POLICY PRIMER

NAADSN
North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network

naadsn.ca

November 3, 2025

Military Spending, NATO's Seven Baseline Requirements, and Infrastructure

Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Network Coordinator and Network Lead

During the last NATO Summit in The Hague, the Allies committed to raise their individual military spending to 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence by 2035. This more than doubles their 2014 commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2024.[1] Prime Minister Mark Carney explained that this would be the equivalent of Canada spending $150 billion per year in 2025 dollars to meet this new NATO target.[2]

Reaching this threshold is likely to prove particularly challenging for Canada given its long history of comparatively low defence spending. In April 2023, former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated to our Allies that Canada was unlikely and unable to meet an earlier 2% of GDP spending commitment,[3] despite increasing pressure on him to do so.[4] The tone has certainly changed under Prime Minister Carney, but Canada's track record on major capital procurement and its inability to actually spend its allocated defence budget, with many dollars earmarked for the military returned to the Treasury each year,[5] raises eyebrows. NATO tabulated Canada's 2024 defence spending at 1.37% of GDP, meaning the government will have to more than triple its military budget to achieve a 5% target.[6]

Economic wisdom suggests that the new Trump Administration's distributive bargaining approach to trade[7] threatens to lead to smaller, less efficient markets, rendering everyone – including Canadians – less well off. With the chance of dramatic economic growth unlikely to help offset more than tripling the defence budget over the coming decade, critics argue that Canada will be faced with some combination of cutting spending elsewhere, raising taxes, and borrowing.[8] Nevertheless, we contend that the Carney government's commitment to increasing Canadian spending on defence to 5% of GDP should not be seen as a burden but an opportunity for Canada to advance its national interests and heighten its preparedness for the more volatile world in which we now find ourselves.

It is in Canada's national interest to invest in strategic infrastructure. President Trump's threats to the sovereignty and economic security of Canada have brought this to the forefront over the past year, motivating the federal, provincial, and territorial governments to call for the dismantling of internal trade barriers and the building of new infrastructure to carry trade across one Canadian economy rather than thirteen.[9] Such efforts

can help to insulate Canada from future trade threats by bolstering its internal market as well as trade links with overseas partners – a "third option" to economic security that the country has long considered.[10]

Much attention currently focuses on developing energy corridors containing transmission lines, rail, and pipelines – what Prime Minister Carney refers to as "nation-building projects."[11] There are also persistent calls for closing long-standing infrastructure gaps within Canada. Most notable of these are gaps between Northern and Southern Canada[12] and between infrastructure available to many Indigenous communities and most other Canadians.[13] Can increased defence spending, using NATO criteria to satisfy the 5% commitment, help to close these overlapping infrastructure gaps?

Peace through Strength?

When we breakdown the 2025 commitment, the 5% figure is divided into two buckets of monies, with 3.5% of GDP allocated for "core defence requirements and to meet the NATO Capability Targets."[14] These core considerations are concerned with the readiness levels of the military's current force, and generating the future force that will slowly replace it through recruiting, training, and recapitalization.[15] They are about deterrence and defence: making Article 5, the collective defence pillar of the North Atlantic Treaty, credible.[16] This spending will produce a larger, more capable military, and has attracted most of the attention in government announcements[17] and in the news cycle.[18]

The promised boost in spending is not just limited to the military, however, and extends to other security and public safety services as well. For example, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is a civilian fleet with a mission to "support government priorities and economic prosperity and contribute to the safety, accessibility and security of Canadian waters."[19] By moving the CCG from under the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to the control of the Minister of National Defence, its $2.5 billion annual budget can be included in defence spending as per NATO criteria.[20]

Some commentators have noted additional flexibility in this spending. Under certain situations, such as building domain awareness, defence budgets can be used to fund dual-use infrastructure –used by both the military and civilians. Ongoing efforts to modernize NORAD offer some examples. Enhanced domain awareness requires new communication systems to move data from sensors to command and control and then on to defence forces. Various commentators note how civilian communication can "piggyback" on this military communication system to bolster connectivity of Arctic and Northern communities.[21] Furthermore, expanding or hardening runways near communities to enhance NORAD Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) and promised Northern Operational Support Hubs (NOSHs) will not only facilitate improved military operations but also commercial air traffic and community resupply. By contrast, purpose-built hangars to accommodate F-35s will not be available to civilian users.

