

ACTIVITY REPORT



March 5, 2025

9th China-Arctic Nordic Arctic Research Center Symposium (October 2024)

University of Akureyri

China's Track II Dilemmas in the Far North: The Case of the Chinese-Nordic Arctic Research Center

Marc Lanteigne

NAADSN Network Coordinator

As Beijing continues to seek acceptance as a stakeholder in the Arctic, this task has assumed more urgency for the Xi Jinping government as the far north attracts greater global attention. This has been caused by post-2022 trends towards accelerated securitisation and militarisation of the far north by both Russia and the NATO alliance, the growing possibility of a permanent diplomatic schism between the United States and European governments sparked by the decision by the second Trump administration to withdraw support for Ukraine in March 2025 which may spill over into Arctic discourse, and the diplomatic aftershocks after threats by the Trump government to annex Canada and Greenland.¹ These events have also placed unprecedented pressure on Arctic regional accords, including the Arctic Council, which will be facing an acid test in May this year, as the chairship is passed from Norway to Denmark, and questions about American and Russian participation abound. Beijing, like other non-Arctic states, must now address a region which is becoming less predictable and more open to kaleidoscopic patterns of strategic cooperation. With many governmental-level contacts in the Arctic becoming more tenuous, Track II engagement has therefore risen in importance.

Track II diplomacy, which has been a mainstay of international relations in the Asia-Pacific since the 1990s, refers to sub-governmental, informal, and frequently unofficial and comprehensive diplomatic links and dialogues. Often the participants are researchers, academics and other specialists, with occasional engagement by government representatives, but usually only in a personal capacity and 'off the record'. Initiatives which feature a somewhat more formalised government presence are commonly referred to as 'Track 1½' diplomatic activities.² These models are all distinguished from formal governmental talks and regimes (Track I) and often have more ambiguous aims and structures. Track II can be useful in the discussion of matters too sensitive for government-to-government talks, (within the Asia-Pacific, the East and South China Seas, and the Taiwan Straits, are common examples), creating a more congenial atmosphere for discussions and problem-solving, and

producing initiatives which can be ‘pushed through the ceiling’ to the governmental level for consideration (or plausible deniability). Under ideal circumstances, the two levels can work together in a separate but symbiotic fashion in the name of problem-solving and confidence-building.³ It is no accident that Track II has been most visible in regions like East and Southwest Asia, where political differences frequently make formal summitry difficult.

As a relative newcomer to Arctic political and diplomatic discourse, China has made frequent use of Track I and II initiatives in the Arctic to demonstrate its capabilities in research, scientific endeavours, and economic cooperation, as well as to ascertain policies of other key Arctic actors. Unlike other non-Arctic states active in the region, such as those in Europe, China has had far less time to develop an Arctic identity and coherent policy, and does not have a long history of exploration to fall back on. Beijing has thus tried to build a regional reputation as an ‘all-round’ contributor to Arctic discourses.⁴ In 2013, several doors were opened for Beijing to further demonstrate its polar skillsets to a wider audience. These included the acceptance of Beijing as an observer in the Arctic Council, along with four other Arctic governments (India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore), plus Italy. This move gave Beijing a louder voice in areas of Arctic policy which included environmental and development affairs, but also assisted the Chinese government in achieving greater status in a region viewed as a ‘strategic new frontier’ (*zhanlüe xin jiangyu* 战略新疆域) for Chinese security interests.⁵

As well, the founding of the Arctic Circle Assembly (ACA), also in 2013, gave China and other non-Arctic governments an additional chance to demonstrate its regional competence and better understand research and policy being created in and out of the far north. Shanghai hosted an Arctic Circle breakout forum in May 2019, with panels on scientific cooperation in areas of technological innovation, green policies, globalisation, and discussions related to specific economic sectors like shipbuilding and tourism.⁶ As another primary goal of Track II endeavours is to create a sense of community and shared interests, China hoped to further considerate its identity as a regional actor despite its lack of Arctic geography and history. Track II diplomacy has factored into Chinese interests, as elucidated in its 2018 government White Paper on the Arctic, to understand, protect and develop the Arctic, participate in regional governance initiatives, and approach the Arctic through a policy of ‘respect, cooperation, win-win results and sustainability’. An earlier version of this framework was *de facto* introduced in October 2015 by then-Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the ACA in the form of a blueprint which included recommendations for a ‘multi-tiered Arctic cooperation framework for win-win results.’⁷

