

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES



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Doing it Right: An IN, TO, THOUGH Analysis of the U.S. 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy

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In July 2024, the U.S. released its *Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy*¹ in response to “major geopolitical changes”² driven by Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine and growing Sino-Russian ties in the Arctic.³ The strategy applies the 2022 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and the 2022 *National Defense Strategy* to the region and updates and focuses the 2022 *National Strategy for the Arctic Region* on defence matters.⁴ This new strategy is notable for its policy coherence and careful framing of the Arctic, which places the U.S. at the forefront of policy development across the region. It also provides an excellent example for Canada to follow when articulating its future Arctic security policy.

The *DoD Arctic Strategy* deliberately and effectively nests the region within the larger international perspective.⁵ The region itself is not defined as “exceptional” or somehow different from the rest of the world.⁶ Global policy drivers like geopolitics and climate change that were identified in the *NSS*⁷ and its ecosystem of supporting documents are applied to the Arctic, with the region inextricably linked to implementing global defence goals like achieving integrated deterrence.⁸ Thus the *DoD Arctic Strategy* seeks a status-quo end state for the Arctic, aiming to preserve it “as a stable region” for American interests in the face of geopolitical competition and global warming. The document also makes clear that “a primary risk to the successful implementation of this strategy stems from the need to balance against other global priorities.”⁹ In short, the U.S. cannot overmatch capabilities to the Arctic region that could leave somewhere else more vulnerable (such as the Indo-Pacific region).¹⁰ Not only does this balance the region with the United States’ broader global commitments, it also ensures that concerns within the Arctic do not dilute from global defence and integrated deterrence.¹¹

Using this international level of analysis, the DoD strategy effectively frames the Arctic as a conduit for threats¹² that can disrupt global security. By applying the *in, to, and through*¹³ analysis to how the DoD frames the Arctic as a series of subregions, we suggest that Canada can learn from the clarity and prioritization provided in terms of distinguishing between the Northern American and European Arctic as well as parsing international and regional levels of analysis. We discern significant differences between how the US views and approaches Arctic security compared to the defence policy of Canada, its Arctic “premier partner,”¹⁴ which can help to refine our understandings of how threats *in, to, and through* the Canadian Arctic contrast with those of other Arctic subregions.

The DoD strategy parses the Arctic into distinct subregions, understanding that different parts of the Circumpolar North represent distinct operating environments that face different threats and thus require different responses to defend. The North American Arctic runs from Alaska across Canada to include Greenland and pushing out into the northern approaches to the continent (the North Atlantic, the North Pacific, and the Arctic Ocean). The European Arctic includes Iceland and runs east across the Barents Sea to include the Nordics. Importantly, the DoD framing of the European Arctic crosses the Russian border to include the Kola Peninsula, home to many of that country's strategic weapons and the force projection capabilities of its Northern Fleet.¹⁵

Threats IN, TO, and THROUGH the North American Arctic

The *DoD Arctic Strategy* positions climate change as the threat *in* the North American Arctic. While acknowledging that the effects of climate change are wide-ranging, noting negative impact on the way of life for Arctic communities, the strategy stays focused on how climate change effects the DoD's operating environment.¹⁶ This maintains a clarity of purpose and focus that prevents the strategy from slipping into a tautology where climate change is posited as a threat to everything, diluting policy responses to this threat *in* the North American Arctic.

The strategy notes that much of the defence infrastructure in the North American Arctic was built during the Cold War. Climate change has since began causing "permafrost thaw and faster-than-anticipated rates of coastal erosion,"¹⁷ threatening these legacy works and placing additional demands on building and future-proofing new infrastructure. Other effects include more forest fires in Alaska, which means less training days and greater response requirements on forces, thus affecting their overall readiness levels.¹⁸ The increased uncertainty due to climate change in the North American Arctic puts greater demands on the Joint Force to operate in and from there, given that it is "far dryer, colder, and sparsely populated with minimal infrastructure" than the European Arctic.¹⁹ These factors all compound to make sustaining forces across the North American Arctic in remote operating locations "even more challenging" than elsewhere.²⁰

