do these require an Arctic Council to exist? Some working groups pre-date the Council's creation in 1996, while others are highlight dependent on the Council and would unlikely survive its dissolution.

The spirited discussions did not lead to a clear consensus on most issues, but the pubinar format proved an entertaining way to facilitate an open exchange of provocative ideas. Various individuals floated ideas that did not reflect their settled opinions on topics but sought to stimulate serious debate and discussion on core issues.

Canada and Arctic Council under Norway's Chairship

This closed meeting, organized by the Arctic Council Secretariat, FNI and NAADSN, was hosted at the Embassy of Norway to Canada on 19 September under Chatham House rules.

The participants discussed challenges facing the Arctic Council. Perspectives included:

- the Arctic Council is doing quite well given the circumstances imposed by the broader geopolitical environment, and good things are happening at the working group level
- bringing practical working group activities online (from written to virtual meetings) has been the primary challenge for the Norwegian chairship
- while formal meetings limited to prepared statements can be convened in any format (including online), the limited possibilities for political figures and senior officials from all eight Arctic states to meet with each other in person precludes informal, in-person meetings where people can bounce ideas off one another
- intense bilateral and trilateral coordination is required given that the Senior Arctic Official (SAO) level is not running in its pre-February 2022 form, meaning that initiatives can still proceed but that it is more difficult to address emerging challenges on the horizon
- Arctic states need to clarify expectations around the Arctic Council and counter "dangerous" narratives around non-Arctic states deserving a greater say in regional governance because Arctic dynamics affect the world
- Does Russia's increasing engagement with non-Arctic states indicate eroding Arctic state primacy in circumpolar affairs, or is Russia's BRICS+-in-the-Arctic agenda a way to assert and maintain its leading status as an Arctic state?
- despite very strict bilateral rules about engagement with Russia, the modest "carve out" for the Arctic Council provides the seven like-minded Arctic states with a bit more leeway for limited engagement (although different states have different rules for their scientists with respect to interacting with their Russian counterparts)
- it remains largely in Russia's hands to set the conditions where trust is sufficiently restored to allow more substantive engagement, and there is little that the like-minded Arctic states can do to influence Russian behaviour

- Russia has been “behaving within the existing situation,” meaning that it has not been pushy or bullying towards the other Arctic states or the Council itself
- the Arctic states and Permanent Participants are not naïve about what the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) is, but are not in a position to change it
- Norway has used other venues to bring together all of the Permanent Participants, including events in Kirkenes and Tromsø, to discuss issues such as wildfires, permafrost, and the Arctic Economic Council – perhaps representing “one area of relatively normalcy” in the Arctic Council
- the Permanent Participants (except for RAIPON) are all steadfast supporters of a “no business as usual with Russia” position

The key challenge facing the Arctic Council is not that it will be misused, one participant emphasized, but that it will be unable to contribute to addressing pressing issues, such as dealing with wildfires. This means ensuring that procedural issues do not trump practical, substantive work as a relevant organization.

On the future of the Council, participants noted that:

- They looked forward to the day when the conditions (which remain unclear) are right for Ministerial and SAO meetings to resume in person, but that it is difficult to see what the conditions for political re-engagement look like when Russia is actively pursuing aggressive and dangerous actions below the threshold of armed conflict (such as GPS jamming, spoof raids on Norwegian radar stations, espionage, and dis/misinformation campaigns)
- Russia sees the enduring value of the Arctic Council, and could have deployed various procedural “shenanigans” to inhibit the body’s functioning but has not – nor has it walked away from the Council as it has other organizations (including Barents cooperation)
- All of the like-minded Arctic states want to have Russia involved in the Arctic Council going forward, and they have adopted an incremental approach to ensure that the seven like-minded Arctic states are not signaling any weakening of their overall stance with respect to Russia
- There is no desire on the part of the Arctic states to change the Arctic Council mechanisms