At this time, Beijing was diplomatically estranged from one Arctic state, Norway, after the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 was awarded to imprisoned dissident and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo. Beijing held the Norwegian government responsible for allowing the award to go forward, and for seemingly condoning what the Chinese government perceived as a slight to its legal system and an ‘insult’ to the Chinese nation (*ruHua* 乳滑). The political fallout included a downgrading of diplomatic relations, suspension of free trade talks, and a temporary halt in Track I bilateral contacts. The situation was only resolved after a memorandum of understanding was signed in 2016 which included a promise by Oslo to avoid any further actions which might harm relations in the future.⁸ During this six-year diplomatic ‘freeze’, Track II events including the ACA and the Arctic Frontiers conference (founded in 2007) held annually in Tromsø, allowed for a certain degree of research

and policy contacts between Chinese and Norwegian representatives. Direct contacts between Chinese and Norwegian universities and research institutes during the freeze were sporadic at best, and so there was a preference for group settings which allowed for political differences to be less muted.

China's interest in Track II cooperation was not limited to being a 'joiner state', since in the wake of improved diplomatic contacts with Arctic regimes, a decision was made, in the wake of a April 2012 framework agreement signed between the governments of China and Iceland to facilitate Arctic scientific cooperation including in relation to the local environment and climate change,⁹ to also develop a broader network linking Chinese and Nordic research institutions. The China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) was founded in 2013 to promote joint scientific cooperation, linking several high-level Chinese institutions engaged in Arctic research, including the Polar Research Institute of China, Tongji University (Shanghai), Ocean University (Qingdao) and Shanghai Jiaotong University, with counterparts in the Nordic region. At the peak of its membership, CNARC included research centres and universities from each of the five Nordic countries. Annual conferences alternated between a city in China and those in the Nordics, (although due to the downgraded Sino-Norwegian political relationship, that country was left off the rotation list until after 2016).

Although CNARC began its existence with an emphasis on disseminating research in the physical sciences, including the understanding of Arctic environmental changes, there was also an interest within the group in economic, resource and maritime affairs as well as overall regional policymaking. The timing was significant, as China, with Russian support, had announced in 2017 that an Arctic wing of Beijing's watershed Belt and Road Initiative would be created in the form of the 'Polar Silk Road' (*Bingshang sichou zhilu* 冰上丝绸之路) linking Chinese economic interests with those of the Arctic states and providing an additional source of trade development.¹⁰ Initial planning for the PSR included cooperation in resource extraction, infrastructure, fossil fuels and shipping, and another emerging role for CNARC was as an incubator for dialogue regarding the expansion of far northern bilateral and multilateral economic as well as scientific collaboration. For example, at the May 2017 CNARC conference in Dalian, there was widespread discussion about that port city and potentially others in China to become hubs for expanded Arctic shipping via the PSR.

Within its framework, CNARC enthusiastically promoted cross-regional research cooperation and offered scholarships to Chinese and Nordic scholars. The CNARC Secretariat is located within the Strategic Studies section of the Polar Research Institute of China (*Zhongguo jidi yanjiu suo* 中国极地研究所) offices in Pudong. In-person meetings were suspended between 2020 and 2023 due to the pandemic, with the annual symposium being reinstated in December 2023 in Guangzhou.¹¹ At that time, however, geopolitical matters had begun to seep more visibly into the Arctic which would greatly affect Sino-European relations, specifically the decision by the Chinese government to maintain a neutral stance on Russia's full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.¹² This was followed by heightened concerns throughout the Western Arctic about the possibility of increased cooperation between China and Russia in Arctic policies and strategy, despite ongoing debates about the limitations to such a partnership. In addition to joint economic agreements involving Siberia and promises of future scientific cooperation, strategic posturing including joint Sino-Russian military manoeuvres off Alaska, including bomber incursions near the Alaskan coast in July 2024, and a combined task force of coast guard vessels which reportedly entered the Arctic in October of that year, further rattled Western governments.¹³

Arctic governments have also raised alarms about Chinese hybrid warfare and dual-use research. Incidents such as two cases of underwater cable cutting allegedly by Chinese vessels, and strains in the Sino-Norwegian relationship over reports of research at China's Yellow River Station (*Huanghe zhan* 黄河站) in Svalbard which could have military applications for China, have further reduced enthusiasm for increased engagement of Beijing amongst Nordic governments.¹⁴ As well, the admission of Finland and Sweden into NATO by 2023, thus making seven out of eight Arctic states (minus Russia) members of the alliance, raised worries in Beijing that its access to the region would be further curtailed.