The closest the strategy comes to attaching timelines around climate security in the North American Arctic is when it addresses the future viability of shipping lanes. The DoD notes that the "Arctic may experience its first practically ice-free summer by 2030." This means "strategic significant maritime chokepoints such as the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia" are becoming "more economically and militarily significant." The strategy concludes that more access will result in an "elevated risk of accidents" and "environmental degradation," placing more operational pressures on U.S. forces in the North American Arctic. Greater contact with adversarial powers like China and Russia also raises the risk of "miscalculation" in the region.²¹

Despite the threats in the North American Arctic, the strategy notes that the subregion is home to "significant U.S. defense infrastructure" that is "vital to homeland defense."²² This infrastructure centres on two elements: 1) providing aerospace warning, aerospace control,²³ and maritime warning capabilities to NORAD, and 2) supporting the air defence and expeditionary forces based in Alaska.²⁴ Adversaries would seek to destroy or disrupt this critical infrastructure in the case of an armed conflict, meaning that the U.S. must deter and be prepared to defend against kinetic threats to the North American Arctic.

The strategy positions Russian forces as a threat to critical military infrastructure, as that country "has a clear avenue of approach to the U.S. homeland through the Arctic."²⁵ Damaging North American aerospace and maritime domain awareness infrastructure "would hamper the U.S. military's ability to operate in the region"²⁶ and undermine its

ability to detect, deter, and defend threats to the U.S. homeland.²⁷ From an international level of analysis, the loss of this infrastructure means the Arctic could become “a strategic blind spot”²⁸ in global awareness of integrated deterrence for threats from and passing through the Arctic.²⁹

Targeting infrastructure that supports air defence and expeditionary forces out of Alaska threatens American ability to project power from and through the Arctic. The strategy explains that infrastructure is “integral to the execution of Indo-Pacific operations as the northern flank for projecting military force from the U.S. homeland to that region.”³⁰ Damaging core military infrastructure also curtails its ability to act in the North American Arctic, such as conducting “personnel recovery/search and rescue.”³¹ The strategy implies that China could add to these kinetic threats to the North American Arctic as it seeks to grow its presence across the circumpolar world.³²

The *DoD Arctic Strategy*’s international level of analysis orients towards addressing kinetic threats *through* the North American Arctic. “The Arctic holds our northern approaches to the U.S. homeland,” it explains, and detecting threats that would pass through the North American Arctic as far away as possible “is critical to the homeland defence.”³³ Russia is the primary source of these threats through the North American Arctic. The strategy argues that Russia “could use its Arctic-based capabilities” to project through the North American Arctic onto a wide-range of targets in the lower 48 states as part of an attempt “to hold the U.S. homeland” at risk and/or threaten American ability to project power elsewhere.³⁴ Subsequently, the DoD frames these threats *through* North America as threats to international rather than Arctic regional security.

Threats IN, TO, and THROUGH the European Arctic

The DoD presents climate change as less of a threat *in* the European Arctic compared to in the North American Arctic. The European Arctic is noted for being a more forgiving operating environment. It is warmer and wetter than the North American Arctic, with a far greater population supported by extensive infrastructure including “more robust roads, ports, and communications networks.” This makes actors in the region more resilient to the pressures of climate change, allowing the Joint Force more reliable options to persistently operate there, bring in supplies, and campaign, if necessary, compared to North America.³⁵

The *DoD Arctic Strategy* includes the Kola Peninsula in its definition of what constitutes the European Arctic. Both “home to Russia’s Northern Fleet” as well as “important strategic nuclear forces, specifically its submarine-launched ballistic missile force,” the power projection capabilities of these forces pose the unique situation of being a kinetic threat *in, to, and through* the larger European Arctic. The major distinction between kinetic *in* and *to* threats posed by Russian forces to the European Arctic is whether the threat originates in the Kola Peninsula or beyond. Kinetic threats by Russian forces within the European Arctic are threats *in* it. Russian forces stationed outside the European Arctic that will strike into it represent threats *to* it.³⁶

These Russian kinetic threats *in, to, and through* the European Arctic are expected to persist into the foreseeable future. The DoD strategy notes that these forces have been largely free of the attrition imposed by Ukraine on Russia’s military.³⁷ Indeed, these threats will likely increase for two reasons. First, the strategy tracks that “Russia continues to invest heavily in new military infrastructure and refurbishing Soviet-era installations,” some of which is in the European Arctic.³⁸ Second, this horizontal proliferation of the Russian forces in the European Arctic is matched by their vertical proliferation of new technologies and tactics designed to destabilize the subregion. The European Arctic’s significant infrastructure is at risk to “lower-level destabilizing activities” like Russian Global Positioning