Arctic Governance – The Role of the Arctic Council

This public discussion was organized by the Arctic Council Secretariat, FNI and NAADSN at the Ottawa Public Library on 19 September – the 28th anniversary of the signing of the Ottawa Declaration creating the Arctic Council. Moderated by Andreas Raspotnik (FNI & High North Center for Business and Governance), the event included keynote presentations by Morten Høglund, Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials, Norwegian Chairship of the Arctic Council (SAOC) and Rob Sinclair, Senior Arctic Official for Canada. The event also had two panel discussions. The first panel saw Serafima Andreeva, Svein Vigeland Rottem, and Heather Exner-Pirot discuss the survival of the Arctic Council, the processes that have made it able to do so, and reflections on if – and why – the Arctic Council should continue to exist as it does in the current geopolitical context. The second panel

provided the opportunity for Whitney Lackenbauer (Trent University/NAADSN), Mathieu Landriault (uOttawa/OPSA/ NAADSN), and Jennifer Spence (Harvard/NAADSN) to discuss the broader context in which the Arctic Council fits, its importance relative to domestic perceptions of the Arctic and security in Canada, and the importance of the Arctic Council for the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic.

Rob Sinclair, Senior Arctic Official for Canada

Mr. Sinclair noted that the simple fact the Arctic Council is “alive and kicking” is a testament to its resilience, and he applauded Norway for a “stellar chairship” in which it effectively moved the Arctic agenda forward. He highlighted three areas of focus regarding current Arctic politics: the resilience of Arctic Peoples and the Arctic Council, the important role the Permanent Participants are playing, and the activities of non-Arctic states in Arctic politics.

1. The Arctic Council has endured what Sinclair called a “double-punch” by the COVID-19 pandemic and the “pause” of Council activities. The persistence of the Council speaks to its relative importance to Arctic states and Arctic peoples, although managing relations with Russia in the current global context remains challenging.
2. The Permanent Participants have been a crucial part of the Arctic Council since its founding, setting it apart from other international forums. The early work of the Permanent Participants in Canada, particularly the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), was an expression of Indigenous Peoples rights both domestically and internationally. Their engagement has helped bring Indigenous Knowledges to the fore of scientific work in the Arctic, and greater perspective to the work of the Arctic Council more broadly. For example, the discourse between local observations of polar bears in Iqaluit and the claims of international scientific activities have not necessarily lined up, leading to important questions for future work. Sinclair noted that the “role of the Permanent Participants continues to be dearly held”.
3. The Arctic Council provides space for the engagement of non-Arctic states and non-state organizations. Their engagement has been important, but “it needs to be on our terms.” Any pressure to change approaches to Arctic governance and Council mechanisms should be resisted. Sinclair suggested that the focus should be on using and maintaining existing mechanisms for cooperation rather than supplanting them or starting new ones.

He also noted that the growing international focus on the Arctic is unprecedented, as is the character of that focus. Furthermore, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly was actively engaging with Canadian Northern stakeholders and rightsholders on Canada’s Arctic foreign policy.⁶

Morten Høglund, Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOC), Norwegian Chairship of the Arctic Council

Acknowledging that this event was taking place in the Ottawa Public Library on the 28th anniversary of the Ottawa Declaration, Morten Høglund reflected on the uniqueness and continued importance of the Arctic Council. He celebrated its many achievements, from the landmark Arctic Climate Impact Assessment released

in 2004, to binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Council, to its work that influenced the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in bringing in a binding Polar Code.

Høglund suggested that it would be impossible to create the Ottawa Council today and cautioned that, if we lose it, we will not be able to create it again – with implications for the Arctic states, Indigenous Peoples, and the wider “Arctic family.” He noted the Council’s uniqueness in bringing the Permanent Participants’ voice to every table, as well as the forum’s close proximity to knowledge holders (from scientists to NGOs) to discuss substantive challenges. He emphasized that there are many different Arctics – not just in terms of natural environment, but diverse peoples and ways of life – and that the Arctic states have special responsibility, and rights, and are in the best position to know the appropriate regulations for the Arctic space. This requires close coordination amongst the states and the PPs.

These understandings have inspired the work of the Norwegian Chairship and its efforts to maintain the Arctic Council in its current form. This has meant a focus on preserving the basic functions of the Arctic Council and on a slow progression towards returning the working groups back to certain projects in a limited manner. He noted three particular topics of focus under the Norwegian Chairship that extend beyond the Council’s normal activities.