The second bucket is 1.5% of GDP spending to protect defence infrastructure, strengthen the defence industrial base, and ensure civil preparedness and resilience.[22] This kind of spending allows Canada to generate, mobilize, and deploy the military, and to support security and public safety forces, both at home and abroad. It promotes

the development of strategic industries such as critical mineral mining and processing centres, as well as defence industries and their supporting infrastructure.[23] This spending is also for protecting critical infrastructure, from encircling it with a chain link fence to installing local air defence systems.[24] Given that Canada's GDP in 2024 was $2.27 trillion,[25] Canada has committed to spend approximately $34 billion per year on infrastructure under this commitment. (To put this into context, spending this amount annually over the ten-year period of Canada's commitment to NATO would close the First Nations' infrastructure gap calculated by the Assembly of First Nations.[26])

To shift this spending into the 1.5% envelope, NATO member governments must "show their work."[27] We suggest that the "ensuring civil preparedness and resilience part" of this spending can be rationalized and justified using NATO's seven baseline requirements (7BRs) for national resilience and civil preparedness.[28] These baseline requirements were designed by the Allies as a metric or methodology by which Canada can demonstrate how infrastructure spending bolsters preparedness and resilience, thus falling within the 1.5% envelope.

Building Article 3

The genesis of NATO's 7BLRs lay with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which encourages national resiliency by requiring Allies to not only maintain but enhance their ability to protect themselves from attack. It states that:

> In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties [Allies], separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.[29]

Although national defences are often equated to standing military forces, consideration should be given to the efforts that go into generating, maintaining, and deploying these forces to deter during crisis or fight in kinetic conflict. As NATO states, militaries "depend heavily on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications, energy and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfil their missions." Civilian sectors that enable military forces must be resilient: "sufficiently prepared and adaptable to deal with the entire spectrum of crises envisaged by the Alliance."[30] NATO's growing list of concerns range from undermining institutions through information warfare to preventing sabotage and resisting direct attack.[31] A "robust" civil preparedness is one that reduces these vulnerabilities across the various sectors so that they might "withstand attacks or disruptions" and "continue supporting NATO military forces at all times."[32] From this perspective, Allies should build and protect infrastructure that prevents a single point of failure from undermining their national efforts.

While Article 3 and its requirements have been in place since 1947 (when what was needed to win a total war was still fresh in Allied memory), only recently has NATO delineated what these entail. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many Allied governments divested themselves of their financial contributions to civilian infrastructure that had been built up to support their military forces to reduce defence spending and capture a

"peace dividend."[33] This was amplified by other developments like the "Revolution in Military Affairs" which suggested militaries could be serviced by commercial contractors rather than governments, further distancing governments from Article 3.[34]

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and the European Migrant Crisis of 2015 began to change this mindset,[35] putting significant pressure on NATO to both demonstrate credible deterrence along its Eastern Flank and respond to the humanitarian crisis occurring on its Southern Flank. While much of Canada's attention during this time was on becoming one of the Four Framework Nations that would eventually lead a multinational NATO battlegroup (now brigade) in Eastern Europe (in our case, Latvia),[36] the 2016 Warsaw Summit focused on enhancing Alliance resiliency to addressing both challenges. Noting the new hybrid threats facing NATO, as exemplified by the "Little Green Men" appearing in Ukraine,[37] the communique stated that resilience against emergent challenges "requires Allies to maintain and protect critical civilian capabilities, alongside and in support of military capabilities." This entailed a whole of government effort that also leveraged the private sector[38] – what Canadian policy documents now call a "whole of society" approach.