System (GPS) jamming and dangerous flights by their military aircraft.³⁹ Jamming equipment stationed within the European Arctic pose an *in* threat. Aircraft flying dangerously that are based elsewhere in Russia pose a threat to the European Arctic. Indeed, as the European Arctic contains far more infrastructure than the North American Arctic, there is subsequently many more in and to threats for adversaries to target. This includes risk of Russian kinetic attacks in and to the European Arctic by “nuclear, conventional, and special operations threats.”⁴⁰ While the strategy celebrates the formal inclusion of both Finland and Sweden into NATO, citing them as highly capable militaries that “opens strategic opportunities”⁴¹ to help confront these Russian threats to the European Arctic, the small drawback is that it increases the threats in and to the European Arctic that the Joint Force is obligated to protect.⁴²

The power projection capabilities of the Russian forces based on the Kola Peninsula might pose a threat to the larger European Arctic, but this is part of a larger effort to strike *through* it (rather than conquest of Arctic territory itself). Russian strategic forces can project power through the European Arctic to the rest of the continent, including Joint Forces stationed across it. These forces also are poised to strike and possibly contest the sea lines of communication (SLOC) through the North Atlantic between North America and Europe, hampering American power projection capabilities and integrated deterrence.⁴³

Responses to the European and North American Arctics

The *DoD Arctic Strategy* applies a “monitor-and-respond approach”⁴⁴ to achieve its desired end state of maintaining the Arctic as a stable region. At its most basic, the “monitor” step means building domain awareness and supporting telecommunications and infrastructure in both Arctics. This level of ambition is different for the two subregions. The North American Arctic calls for “long-range persistent aerospace and maritime surveillance capabilities”⁴⁵ to confront threats coming over the Arctic, North Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans. As NATO allies share land borders with Russia in the European Arctic, the strategy subsequently requires the higher level of ambition of “enhancing all-domain awareness.”⁴⁶ Much of this effort to monitor the North American and European Arctics requires the building of new infrastructure there and is directly linked to providing the important first step in integrated deterrence globally.

The “response” part of the American approach to the Arctic is largely expeditionary in nature and is also framed through the international security lens of providing integrated deterrence. The strategy emphasizes that “the deterrent value” of the Joint Force lies with “DoD’s ability to deploy [it] globally at the time and place of our choosing.”⁴⁷ This implies that much of the Joint Force’s deterrence by denial value comes from engaging with allies and partners – a common theme in the U.S. strategic literature.⁴⁸

The strategy posits exercises and engagement with allies as the two primary means to address threats in, to, and through the North American and European Arctics. It seeks to address the threats posed *in, to, and through* the European Arctic by engagement with NATO and enhancing cooperation between U.S. Unified Combatant Commands.⁴⁹ NORAD and NATO are positioned as allied responses for threats *to* and *through* the North American Arctic.⁵⁰ The strategy also notes that the Joint Force’s ability to project power (deterrence by punishment) from or through the Arctic comes from exercising across the region.⁵¹

Responses to the European and North American Arctics

The *DoD Arctic Strategy* frames the Arctic as a region *from* and *through* power (in this case, primarily in the form of kinetic threats) is projected into the international system.⁵² Power projection from the Arctic is often associated with the Kola Peninsula, and Russian long-range fires originating from there. For example, the strategy notes that “Russia’s Arctic capabilities have the potential to hold the U.S. homeland, as well as Allied and partner territory, at risk.”⁵³ This is well established in defence thinking going back to the start of the Cold War.⁵⁴ However, the strategy makes clear that the Arctic is a place from and through which the United States is increasingly projecting military force from Alaska into the Indo-Pacific.⁵⁵ Similarly, the strategy highlights that being able to operate in the Arctic demonstrates credibility not only in defence but in “global power projection operations.”⁵⁶

This sets up the relationship between threats *to* and *from* the Arctic from an American vantage point. The *DoD Arctic Strategy* notes that “Russia... could use its Arctic-based capabilities to threaten the ability of the United States to project power both to Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, constraining our ability to respond to crises.”⁵⁷ Part of this ability to constrain American power projection stems from threatening American forces and infrastructure in the North American and European Arctics. These forces might be in the Arctic but are primarily oriented around effecting international security and defence objectives, like achieving integrated deterrence. This demonstrates the utility of the *DoD’s Arctic Strategy* approaching the Arctic from the outside perspective of the international level of analysis, rather than a regional or state-centric lens.