1. While youth engagement has been on the radar of earlier Chairships, this Norwegian agenda sought to bring more opportunities for youth to share their perspectives and gain new experiences. They are seeking to establish a permanent platform for youth voices within the Arctic Council to inform decision makers.
2. Wildland fires, including those in the Northwest Territories and Siberia, have increased in frequency and intensity at an “alarming rate” in recent years. Creating mechanisms to share lessons learned and build local knowledge and capacity has become a key priority for the Permanent Participants and the Arctic states.
3. The changing cryosphere has regional and global implications. The Arctic states will bring this message to COP29 in Baku, recognizing that they have a responsibility to carry a strong message to global negotiations.

He reiterated that the Arctic Council remains important to both the Arctic states and the Permanent Participants, and working to find a path forward despite the procedural challenges is important for the long-term.

Panel Discussions

The first panel discussion was broadly focused on the Arctic Council and its survival through the significant turbulence that it has experienced since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Serafima Andreeva began by highlighting three key phases the Council has gone through since the start of the war: the “pause” of all Arctic Council work, its partial resumption, and the transition of the Chairship from Russia to Norway. She highlighted how careful diplomatic maneuvering has been at the core of maintaining the Council through this difficult situation. In a statement of joint condemnation of Russia and its war in Ukraine released

on 3 March 2022, the other seven member states placed their participation in the work of the Arctic Council on “pause.” This saw a shift by Russian officials towards domestic interests while discussions took place behind the scenes and SAO meetings were confidential. On 10 May, however, it was indicated that Norway intended to proceed with its own scheduled Chairship after the conclusion of Russia’s. This period produced a variety of debates about whether the Arctic Council should be maintained as it was, or if an Arctic-7 (A-7), or some other new institution, should be established without Russia. Andreeva discussed how the open dialogue at the Arctic Circle Assembly 2022 was a pivotal moment: it pushed the Arctic states to clarify and demonstrate their commitment to ensuring the survival of the Council.⁷ With the upcoming transition of the Chairship from Russia to Norway, the priority was on how to successfully conduct the changeover between the two states. Preserving the Arctic Council was identified as the key task for Norway’s Chairship, which it has been successfully doing thus far. The new phase was on having a “functional Arctic Council – not survival for its own sake.”

Svein Vigeland Rottem, a senior researcher at FNI, began by asking why Norway has been so eager to work to ensure the survival of the Arctic Council, and why the discourse puts so much emphasis on Norway as “ideally placed” to be the Chair? He highlighted three strategic considerations driving Norway to remain so invested in the Council:

1. Norway has a 20-year plan to create Tromsø as an Arctic capital.
2. Norway cannot escape geography when it comes to the need to cooperate with Russia on matters like search and rescue. The Arctic Council remains a key future venue for enhanced cooperation after Russia ends its war in Ukraine.
3. The Arctic Council remains a strategic tool to tell a story of Arctic stability, countering ideas of the region as an ungoverned, lawless frontier.

Heather Exner-Pirot closed out the panel by suggesting that Arctic exceptionalism was real in the 2000s but has become untenable today. Russia’s choices have made it impossible to compartmentalize Arctic relations from broader geopolitics. Dr. Exner-Pirot initially questioned the merits of upholding the Arctic Council as it was, arguing that maintaining a complex relationship with Russia is preventing important work from being done – specifically scientific work that could continue among the seven like-minded Arctic states. However, the current approach being taken to maintain the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum does not mean “business as usual.” There are tradeoffs in including Russia in the Arctic Council, which means that some essential discussions cannot be had. She agreed that compartmentalizing just the Arctic Council – rather than Arctic relations more broadly – in order to save this unique institution makes sense to preserve space for when relations with Russia can resume in the “unknown future.”

A short discussion ensued, prompted by Dr. Exner-Pirot’s concern that Arctic defence policies seemed to fill in for what had once been a general Arctic state consensus on foreign policy dedicated to preserving peace and stability in the region. Did this mean that the Arctic states were no longer aligned in terms of a common desired end state? Respondents suggested that all of the Arctic states still sought regional stability, with the US’s [2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy](#) committing to work alongside its Allies and partners “to preserve the Arctic as a secure and stable region in which the U.S. Homeland is defended and our vital national interests are

safeguarded.” A state official in the audience noted that policy makers did not have the luxury of choosing between either security policy or other policy priorities – Arctic homelands are now threatened, so states must do both.

The second panel continued the discussion along similar lines.