The 2016 Warsaw Summit communiqué explained that civil preparedness "is above all a national responsibility" and is a critical component of resiliency. Civil preparedness not only enables military capabilities but is strengthened by them in return, and protects "our populations and territory by strengthening continuity of government, continuity of essential services and security of critical civilian infrastructure." Allied national and foreign NATO military forces "can at all times be adequately supported with civilian resources," including in sectors such as energy, transportation, and communications.[39] Subsequently, NATO leadership set seven baseline requirements (which are updated to meet new threats as NATO encounters them) to both encourage and measure each Allies' preparedness.[40]

NATO's standup of the Resilience Committee (RC) in 2022, which subsumed and replaced the Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) created in the 1950s, was guided by 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, the NATO 2030 Agenda, and the 2022 Strategic Concept.[41] The RC:

> sets the priorities for resilience activities within the Alliance, translating NATO's level of ambition for national and collective resilience into concrete actions and guidance. It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal political decision-making body, and is responsible for maintaining a planning and review cycle for resilience at NATO, including the establishment, assessment, review and monitoring of resilience objectives to guide nationally-developed resilience goals and related implementation plans.[42]

In turn, six specialized planning groups comprised of subject-matter experts provide advice to the committee:

- the Civil Communications Planning Group (CCPG) provides advice on building resilience in the communications sector;
- the Civil Protection Group (CPG) addresses ways to ensure continuity of government as well as the ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movements of people; and

- the Energy Planning Group (EPG) is responsible for the oversight of resilient energy supplies;
- the Food and Agriculture Planning Group (FAPG) addresses resilience matters in the food and water sector;
- the Joint Health Group (JHG) covers Allies' ability to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises;
- the Transport Group (TG), subdivided across inland surface, maritime and aviation, supports resilient civil transport systems. [43]

The planning groups closely reflect the 7BRs, with the CPG essentially "double-hatted" to address continuity of government and critical government services as well as the ability to deal with uncontrolled movement of people.[44]

The Seven Baseline Requirements

Chapter seven of the *CIMIC Handbook* published by the NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE)[45] deals with the topic of layered resilience, resilience through civil preparedness, and the seven baseline requirements (BLR):

BLR 1 – Assured continuity of government and critical government services

This includes developing a formalized plan, crisis communications, trained personnel to operate and restore critical infrastructure, and establishing a crisis management centre to ensure a civilian command and control capability.

BLR 2 – Resilient energy supply

A resilient energy supply means that Canada has secure access to energy, with diverse routes and suppliers. Redundancy should be built into these supplies with crisis management plans, trained staff, and secured monitoring systems. Single points of failure should be eliminated, and attention given to critical points in energy supply chains and how they interact with other sectors of the economy. How emergent technologies could compromise or enhance resiliency of energy supplies should be identified.

BLR 3 – Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people

This is based around a national plan to move a mass of people exceeding 2% of the national population from inside or outside Canada which supports them with food, water, shelter, transportation, security, and medical support. This also includes civilian-military coordination and planning allowing the safe movement of refugees along transportation routes that will not impede military forces.

BLR 4 – Resilient food and water resources

This includes identifying and reporting contaminated food and water, a plan to ensure alternative sources are available, and a comprehensive contingency plan to account for a loss of labour enabling the production of both resources.

BLR 5 – Resilience to deal with mass casualties

This is built around Canada having robust national supply lines for medical supplies, a database to monitor civilian medical capabilities, and early warning and reporting system to alert the population of mass casualties and building resilience through civil preparedness to deal effectively with such an event. This includes having sufficient personnel, surgical capacity, transportation, and burial capabilities.

BLR 6 – Resilient civil communications systems

This calls for access to secure and reliable communications infrastructure even during conflict. This infrastructure is to be protected against intrusion and disruption, which means building in redundancies to respond quickly to failures. This also means assessing the threats and benefits of new technologies.

BLR 7 – Resilient civil transportation systems

This calls for national regulation of transport in the event of crisis or conflict, prioritizing NATO forces followed by other BLRs. This regulation needs legal enforcement. This also requires civil military coordination for military use of these systems.[46]

Concluding Thoughts

The list of NATO's seven baseline requirements and their various criteria offers a methodology by which Canada can rationalize its NATO spending commitments through dual-use and multi-use infrastructure, not only making "Canada Strong" [47] but advancing our Alliance spending commitments. This infrastructure can grow the economy and make Canada more resilient to future economic shocks, and spending dedicated to ensuring civil preparedness and resilience (pursuant to the 1.5% envelope) satisfies critical Alliance obligations.