Despite attempts by CNARC to maintain a degree of distance from wider political affairs in the Arctic, the resumption of full operations after the pandemic was hampered first by the 2023 withdrawal of the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat (SPRS) from the organisation (it was not represented at the Guangzhou conference), and the subsequent decision by Sweden's Umeå University to also discontinue participation in CNARC events in early 2024, ended overall Swedish participation in the initiative. These decisions took place at a time of deteriorated diplomatic relations between Beijing and Stockholm. For almost a decade, a series of contentious issues, including clashing human rights policies, the detainment since 2015 of Chinese-born Swedish national Gui Minhai, Swedish relations with Taiwan, differences over Chinese economic and Covid policies, and later Sweden's NATO membership in March 2024. Not helping matters was the combative attitude of then-Chinese Ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou, who was a frequent critic of the Swedish government and the country's media, and would eventually be perceived as an example of the turn towards more combative 'wolf warrior diplomacy' (*zhanlang waijiao* 戰狼外交) on Beijing's part.¹⁵ Then, in December 2023, the Copenhagen-based Nordic Institute for Asian Studies (NIAS), closed after a long period of financial instability, thus removing Denmark's only member group within CNARC, and placing future Danish participation in the group in question.¹⁶

The October 2024 CNARC symposium, the first to be held in Akureyri in a decade, was illustrative of how much the organisation has changed since that time, and how difficult it has become to maintain separation between science and politics in the Arctic under current conditions. The event, which sought to rebalance the organisation after such a tumultuous few years, on one hand sought to go back to basics by advertising the benefits of Sino-Nordic science cooperation in Arctic, but on the other acknowledged the problem of 'geopolitics' interfering more frequently with CNARC's stated aims. In recent years, Beijing had stepped up its criticism of Western policies in the Arctic, arguing that they reflected a renewed 'cold war mentality' (*lengzhan siwei* 冷战思维), and a push towards militarization of the Arctic, which is interfering with multilateral cooperation in scientific and environmental research in the far north.¹⁷ Beijing has thus sought to renew its identity-building as a scientific partner for the Nordic region as well as the overall Arctic, and this was a common theme at the Akureyri conference.

The event began with a tour of the joint China-Iceland Joint Arctic Observatory (CIAO) in Kárhóll, which specialises in atmospheric studies as well as measuring of 'space weather' / geo-magnetic activity and aurora patterns. Despite having officially opened in 2018, much of the facilities remain under construction, with main equipment having yet to be brought in, there were plans discussed about expanded operations and closer data-sharing with China's five operational Antarctic stations. As with Yellow River, however, the Kárhóll facilities have

also raised concerns about dual-use activities, and both stations were the subject of an October 2024 letter from the US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party calling for increased scrutiny into dual-use practices, including the possibility of monitoring military traffic.¹⁸ The CIAO project is thus another example of the greater frequency of collisions between China's Arctic research and strategic aims.

There were several areas of potential environmental and related cooperation which were cited at the Akureyri seminar, such as climate change, biodiversity, environmental technology, sustainable development, health, oceanography, counter-pollution initiatives, agri-food, and the 'blue' / maritime economy. Science diplomacy, referring to scientific cooperation as a means to maintain communications lines under difficult Track I conditions (and was a common practice during the cold war), was frequently cited as a way of improving knowledge-building in these fields as well as in future 'green governance'. The discussions did not discount the political obstacles present in developing science diplomacy however, as there were frequent mentions of the spillover from the 'Ukraine war' as well as the regional split between the 'NATO Arctic' and the 'Russian Arctic', the loss of data by communication lapses with Russian institutions, and the possibility of an alternative regional regime to the Arctic Council.