Whitney Lackenbauer, a professor at Trent University and the network lead of NAADSN, followed up on Dr. Exner-Pirot’s reflections about “Arctic exceptionalism” – an idea that he has never espoused. The Arctic states’ national interests have always been the primary driver of regional dynamics, he insisted, and he returned to ideas that he first floated about fifteen years ago that the idea of Arctic exceptionalism is in greater danger than Arctic peace and stability itself. He emphasized the dangers of overinflated expectations for the region, with the Arctic Council at the epicenter of those expectations.

Dr. Lackenbauer then highlighted four key issues:

1. What he saw as an appropriate refocus of the Arctic Council on working group activities, which he considers the “bread and butter” of the Council’s contributions to both the region and the world. He noted how he still assigns the groundbreaking *ACIA* and *Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment* reports to his students, which not only provided a strong evidentiary base to inform national policy action but also influenced collective action on regional and global levels. While some commentators in the 2000s and 2010s measured the success of the Arctic Council based on its role in facilitating binding agreements, and some hoped to see it “evolve” into a hard law organization, he has always been more enthusiastic about its “soft sleddings” (to borrow the characterization of Timo Koivurova and David Vanderzwaag⁸) and its focus on scientific research and knowledge exchange.
2. While he celebrates the importance of scientific diplomacy and informative sharing, he also cautions that scientific engagement has become a vector for foreign influence.
3. China’s desire for a greater role in regional governance, and how this will play out with respect to its relationship with Russia, remains a subject of ongoing debate. Dr. Lackenbauer has noted that his own views on China’s Arctic ambitions have changed significantly since 2017,⁹ and he urged sober analysis on how the Sino-Russian Arctic relationship is evolving.¹⁰
4. Ensuring that the Permanent Participants’ priorities are not marginalized with the current focus on geopolitics. National security, human security, and environmental security are all important.

Mathieu Landriault, director of the Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique (OPSA) and a lecturer in the School of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, began by noting that we need to be careful about overgeneralizing about the state of Arctic regional governance. While Barents cooperation was over, the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement Conference of Parties continues to meet in its Arctic 5+5 format (the five Arctic coastal states plus Iceland, the EU, China, Japan, and South Korea).¹¹ The Arctic Council, he suggested, falls somewhere in between.

He then presented the preliminary results of an opinion poll on Canadian perceptions of Arctic issues, describing the Canadian mood as “gloomy.” 60% of respondents say that we should not resume any Arctic cooperation

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with Russia until the war in Ukraine is over. Canadians are taking a much harder line than they did in the late 2000s and 2010s, when the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation conducted its Arctic public opinion surveys.¹² Accordingly, “cooperation” is unlikely to be a “big seller” in Canadian political circles. Based on work that he has done on the information domain, Dr. Landriault also noted that analysis of the Russian media reveals a clear shift in narratives away from cooperative frames to those emphasizing competition, struggle, and threats from the West.

Jennifer Spence, the Director of the Arctic Initiative at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, emphasized the need for “serious pragmatism” given the current context in the Arctic and the world. There is a danger in over-simplifying the situation – and the news media is not helping us in this regard. Casting everyone in black-and-white, good-guy/bad-guy roles limits the room for creativity and cooperation where this serves national interests. She encouraged the audience to avoid simplified narratives and bring nuance to assessments and discussions.

Dr. Spence observed that governments are increasingly reactive to popular assumptions and opinions. Accordingly, it is important for “experts” to consider how they can shape opinions with respect to Arctic affairs. While we are not “sleepwalking” in the Arctic governance space, she warned the we are at risk of “coasting.” When she was considering the path ahead during the “pause” in Arctic Council activities, she arrived at a fundamental question: what is more important, the institution or the achieving of policy objectives?

Reflections

- Perspectives of some of the expert commentators changed in light of information shared and explanations offered as the conversation progressed.
- The combination of incrementalism and confidence building has been a successful approach to the Arctic Council’s survival, but the situation remains tenuous.
- Compartmentalizing the Arctic Council is different than compartmentalizing broader Arctic relations from global geopolitics.
- The Arctic Council is NOT conducting business as usual. The processes in place have kept it primarily in maintenance-mode, with some areas of work proceeding on a limited basis. This balance is important, primarily to indicate to Russia and the world that its actions are unacceptable, but that avenues for greater cooperation exist for Russia should it change its behavior.