The 7BLs also offer a mechanism through which Canada can reexamine NATO's concern that civil preparedness and resiliency enable military operations. We contend that this is a mutually-reenforcing relationship, wherein building infrastructure and mounting military operations also builds civilian preparedness and resiliency. The 7BLs frame a whole-of-society approach to infrastructure that benefits various sectors.

The vast and sparsely populated Canadian Arctic and North is marked by a lack of infrastructure. The 7BLs provide a window of opportunity to effectively override market forces with defence- and security-driven concerns. Infrastructure spending, articulated with reference to the 7BLs, will allow for better services, connectivity, and lower prices for civilian services, while also generating more and better options for the military when operating in or from the Canadian Arctic. This will build the resiliency, preparedness, and defence of the North – and, by extension, our country as a whole.

Notes

[1] NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration," *Press Release*, 5 September 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease.
[2] Christiane Amanpour, "Canadian PM Mark Carney on Iran, Ukraine, and being a 'Trump whisperer'," *CNN*, 28 June 2025, https://www.cnn.com/audio/podcasts/amanpour/episodes/84c4de84-2993-11ef-9655-f7b2cf27ff72.
[3] Steven Chase, "Trudeau privately told NATO Canada would never meet 2-per-cent defence spending target: report," *The Globe and Mail*, 19 April 2023, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-privately-told-nato-canada-would-never-meet-2-per-cent-defence/ and Alexander Panetta, "U.S. report claims Trudeau told NATO Canada will never meet its military spending target," *CBC News*, 19 April 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canadian-forces-nato-washington-post-1.6815616.
[4] See, for example, Aaron Wherry, "Everyone agrees Canada should spend more on defence. How do we pay for it?" *CBC News*, 30 November 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-defence-spending-nato-trump-1.7397141.
[5] See, for example, Murray Brewster, "DND unable to spend billions in equipment funds, pushing projects beyond next election," *CBC News*, 30 May 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sajjan-dnd-equipment-funds-1.4683606.
[6] NATO, "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024)," *Press Release*, June 2024, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf.
[7] See, for example, Alexander Panetta, "Top Trump White House pick has strong view on Canada's government. It's not flattering," *CBC News*, 11 November 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-security-adviser-canada-1.7380755; Mike Blanchfield, "Canada rethinks military spending as Trump turns up the pressure," *Politico*, 29 May 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/29/canada-finance-minister-francois-philippe-champagne-00373414; and Philippe Lagassé, "Canada's Military Has a Trump Problem," *The Atlantic*, 28 March 2025, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/03/canada-military-spending-trump/682224/.
[8] Jordan Gowling, "Expect higher deficits to meet Canada's 5% NATO defence spending target," *Financial Post*, 26 June 2025, https://financialpost.com/news/economy/higher-deficits-canada-nato-defence-spending-target; Cory Renner and Richard Forbes, "Re-building our Military Will be Expensive, but Create Opportunities," *Conference Board of Canada*, 23 June 2025, https://www.conferenceboard.ca/insights/rebuilding-our-military-will-be-expensive-but-create-opportunities/; and Todd Hirsch, "To up defence spending, Canada must cut deeper, tax harder and borrow more – all at once," *Globe and Mail*, 3 July 2025, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-to-up-defence-spending-canada-must-cut-deeper-tax-harder-and-borrow/.
[9] See Prime Minister of Canada, "Introducing legislation to build One Canadian Economy," 6 June 2025, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/videos/2025/06/06/introducing-legislation-build-one-canadian-economy.
[10] For more on this concept, see Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," *International Perspectives* (Autumn 1972): 1-24.
[11] See, for example, Meghan Potkins and Barbara Shecter, "Carney government's nation-building projects list expected to draw from these five areas, says source," *Financial Post*, 7 July 2025, https://financialpost.com/news/economy/carney-nation-building-projects-list-focus-5-areas.
[12] See, for example, Governments of NWT, Yukon, and Nunavut, "*Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustainable Development*," 2027, https://www.gov.nt.ca/sites/flagship/files/documents/pan-territorial_vision_for_sustainable_development_en.pdf and Government of NWT, Nunavut, and Yukon, "Partner Chapters" in *Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2019), https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1567801878530/1567801893671.
[13] Assembly of First Nations, "Closing the Infrastructure Gap," Economy and Infrastructure, https://afn.ca/economy-infrastructure/infrastructure/closing-the-infrastructure-gap/.
[14] NATO, "Defence expenditures and NATO's 5% commitment," *Topics*, 27 June 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm. NATO's Capability Targets are not publicly available but are defined as "the ability to create an effect through employment of an integrated set of aspects categorised as doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership development, personnel, facilities and interoperability." NATO point out that it "sets capability targets defining