A lack of trust was mentioned often as an impediment to necessary regional cooperation and greater participation by non-Arctic states in Arctic affairs, and there was blame placed on the West by some speakers for forcing Moscow, including via sanctions (which Beijing has consistently been against),¹⁹ to 'de-Westernise' its Arctic strategies, and seek out alternative partnerships, including via the recently-expanded BRICS+ group. There were also criticisms of trends in the Arctic towards militarization by NATO states, (with Moscow omitted from that discussion) and 'security narratives' by the US and its allies, described as an anathema to vital multilateral environmental cooperation, as well as Western 'green colonialism' (*luse zhiminzhuyi* 綠色殖民主義),²⁰ which risks displacement of Indigenous communities in the rush for strategic materials, notably rare earths, in the Arctic. Recommendations included seeking ways to reintroduce Russia into Arctic discourses, promoting scientific cooperation as means of working around political roadblocks, and enhancing CNARC's mandate to contribute to greater Arctic policymaking, with Nordic cooperation, potentially via some of Beijing's major foreign policy endeavours, namely the 2021 Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the 2023 Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI),²¹ seen as possibly part of an emerging 'CNARC+' process. Noting these interests as well as a significant uptick in Chinese scientific publishing on Arctic subjects over the past five years, there was a tacit invitation presented for Nordic scholars to become more involved. Subsequent CNARC symposia were confirmed planned for Tongji University in late spring of 2025, and potentially Tromsø the following year.

Conclusions which can be drawn about China's evolving Arctic interests from the CNARC example are many. First, CNARC represents Beijing's concerns about getting 'back in the game' in Arctic affairs after considerable delays and setbacks caused by the global pandemic and the post-2022 Chinese relationship with Russia. Moreover, CNARC has allowed for a reset of sorts of Chinese Arctic policy, stressing the country's expanding scientific and research and development capabilities which could be brought to the far north as environmental threats continue. Second, as relations between China and the North American Arctic remain fraught, with Sino-Canadian ties uneven at best and the possibility of the China-sceptic Conservative Party returning to power in Ottawa later this year, and China-US relations set to decline as the second Trump

administration in early 2025 re-ignited the bilateral trade war it opened seven years previous,²² the Nordic region is considered a more viable partner for China's Arctic interests beyond Russia.

Third, with a recommenced focus on science diplomacy, CNARC and overall Track II activities are a representation of China's interests in changing core geopolitical narratives in the Arctic, including positing that the militarisation of the region is a singly Western initiative and also represents a dangerous distraction away from 'global civilisational' efforts to protect the far north, that Russia's ostracism from Arctic discourses is self-defeating, and that China is open to wider research partnerships if only other Arctic governments would move beyond a cold war mindset. Finally, there is an acknowledgement in Chinese policy circles that it is no longer possible to separate its scientific interests in the Arctic from geopolitical shifts, and so there will continue to be overtures to local epistemic communities in the Arctic as a means of bypassing perceived central government political interference. Responding to these policies and addressing the grey zone challenges of Chinese dual use activities and influence strategies must continue to factor into the debates over securing the Arctic. It remains unclear how a reduced-membership CNARC will continue, considering the geopolitical divides facing the north today. What can be said is that the organisation reflects the changed shape of China's Track II interests in the Arctic, interests which now require further assessment.

Endnotes

-
- ¹ Joanna Smialek, 'Europe Is Left with Hard Choices as Trump Sours on Ukraine,' *The New York Times*, 2 March 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/02/world/europe/ukraine-trump.html>; Will Weissert and Zeke Miller, 'Trump Refuses to Rule out Use of Military Force to take Control of Greenland and the Panama Canal,' *Associated Press*, 8 January 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/trump-biden-offshore-drilling-gulf-of-america-fa66f8d072eb39c00a8128a8941ede75>; Alison Durkee, 'Trump Confirms He's Serious About Wanting Canada As 51st State,' *Forbes*, 10 February 2025, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2025/02/09/trump-confirms-hes-serious-about-wanting-canada-as-51st-state>.
- ² David Capie and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* (2nd ed.) (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), 229-36.
- ³ Brian L. Job, 'Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order,' (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 241-79; Huiyun Feng, 'Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: Lessons for the Epistemic Community,' *Asia Policy* 13(4)(October 2018): 60-66; Sun Chenghao, "'二轨外交" 仍有巨大潜力可挖,' ['"Two-Track Diplomacy" Still Has Great Potential to Explore,], *Tsinghua University Centre for International Security and Strategy*, 17 May 2024, https://ciss.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/subemail_wzjx/7186; Wang Cungang, '二轨外交与亚太合作: 作用与问题,' ['Track II Diplomacy and Asia-Pacific Cooperation: The Roles and Problems,'] *Journal of Tongji University (Social Science Edition)* 4(2011): 64-70.
- ⁴ Marc Lanteigne, 'Inside, Outside, Upside Down? Non-Arctic States in Emerging Arctic Security Discourses,' *The Arctic and World Order*, ed. Kristina Spohr, Daniel S. Hamilton and Jason Moyer, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020), 379-404.
- ⁵ Yang Jian, '中国发展极地事业的战略思考,' ['Strategic Thinking on the Development of China's Polar Cause,'] *Academic Frontiers* (June 2017): 6-15.
- ⁶ *Arctic Circle Forums*, <https://www.arcticcircle.org/forums#>.