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- The Permanent Participants continue to play an important role in the Arctic Council, and have voiced the desire for peaceful cooperation while also taking different sides on Russia’s war in Ukraine (with RAIPON vigorously supporting Putin and the Russian war effort, and the others opposing it). The Permanent Participants are “clear-eyed” about the balance that needs to be struck, but some analysts remain skeptical about their ability to do so with RAIPON (described by one participant as an “appendage of the Kremlin”) in the mix.
- The 1996 Ottawa Declaration is an agreement that could not be produced in today’s context, and every reasonable consideration to preserve the Arctic Council should be taken. However, this should not be at the expense of indicating support for Russia’s broader revisionist and revanchist activities, and it should be recognized that Russia also has much to lose if the Council were to collapse. The like-minded Arctic states should not downplay this when forecasting regional governance futures in an era of geopolitical competition globally.

Notes

¹ CIRNAC, “Arctic and Northern Policy Framework.”

² See, for example, Heather Exner-Pirot and Robert Murray, “Regional Order in the Arctic: Negotiated Exceptionalism,” *The Arctic Institute*, 24 October 2017, <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/regional-order-arctic-negotiated-exceptionalism/>; Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Arctic Exceptionalisms,” in *The Arctic and World Order: The Question of Future Regimes to Manage Change*, eds. K. Spohr and D.S. Hamilton, 327-355 (Washington: Johns Hopkins University for Brookings University Press, 2020); Jason Smith, “Melting the Myth of Arctic Exceptionalism,” *Modern War Institute*, 19 August 2022, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/melting-the-myth-of-arctic-exceptionalism/>.

³ Regarding the ACIA, see Tim Koivurova, E. Carina H. Keskitalo, & Nigel Bankes (Eds.), “Climate Governance in the Arctic”, Springer, 2009.

⁴ To access the three legally-binding agreements see, Arctic Council, “International Cooperation in the Arctic”, <https://arctic-council.org/explore/work/cooperation/>

⁵ Arctic Council, 28 February 2024, “Arctic Council advances resumption of project-level work” <https://arctic-council.org/news/arctic-council-advances-resumption-of-project-level-work/>.

⁶ See Emily Blake, “Canada developing Arctic foreign policy,” Cabin Radio [Yellowknife], 17 September 2024, <https://cabinradio.ca/201460/news/politics/canada-developing-arctic-foreign-policy/>.

⁷ For a report on Arctic Circle Assembly 2022 and international perspectives being shared there, particularly by China, see, for example, Justin Barnes “Arctic Circle Assembly 2022 - Activity Report”, December 2022, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ACA22-Activity-Report_JBarnes.pdf; and Marc Lanteigne, “Arctic Circle 2022: The Outside World Keeps Walking In,” NAADSN *Quick Impact*, 23 October 2022, <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Lanteigne-quick-impact-23oct2022.pdf>.

⁸ Timo Koivurova and David Vanderzwaag, “The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects,” *UBC Law Review* 40 (2007): 121-194, https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1499&context=scholarly_works.

⁹ See, for example, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Canada and the Asian Observers to the Arctic Council,” *Asia Policy* 18 (2014): 22-29; and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Frédéric Lasserre, *China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018), <https://press.ucalgary.ca/books/9781552389010/>.

¹⁰ See, for example, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, and Ryan Dean. “Why China is not a peer competitor in the Arctic.” *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* (2022): 80-97; Adam Lajeunesse, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Sergey Sukhankin, and Troy Bouffard, “Friction Points in the Sino-Russian Arctic Partnership,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 111 (October 2023): 96-106, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-111/jfq-111_96-106_Lajeunesse-et-al.pdf; and Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, *Selling the ‘Near Arctic’ State: China’s Information and Influence Operations in the Arctic* (Washington: Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2024), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/SellingNearArctic-4.pdf>.

¹¹ Oceans North, “Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement Meeting Ends with Step Forward for Conservation,” 14 June 2024, <https://www.oceansnorth.org/en/blog/2024/06/central-arctic-ocean-fisheries-agreement-meeting-ends-with-step-forward-for-conservation/>.

¹² See https://gordonfoundation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/APO_Survey_Volume-2_WEB.pdf.