what effect Allies should be able to provide, but it does not tell Allies *how* they should do it." NATO, "NATO's role in capability development," 26 June 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49137.htm.

[15] For more on this, see the writings of Douglas Bland, such as his (with Sean A. Maloney) *Campaigns for International Security* (Kingston: Queen's School of Policy Studies, 2004).

[16] See NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

[17] For recent announcements, see Steven Chase, "Carney commits Canada to biggest increase in military spending since Second World War, doubling budget by 2035," *Globe and Mail*, 25 June 2025, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-carney-commits-canada-to-major-increase-in-military-spending-in-new/; Prime Minister of Canada, "Canada's new government is rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces," *News Release*, 9 June 2025, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2025/06/09/canadas-new-government-rebuilding-rearming-and-reinvesting-canadian; and Prime Minister of Canada, "Reinforcing Canada's security and sovereignty in the Arctic," *Backgrounder*,18 March 2025, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2025/03/18/reinforcing-canadas-security-and-sovereignty-arctic.

[18] Ian Austen, "Canada Commits Billions in Military Spending to Meet NATO Target," *The New York Times*, 9 June 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/09/world/canada/carney-canada-nato-military-spending.html; David Pugliese, "Budget watchdog raises questions about Carney's defence spending promises," *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 June 2025, https://ottawacitizen.com/public-service/defence-watch/pbo-carney-defence-spending-nato; and Murray Brewster, "Is Canada beating ploughshares into swords with its NATO 5% pledge? Not likely," *CBC News*, 2 July 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-defence-rearmament-analysis-1.7574659.

[19] Government of Canada, "Our Mandate," *Canadian Coast Guard*, https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/corporation-information-organisation/mandate-mandat-eng.html.

[20] Steven Chase, "Carney to announce Canada's defence spending will hit NATO's target of 2% of GDP this fiscal year, sources say," *Globe and Mail*, 9 June 2025, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-carney-to-announce-canadas-defence-spending-will-hit-2-of-gdp-nato/; Murray Brewster, "Carney to announce Canada will meet 2% NATO spending target by March," *CBC News*, 9 June 2025, https://ici.radio-canada.ca/rci/en/news/2170636/carney-to-announce-canada-will-meet-2-nato-spending-target-by-march; Kyle Duggan, "Coast Guard union says crews in the dark about move to defence minister's control," *National Post*, 16 June 2025, https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/coast-guard-union-says-crews-in-the-dark-about-move-to-defence-ministers-control; and Stuart Benson, "Enlisting Coast Guard to buoy defence spending expected to hit choppy waters, say analysts," *The Hill Times*, 18 July 2025, https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2025/06/11/plan-to-enlist-coast-guard-to-buoy-canada-to-nato-defence-spending-target-expected-to-hit-choppy-waters-say-military-analysts/463441/.

[21] See, for example, Nancy Teeple and Ryan Dean (eds), *Shielding North America: Canada's Role in NORAD Modernization* (Peterborough: NAADSN, 2021).