What can Canada learn?

The 2024 *DoD Arctic Strategy* applies the *in*, *to*, and *through* methodology in laying out the sort of threats that the U.S. is facing, what capabilities are needed to properly defend the Arctic, and where synergies can be found from national, regional, and international levels of analysis. The strategy positions the Americans as reacting to events *from* or *through* the Arctic and then enacting globally. Its priority is to enhance aerospace warning, control, and maritime warning capabilities in the North American Arctic to detect and check threats *to* or passing *through* this subregion. Canada is defined as a partner with whom the U.S. will work, largely through NORAD, to deliver these capabilities. Doing so will advance the end goal of preserving the Arctic “as a stable region” for American interests in the face of growing strategic competition and climate change.

The *DoD Arctic Strategy* arranges threats and responses in a policy hierarchy of needs and then makes and justifies its choice to prioritize the North American Arctic over the European Arctic,⁵⁸ with particularly focus on enhancing domain awareness and communications because of the threat posed to the North American Arctic by Russian Strategic forces and the need to detect them⁵⁹ (needs articulated in the 2022 NDS).⁶⁰ This positions the Arctic as supporting the global perspective, not subordinating larger international commitments to the Arctic.⁶¹

The preceding analysis reveals the fundamental difference between American and Canadian applications of the *in*, *to*, and *through* methodology in both the 2024 *DoD Arctic Strategy* and Canada’s April 2024 defence policy update, *Our North Strong and Free*.⁶² The United States has power projection capabilities from the North American and European Arctics while Canada does not. This power projection is enabled by significant American forces and infrastructure based in both subregions. Canada has no commensurate military footprint of expeditionary forces. Thus, the US must deal with kinetic threats *to* its Arctic to ensure that it is able to project power *from* Alaska, as well

as addressing threats passing *through* the region. In comparison, Canada does not face the same military threats to its Arctic and must deal with kinetic threats passing *through* the region.

The *DoD Arctic Strategy* also presents the costs of inaction. Should the U.S. fail to develop early warning and air defence sensors to monitor the Arctic, it will increase the geopolitical risks to the U.S. homeland.⁶³ This logic directly applies to Canada.⁶⁴ The DoD is also aware that if the U.S. cannot achieve its goals, “it will cast doubt on the credibility” on American capability to operate in the Arctic.⁶⁵ This credibility issue is an urgent concern for Canada.⁶⁶ The North American Arctic focus places Canada at the centre of American security, raising the specter of needing to “defend against help” should Canada be unable to contribute in a manner that satisfies the U.S.’s perceived homeland defence requirements.⁶⁷ Canada must be perceived as a credible and capable ally in the shared defence of North America. As the US builds capability in the Arctic, Canada will be under increasing pressure to complement it with infrastructure to assist monitoring the aerospace and maritime approaches of the North American Arctic, and to contribute to integrated deterrence with appropriate denial capabilities to defend these approaches. Given Canada’s comparatively modest defence resources, this clarity of analysis of the threats *in, to, and through* the Arctic from an international defence perspective provides useful guidance to future Canadian planners integrating the Arctic into our defence policy.

¹ DOD, “2024 Arctic Strategy,” available at <https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF>.

² 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, iii.

³ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 3.

⁴ For an overview, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, “‘Cooperation in the Age of Competition’: The Arctic and North American Defence in 2022,” *NAADSN Policy Brief* (December 2022), <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/22-dec-PWL-RD-Arctic-and-NA-Defence-2022-NAADSN-policy-brief.pdf>.

⁵ Often referred to as the international level of analysis in political studies. See Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (Columbia University Press, New York: 1959) and David J. Singer, “The level-of-analysis problem in international relations,” *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77-92 for seminal works on the topic.

⁶ P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, “Arctic Exceptionalisms,” in *The Arctic and World Order*, eds. Kristina Spohr, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Jason C. Moyer (Washington DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2020), 372.