- ⁷ ‘中国的北极政策,’ [‘China’s Arctic Policy’], *Government of the People’s Republic of China*, 26 January 2018, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-01/26/content_5260891.htm; ‘Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly,’ *Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Iceland*, 17 October 2017, http://is.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zbgx/gjhz/201510/t20151018_3165200.htm.
- ⁸ Ivar Kolstad, ‘Too Big to Fault? Effects of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize on Norwegian Exports to China and Foreign Policy,’ *International Political Science Review* 41(2)(2020): 207-23; Sewell Chan, ‘Norway and China Restore Ties, 6 Years After Nobel Prize Dispute,’ *The New York Times*, 19 December 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/europe/china-norway-nobel-liu-xiaobo.html>.
- ⁹ ‘Framework Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Arctic Cooperation,’ *Arctic Portal*, 12 April 2012, <https://library.arcticportal.org/2447/1/China%20Iceland%20Agreement%202012.pdf>.
- ¹⁰ Ran Xin, Chu Ling, and Feng-Yin-hu, ‘冰上丝绸之路’ 倡议：研究脉络、热点分析与展望,’ [‘The “Ice Silk Road” Initiative: Context, Issues, and Prospects,’] *Journal of Hexi University* 1(2024): 47-53; Marc Lanteigne, ‘Not Being Absent: China’s Polar Silk Road and the Politics of Identity,’ *Research Handbook on the Belt and Road Initiative*, ed. Joseph Chinyong Liow, Hong Liu, and Gong Xue (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2021), 404-15.
- ¹¹ Egill Thor Nielsson, ‘The China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre: One Decade In,’ *Arctic Yearbook* 2023, https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2023/Commentaries/4C_Nilsson_AY2023.pdf.
- ¹² Huasheng Zhao, ‘Explaining China’s Reaction to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis,’ *China’s International Strategy Review* 5(2023): 24-46; Fu Yu, ‘全球安全格局与中国国际战略选择,’ [‘Global Security Structure and China’s International Strategic Choices,’] *Frontiers* 3(2023): 46-56.
- ¹³ Heather Williams, Kari A. Bingen, and Lachlan MacKenzie, ‘Why Did China and Russia Stage a Joint Bomber Exercise Near Alaska?’ *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, 30 July 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-china-and-russia-stage-joint-bomber-exercise-near-alaska>; ‘China’s Coast Guard Enters Arctic for the First Time for Patrol with Russia,’ *Reuters*, 2 October 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-coast-guard-enters-arctic-first-time-patrol-with-russia-2024-10-02>; Marc Lanteigne, ‘A China-Russia Arctic Alliance? Not So Fast,’ *The Diplomat*, 21 February 2024, <https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/a-china-russia-arctic-alliance-not-so-fast>.
- ¹⁴ For example, see Sophia Besch and Erik Brown, ‘A Chinese-Flagged Ship Cut Baltic Sea Internet Cables. This Time, Europe Was More Prepared,’ *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 3 December 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/12/baltic-sea-internet-cable-cut-europe-nato-security?lang=en>; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘China’s Expanding Arctic Ambitions Challenge the US and NATO,’ *Newsweek*, 21 July 2024, <https://www.newsweek.com/2024/08/09/china-russia-us-arctic-north-pole-strategy-svalbard-norway-sea-route-1916641.html>; Marc Lanteigne, ‘Oasis No More? Svalbard and Contested Arctic Strategies,’ *Over the Circle*, 1 July 2024, <https://overthecircle.com/2024/07/01/oasis-no-more-svalbard-and-contested-arctic-strategies>; Johannes Fjeld, ‘Amerikansk alarm om forskning i Norge,’ [‘American Alarm about Research in Norway,’], *Borsen – Dagbladet*, 3 November 2024, <https://borsen.dagbladet.no/nyheter/amerikansk-alarmom-forskning-i-norge/82139907>.
- ¹⁵ Zhuang Pinghui, ‘China’s Ambassador to Sweden Summoned After He Hit Out at “Smears” in Latest Outburst against Beijing Critics,’ *South China Morning Post*, 18 January 2020, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3046689/chinas-ambassador-sweden-hits-out-smears-latest-outburst>; Gu Jing and Zheng Yuanhui, ‘外交翻译中的“战狼”话语陷阱分析与应对——“理直情适”原则的确立,’ [‘Breaking Free from the Discursive Trap of “Wolf Diplomacy” by Formulating the Principle of “Explicit Justification with Moderate Emotion” in Translation of Chinese Diplomatic Discourse,’] *Journal of PLA University of Foreign Languages* 2(2023): 129-36+144; Martin Pella, ‘Revisiting Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,’ *Lund University - Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies* (Spring 2024), <https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOid=9176927&fileOid=9176928>.
- ¹⁶ ‘NIAS is Closing Down!’ *Nordic Institute of Asian Studies*, 21 August 2023, <https://nias.ku.dk/nias-is-closing-down>.
- ¹⁷ Li Quan, ‘相关国家强化北极地区军事部署，冷战思维死灰复燃,’ [‘Relevant Countries Strengthen Their Military Deployment in the Arctic, and the Cold War Mentality is Rekindled,’], *China Military Network*, http://www.81.cn/wj_208604/10161736.html; Zhang Weiping, ‘“泛安全化”态势与推动北极安全治理的中国方案,’ [‘The Trend of “Pan-Security” and China’s Plan to Promote Arctic Security Governance,’] *Pacific Journal / Xi Jinping Research Centre for Diplomatic Studies*, 30 December 2024, http://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2024-12/30/content_117674503.shtml; Du Xiaojie, ‘拜登政府北极战略评析 杜晓杰,’ [‘Evaluating the Biden Administration’s Arctic Policy,’] *Country and Area Studies* 2(2024): 59-74+156; ‘US 2024 Arctic Strategy Aims to Bring “Pristine land” into US’ Military Backyard,’ *Global Times*, 23 July 2024, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1316574.shtml>.