[22] NATO, "Defence expenditures and NATO's 5% commitment," *Topics*, 27 June 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm

[23] Abbas Qaidari, "How Mark Carney is turning military spending into a force for economic renewal," *Policy Options*, 19 June 2025, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/june-2025/defence-spending-economy/; Chantal Lavallée, "Embracing Innovation to Strengthen Canada's Leadership in NATO," *CDA Institute Opinions*, 25 June 2025, https://cdainstitute.ca/embracing-innovation-to-strengthen-canadas-leadership-in-nato/; and Mehrdad Hariri, "Defence spending should be leveraged to boost Canada's R&D," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 July 2025, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-defence-budget-nato-research-development/.

[24] For more on defence of infrastructure, for example, see MGen (Ret) Scott Clancy "Defeat Mechanisms, Deterrence by Denial, and Continental Defence," *NAADSN Ideas Series*, 30 November 2022, https://www.naadsn.ca/events/defeat-mechanisms-deterrence-by-denial-and-continental-defence/.

[25] Statistics Canada, "Gross domestic product (GDP) at basic prices, by industry, annual average (x 1,000,000)," *Data*, 27 June 2025, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610043403.

[26] Assembly of First Nations, "Closing the Infrastructure Gap," Economy and Infrastructure, https://afn.ca/economy-infrastructure/infrastructure/closing-the-infrastructure-gap/.

[27] Sean Boynton, "What counts for NATO's defence infrastructure spending? Not just minerals," *Global News*, 27 June 2025, https://globalnews.ca/news/11261376/nato-defence-spending-infrastructure-canada-explained/.

[28] NATO, "Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3," 13 November 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.

[29] NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
[30] NATO, "Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3," 13 November 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.
[31] Going through the various NATO Centres of Excellence and the topics they are engaged with will give a great understanding of this growing spectrum of crises as currently envisioned by the Alliance. See NATO, "Centres of Excellence," 15 January 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm.
[32] NATO, "Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3," 13 November 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.
[33] NATO, "Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3," 13 November 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm. For more on this topic, see the President George Bush interview with *C-SPAN*. "U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Forces Reduction," *C-SPAN*, 27 September 1991. https://www.c-span.org/program/white-house-event/us-soviet-nuclear-forces-reduction/15727.
[34] For an early Western view of this topic, see Steven Metz and James Kievit, "Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy," 27 June 1995, https://web.archive.org/web/20040222232353/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/stratrma.pdf.
[35] By the end of 2016, over 5 million refugees and migrants reached Europe from predominately Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. UNHCR, "Refugee Crisis in Europe," *Emergencies*, https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/europe/.
[36] See Government of Canada, "Operation REASSURANCE," *National Defence*, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-reassurance.html and Prime Minister of Canada, "Prime Minister attends NATO Summit in Warsaw," *Press Release*, 9 July 2016, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2016/07/09/prime-minister-attends-nato-summit-warsaw.
[37] See, for example, *"Little Green Men": a primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-4* (Fort Bragg: The United States Army Special Operations Command, 2022), https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf.
[38] NATO, "Commitment to enhance resilience," *Press Release*, 8 July 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm. This is now referred to as a "Whole of Society" Approach.
[39] NATO, "Commitment to enhance resilience," *Press Release*, 8 July 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm.
[40] NATO, "Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3," 13 November 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm; Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers," *NATO*, 25 October 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169945.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[41] See "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept," NATO Summit in Madrid, 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.
[42] NATO, "Resilience Committee," 7 October 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50093.htm.
[43] NATO, "Resilience Committee," 7 October 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50093.htm.
[44] NATO, "Resilience Committee," 7 October 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50093.htm and CIMIC Centre of Excellence, *CIMIC Handbook* (The Hague: CCOE, 2025), https://www.cimic-coe.org/handbook-entries/welcome-to-the-cimic-handbook/vii-resilience/7-2-seven-baseline-requirements/.
[45] Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is defined by NATO as "A military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment, and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil- military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis and conflict." *CIMIC Handbook* (The Hague, CCOE, 2025), 5, https://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/cimic-handbook.pdf.
[46] *CIMIC Handbook* (The Hague, CCOE, 2025), 86-9.
[47] Government of Canada, "Building Canada Strong: A Bold, Ambitious Plan For Our future," *Speech from the Throne*, 45th Parliament of Canada, 27 May 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/campaigns/speech-throne/2025/building-canada-strong.html.