⁷ The White House, “National Security Strategy,” October 2022, 6, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>.

⁸ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 7.

⁹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 17.

¹⁰ For an example of this, see Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “China’s Arctic Gambit? Contemplating Possible Strategies,” *NAADSN Strategic Perspectives*, 23 April 2020. <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20-apr-23-China-Arctic-Gambit-RD-PWL.pdf>.

¹¹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 11-14. Indeed, the strategy only mentions the word sovereignty twice on pages III and 14.

¹² For more on this framing, see Kenneth C. Eyre “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87,” *Arctic* (1987): 292-299.

¹³ Please see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Threats Through, To, and In the Arctic: A Framework for Analysis,” *NAADSN Policy Brief*, 23 March 2021, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Lackenbauer_Threats-Through-To-and-In-the-Arctic.pdf ; and

Ryan Dean, "MythBuster." NAADSN Activity Report, June 2020, <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/MythBuster-Final.pdf>.

¹⁴ For more on this bilateral relationship, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Rob Huebert, "Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20, no. 3 (2014): 320-333.

¹⁵ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2, 4. See, for example, Jonas Kjellén, "The Russian Northern Fleet and the (re) militarisation of the Arctic," *Arctic Review on Law and Politics* 13 (2022): 34-52.

¹⁶ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 5.

¹⁷ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 5.

¹⁸ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 5-6.

¹⁹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 6.

²⁰ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 6.

²¹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

²² 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

²³ Canada does aerospace warning and air control but not aerospace control due to its 2005 decision to not participate in ballistic missile defence with the United States. See James G. Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà Vu All Over Again* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).

²⁴ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

²⁵ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

²⁶ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 17.

²⁷ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 8.

²⁸ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 17.

²⁹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 9.

³⁰ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

³¹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 10.

³² 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 3, 5.

³³ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 8.

³⁴ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4. For more on this analysis of Russian long-range fires through the Arctic, see Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy and Peter M. Fesler, *Hardening the Shield: A Credible Deterrent and Capable Defense for North America* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, September 2020), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/>.

³⁵ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 6.

³⁶ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

³⁷ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

³⁸ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

³⁹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

⁴⁰ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

⁴¹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

⁴² 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 11.

⁴³ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

⁴⁴ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 7.

⁴⁵ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 8.

⁴⁶ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 9.

⁴⁷ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 1.

⁴⁸ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 11.

⁴⁹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

⁵⁰ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

⁵¹ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 14.

⁵² For example, see 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 8-9.

⁵³ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

⁵⁴ See, for example, Joseph T. Jockel's *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987).

⁵⁵ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 2.

⁵⁶ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 7.

⁵⁷ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 4.

⁵⁸ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 8.

⁵⁹ For the logic on this, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, "We Cannot Deter What We Cannot Detect," *NAADSN Quick Impact*, 25 May 2020. <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20-may-25-PWL-RD-We-Cannot-Deter-What-We-Cannot-Detect-final.pdf>.

⁶⁰ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 8.

⁶¹ See, for example, Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Defence Policy Update and NATO's Northern Flank: Insights from Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's 1947 Gray Lecture," *NAADSN Strategic Perspectives*, 8 July 2024. <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/StrategicPerspective-Dean-Lackenbauer-DPU-NATO-Gray-Lecture.pdf>.

⁶² National Defence, *Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2024) available at <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/corporate/reports-publications/2024/north-strong-free-2024-v2.pdf>.

⁶³ Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Defence Policy Update and NATO's Northern Flank: Insights from Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's 1947 Gray Lecture," *NAADSN Strategic Perspectives*, 8 July 2024, <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/StrategicPerspective-Dean-Lackenbauer-DPU-NATO-Gray-Lecture.pdf>.

⁶⁴ Given high levels of defence and economic integration, North America has long been considered a single geopolitical target to strike. See Robert J. Sutherland, "Canada's long term strategic situation," *International Journal* 17, no. 3 (1962): 199-223.

⁶⁵ 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, 17.

⁶⁶ Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Defence Policy Update and NATO's Northern Flank."

⁶⁷ See Nils Ørvik, "Defence against help-a strategy for small states?" *Survival* 15, no. 5 (1973): 228-231 and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Defence Against Help' Revisiting a Primary Justification for Canadian Participation in Continental Defence with the United States," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 20, no. 2 (2021): 62-89.