ACTIVITY REPORT



¹⁸ ‘Letter to Pentagon and State Department on Chinese Military Research in the Arctic,’ *US House of Representatives*, 17 October 2024, <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/letters/letter-pentagon-and-state-department-chinese-military-research-arctic>.

¹⁹ See Austin Ramzy, ‘China Criticizes Sanctions Against Russia as Ineffective and Warns of Wider Damage,’ *The New York Times*, 23 February 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/china-russia-ukraine-sanctions.html>; ‘俄乌冲突两周年：影响与启示,’ [‘Second Anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Effects and Implications’], *Renmin University Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies*, 21 February 2024, <https://interpret.csis.org/translations/second-anniversary-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-effects-and-implications>.

²⁰ For background, see Guo Peiqing and Li Lingzi, ‘挪威北极开发中的原住民发展权问题研究,’ [‘Study of the Right to Development of Norway’s Indigenous in Arctic Development,’] *World Regional Studies* 32(7)(July 2023): 49-60.

²¹ Jyrki Kallio, ‘China’s Global Initiatives: Common Security in the Service of National Interest,’ *Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper* 401(December 2024), https://fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/BP401_Chinas-global-initiatives.pdf.

²² Frank Chen and Ji Siqi, ‘China Hits Back at Trump with Reciprocal Tariffs, Sanctions of US Firms,’ *South China Morning Post*, 4 March 2025, <https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3300948/china-hits-back-trump-reciprocal-tariffs-sanctions-us-firms>; Darren Major, ‘Conservative Leader Wants Canada to Match US Tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles,’ *CBC News*, 9 August 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poillievre-electric-vehicle-tariffs-1.7290108>.